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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio consists of a selection of academic, therapeutic, and research work 
carried out as part of my doctoral training in psychotherapeutic and counselling 
psychology. The pieces included in this portfolio reflect areas of personal interest to 
me and represent my thinking at various stages in my personal and professional 
development as a counselling psychologist. Before introducing the three dossiers of 
work that follow, I would like to offer the reader some background to my decision to 
train as a counselling psychologist.
I grew up in California and completed my undergraduate degree in psychology there 
in 1972. Having come of age in the ‘sixties,’ I was heavily influenced by the 
American peace and civil rights movements of that era. Growing out of my 
encounters with the peace movement, women’s movement, and Black Power 
movement while at university, I developed a keen personal and professional interest 
in the negotiation of conflicts and power in relationships (interpersonal and 
intergroup) and was fascinated by the interplay of underlying intrapsychic, 
interpersonal, and systemic dynamics. This led to a first career as a peace and social 
justice educator/activist employed on the national staff of a liberal mainline religious 
denomination in the USA.
As part of a California subculture in which psychotherapy was considered a valuable 
and accepted means of facilitating personal development and growth as well as 
addressing psychological distress, I (like most of my peers) undertook several years of 
personal therapy as a thirty-something, by this time also married and a mother of two 
young children. In therapy I had an opportunity to explore and reflect upon the 
internal and external psychological dynamics of my own life. I believe this process 
made an invaluable contribution to my personal development and parenting, and also 
to my professional efforts at understanding the wider social conflicts and power 
struggles that were at the time the focus of my work life.
Following a move to the United Kingdom in 1995,1 began to consider the possibility 
of shifting from the role of peace educator and advocate to that of therapeutic 
practitioner—which I conceptualised at the time as supporting and assisting clients in 
the process of working through their internal and external struggles. I subsequently 
undertook the ‘Intensive Foundation’ course in psychotherapy and counselling at 
Regent’s College to ‘test the waters’ of my interest and aptitude. This gave me an 
introduction to theories underlying the major psychotherapeutic models alongside the 
opportunity to ‘practice’ basic counselling skills in triads and participate in a self­
development group with my student colleagues. On the basis of this very positive 
introduction, I decided to pursue a career in counselling psychology. I used a 
sabbatical from my job to update my psychology degree by way of a ‘conversion’ 
course at the University of East London and was subsequently accepted to the 
practitioner doctorate course in psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology at the 
University of Surrey where I began what for me was a four year training process.
Initially I was attracted to the discipline of counselling psychology because of its solid 
grounding in the field of psychology and the opportunity to train in multiple 
theoretical models. As I learned more about its philosophical underpinnings (Woolfe, 
1996) I felt very drawn to the profession’s emphasis on the therapeutic relationship, 
its respect for the validity of individual phenomenological accounts (British 
Psychological Society, Division of Counselling Psychology, 2001), its emphasis on 
facilitation of psychological development and well-being, and its requirement for 
personal therapy as part of the training process.
Throughout training the focus of my interest has been the therapeutic relationship, and 
I have sought to immerse myself in this relationship from the perspective of therapist, 
client, supervisee, and researcher. As I have been introduced in turn to each of the 
core models taught on this course—humanistic, psychodynamic, and cognitive 
behavioural—my understanding of the therapeutic relationship and my role as a 
practitioner within it has developed and evolved. I believe this developmental process 
and my current conceptualisation of this relationship are reflected in the dossiers 
comprising the three sections of this portfolio.
Academic Dossier
This dossier contains three essays. The first explores the therapist’s ‘use of self 
within the psychodynamic model. Completed in my second year, this essay 
represented an effort on my part to try and locate my nascent understanding of ‘use of 
self within psychodynamic theory as it has evolved from classical Freudian to early 
object relations and self psychology models, and on into contemporary 
relational/intersubjective conceptualisations of the therapeutic relationship. In writing 
this essay I discovered within relational/intersubjective theory, a set of concepts and 
vocabulary that seemed to fit well with my ovm experiences and understanding of the 
therapeutic relationship both as a client and a practitioner.
The second essay explores shame dynamics in the therapeutic relationship focusing 
on the therapist’s experiences of shame in the countertransference. A primary 
motivation for selecting this topic was an awareness of the potential for shame 
dynamics to arise in therapeutic relationships based on my ovm experiences both as a 
client and a trainee therapist. Also I had in my previous career observed the powerful 
role of shame in the dynamics of internalised and externalised oppression and 
violence underpinning systems such as racism, sexism, and classism, and had also 
become aware of the shame vulnerability of the less powerful partner in power- 
imbalanced relationships. In this essay I critically discussed Hahn’s (2000) 
application of object relations theory to conceptualise the therapist’s 
countertransference experience of shame and to consider the potential therapeutic 
usefulness as well as risk of such experiences. I found Hahn’s model very helpful in 
making sense of these complex and difficult feelings and considering how I might 
make therapeutic use of them when they arose in my own clinical experience as a 
trainee therapist.
The third essay discusses the process of working through difficulties in the therapeutic 
relationship within a cognitive behavioural theoretical framework drawing upon 
examples from my clinical experience. This essay was written during my final year 
as part of my own process of integrating the cognitive behavioural model into my 
overarching relational/intersubjective conceptualisation of the therapeutic 
relationship.
Therapeutic Practice Dossier
This dossier offers an overview of the development of my therapeutic practice during 
training. Included are descriptions of each of my four training placements and the 
client groups I have worked with. It also includes my Final Clinical Paper in which I 
reflect on my approach to the practice of counselling psychology as it has developed 
over the four years of training through clinical practice and exposure to multiple 
theoretical perspectives.
Research Dossier
The research dossier includes my literature review and two empirical projects— 
qualitative and quantitative. Together, they comprise my exploration of the practice 
implications of therapists’ experiences of self-conscious affect in the therapeutic 
relationship and reflect the progression of my thinking about that subject.
In reviewing the relevant literature, I discovered that, as more bi-directional 
conceptualisations of affective engagement between therapist and client have been 
emerging (e.g., Bacal, 1985; Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; Jordan, 2001; Stolorow & 
Atwood, 1992), therapists have also begun to write about significant practice 
implications of their own experiences of shame and guilt in the therapeutic 
relationship (e.g., Hahn, 2000; Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Jacobs, 1996; Jordan, 1997; 
Kaufinan, 1992; Livingston & Farber, 1996; Retzinger, 1998; Scheff, 1987, 1998; 
Stein, 1997). In the literature I found repeated allusions to therapists’ ‘shame about 
shame’ (e.g., Jacobs, 1996; Nathanson, 1992; Morrision, 1994) as well as a curious 
lack of systematic empirical investigation of therapists’ shame experiences in the 
therapeutic relationship. This led me to entitle my review: “Elephant in the
Consulting Room: Therapists’ Experiences of Shame and the Therapeutic Process—A 
Review of the Literature.”
In the fblloAving year I sought to learn more about the ‘elephant’ from therapists’ first­
hand accounts of such experiences in clinical practice. In order to build up a fine­
grained picture, I chose to interview a small sample of therapists in depth who were 
willing to talk in detail about their own experiences and systematically. I then
analysed their accounts using a qualitative method knovm as Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, 1995; Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999). The 
results of this analysis triangulated vdth much that had previously been written while 
offering a more intimate glimpse into therapists’ experiences recognising and 
processing their own feelings of shame aroused in therapeutic work. The analysis 
highlighted the importance of therapist self-awareness and an ability to recognise and 
tolerate one’s own shame as well the therapeutic potential in such experiences. This 
research was awarded joint first prize in the annual British Psychological Society 
Division of Counselling Psychology Trainee Prize for 2005, and a summary was 
published in the August 2005 issue of Counselling Psychology Review.
In my final year, I sought to quantitatively explore the relationship between therapist 
‘affective style’ in the clinical setting (defined as proneness to shame, guilt, 
externalisation, detachment responses) and factors such as individual disposition, 
trainee status, making a therapeutic ‘mistake,’ being criticised by a client, and an 
ethnicity difference between therapist and client. I drew upon the theoretical 
framework and principles underpinning Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow’s 
(2000) Test of Self-Conscious Affect -  3 (TOSCA-3) in the design of my own 
research instrument. The TOSCA is an empirically validated and reliable measure of 
affective style in everyday life on which I have modelled an analogous test to measure 
therapist affective style in the therapeutic relationship—the Measure of Therapists’ 
Self-Conscious Affect (MOTSCA: Miller, 2005). Both measures assess the tendency 
to experience shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment in response to scenarios 
depicting ‘mistakes’ or ‘failures’. With a sample of 136 therapists, I explored the 
frequency and implications of shame and guilt affect associated Avith therapists’ 
responses to ‘mistakes’ and client criticisms in the therapeutic relationship. The 
results are reported in a paper entitled: “Elephant in the consulting room:
Implications of therapist affective style in responding to ‘mistakes’ and client 
criticisms.”
Conclusion
In reflecting on the four years of training and development documented in this 
portfolio, I believe they have given me a solid foundation from which to practice and
continue my development as a psychotherapeutic and counselling psychologist. From 
here, I look forward to participating in an ongoing developmental process through 
which there will always be more to experience, to learn, and hopefully to offer in my 
work’with clients.
Statement Regarding Anonymity and Confidentiality
Potentially identifying details pertaining to individual clients, research participants, or 
locations of placements have been omitted or changed in order to protect their 
confidentiality and anonymity.
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Introduction to the Academic Dossier
The academic dossier contains three essays that were submitted during my training. 
The first traces the evolution of psychodynamic ideas about ‘use of self in the 
therapeutic relationship. The second critically evaluates Hahn’s (2000) object 
relations model for conceptualising therapists’ experiences of shame as 
countertransference identifications with clients’ shame that can be used 
therapeutically. The third essay considers how to work with problems arising in the 
therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy.
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‘Use of Self within the Psychodynamic^ Model
Introduction
It is often assumed that humanistic therapists espouse a transparent and disclosing 
‘use of self, whereas psychodynamic therapists adopt an overt stance of strict 
neutrality, anonymity and abstinence—ftmctioning as a ‘blank screen’ or ‘empty 
container’ whilst retaining ‘self in the background—at most, to be used covertly in 
‘containing’ and ‘metabolising’ the patient’s unconscious projections. In The 
Therapist’s Use o f  Rowan and Jacobs (2002) assert that such dichotomous 
characterisations are more caricature than reality. Citing numerous historical and 
contemporary examples, they show that there exists within the psychodynamic 
orientation (and other models) a diverse continuum of theory and practice regarding 
the therapist’s use of self.
Working Definition of ‘Self
While a full discussion of the term ‘self is well beyond the scope of this essay, it 
seems important to establish a working definition of ‘self for purposes of this 
discussion. What exactly is it that therapists are said to be using, withholding, and 
disclosing? It is proposed that ‘self in this context should include the entire 
inventory of values and intentions, beliefs and theories, emotional valences, character 
and personality arising fi*om the unique constitution and reservoir of unconscious and 
conscious experience of each therapist—in other words, the “overall structure of a 
subjective universe” (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 34). This then, is the ‘self that 
every therapist brings to a therapeutic relationship and uses in some way.
The remainder of this essay will discuss three stances regarding the therapist’s ‘use of 
self within psychodynamic theory and practice. The first, articulated by Freud and his 
early followers, will be contrasted vrith two subsequent theoretical perspectives, one 
that is most closely associated with object relations theory, the other with a 
relational/intersubjective perspective. These three viewpoints will be presented from 
earliest to most recent. In this way, it becomes possible to trace an evolution in
 ^Because the theoretical base of the psychodynamic orientation is found in psychoanalytic literature, 
for the purpose of this essay, the terms psychoanalytic and psychodynamic are used interchangeably.
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psychodynamic theory regarding the therapist’s use of self from the very narrowly 
circumscribed role set forth by Freud toward an enlarged and ultimately, overt use of 
self in the therapeutic process. Each perspective represents a way of conceptualising 
the location and function of a therapist’s subjectivity within the therapeutic 
relationship—a particular capacity for ‘use of self.’
Historic Freudian Perspective: Abstinence, Anonymity, and Neutrality
Analyst as ‘Blank Screen, ’ ‘Objective Observer, ’ ‘Authoritative Interpreter. ’ This is 
the stance most associated with psychodynamic theory and practice historically. 
Even though, as noted earlier, there is a diversity of theory and practice among 
psychodynamic clinicians regarding ‘use of self,’ the metaphor of the ‘blank screen’ 
and Freudian guidelines of abstinence, anonymity, and neutrality for clinical 
technique will be familiar to every psychodynamic therapist (and much of the public). 
In some ways, this early stance may have less to do vrith ‘use of self than with 
preventing ‘misuse of self on the part of therapists. Whatever other motives were 
involved, Ricci and Broucek (1998) have asserted that one of Freud’s intentions was 
to provide a therapeutic frame, which could both facilitate and contain patients’ 
powerful transference experiences and regression, and prevent therapists from acting 
out their own countertransference in ways that might be damaging to patients or 
themselves.
From Freud’s initial perspective, the ‘self of the analyst—that is, the analyst’s 
‘subjective universe’—simply did not belong in the therapeutic relationship. The 
notion that a therapist’s subjectivity could be used therapeutically was completely 
inconsistent vrith Freud’s training as a physician and eagerness to establish 
psychoanalysis as a credible science vrithin the intellectual climate of nineteenth 
century Europe (Ricci & Broucek, 1998). A therapist, having undergone personal 
analysis was supposed to be capable of assuming the stance of an emotionally 
detached, ‘objective’ observer and thus, authoritative interpreter. Freud’s (1912) 
advice to early psychoanalytic practitioners speaks to a clinical necessity for 
psychoanalysts to remain emotionally detached—even “cold” in relation to patients, 
scrupulously ‘abstinent’ and ‘neutral’ in the expression of feelings, refraining from 
warmth and affirmation as well as judgement and disapproval.
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I cannot advise my colleagues too urgently to model themselves during 
psychoanalytic treatment on the surgeon who puts aside all his feelings, even 
his human sympathy. . . The justification for requiring this emotional 
coldness in the analyst is that it creates the most advantageous conditions for 
both parties: for the doctor a desirable protection for his own emotional life 
and for the patient the largest amount of help that we can give him today 
(Freud, 1912, p. 115).
This so-called blank screen approach, Freud believed, would result in an optimal level 
of frustration to spur thé patient toward psychological growth and facilitate 
transference of the patient’s unconscious feelings and internal conflicts onto the 
analyst who could then objectively interpret and bring them into the patient’s 
conscious awareness. Apparently on occasion, Freud himself took exception to 
abstinence, neutrality and anonymity, for example, socialising with clients and 
lending them money (Rowan & Jacobs, 2002).
So where do these early guidelines regarding ‘use of self fit in terms of contemporary 
practice? Freud’s concept of psychoanalyst as ‘objective observer’ and ‘authoritative 
interpreter’ pre-dates later epistemological perspectives which hold that an ‘observer’ 
is inevitably also a participant with an impact on the observed. Likewise, this stance 
pre-dates empirical research on attachment and the critical role of empathy in healthy 
psychological development, and seems naively unaware of its own potential for re- 
traumatising patients in the replication of early experiences with emotionally cold and 
detached caregivers. Today virtually all psychodynamic therapists would consider the 
therapist’s empathy indispensable to the therapeutic process, even though they might 
differ Over how it should be communicated—whether indirectly through 
‘empathically attuned’ interpretations, or more directly, in a warm and responsive 
manner and the occasional judicious sharing of personal experience (Rowan & 
Jacobs, 2002).
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Object Relations Perspective: Therapist as ‘Empty Container’
‘Use o f se lf to ‘contain, ’ ‘metabolize, ’ and ‘return ’ split-offparts o f the patient’s self 
Whereas Freud initially viewed countertransference as a problem, many contemporary 
practitioners consider countertransference to be a valuable therapeutic resource 
(Bateman & Holmes, 1995). The idea that therapists might be able to therapeutically 
make use of their own affective experiences (‘countertransference’) in relationships 
with patients was significantly advanced with the theoretical formulation of 
unconscious processes such as projective and introjectiye identification—ideas 
introduced by Melanie Klein (1946; 1952/1975) and extensively reworked by 
subsequent theorists. Freud’s (1912) ‘blank screen’ gave way to Bion’s (1962) 
metaphor of the ‘empty container.’ The overt stance of the therapist was likened to 
that of an ‘empty container’ into which the patient could unconsciously project 
unwanted feelings or disowned parts of the patient’s ‘seff (‘objects’ and ‘part 
objects’), emotionally reconnecting with those parts in interactions with the therapist, 
who would feel pressured to experience the projected role (Scharff, 1992). The 
therapist would use his/her ‘self to ‘contain’ and make sense of the projections, 
‘returning’ them to the patient in the form of an interpretation. Bion (1962) compared 
the therapist-patient relationship to that of mother and infant, wherein it was theorized 
that the infant would project unbearable parts of its self-experience into the more 
mature psychological self of its mother, who would ‘contain’ and ‘detoxify’ them, 
returning them to the infant to be re-introjected and ultimately integrated into the 
infant’s internal object world in less threatening and overwhelming forms.
In the following passages Scharff (1992) describes her ‘use of self in these processes:
My self is what I have to offer. I am both myself and the person the patients 
need me to be. In interaction with me, patients re-create the early experience 
that has shaped their psychic structures. Metabolizing my own experience of 
the expression of their internal structures, I arrive at understanding, which I 
communicate in the form of interpretations that ultimately have the 
explanatory power to modify intrapsychic and interpersonal dynamics (p.
12).
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Compared to the stance of Freud and his early followers, this represents a vastly 
expanded, albeit, covert ‘use of self on the part of the therapist. In contrast to the 
earlier view, the therapist’s countertransference experience is valued as a rich source 
of data about the patient’s inner world as the landscape of the patient’s internalised 
‘object relations’ is externalised in projections that reverberate in the ‘self of the 
therapist.
A principal criticism of this perspective is that it underplays the therapist’s potential 
for countertransference originating in his/her own life history and experience, and 
seems to assume that every countertransference feeling can be traced back to 
something the patient has ‘put into’ or ‘induced’ in the therapist, while ignoring the 
therapist’s contribution to the relational process (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Scharff 
(1992), in her extensive review of the literature, observes that the patient’s role of 
projection is emphasised, whereas the therapist’s inteijecting role has received little 
attention. There has been a tendency to characterise the patient’s unconscious 
projective role in words that make it sound intentional and ‘active’—using language 
like ‘putting into’, ‘pressuring’, even ‘attacking’, whereas the therapist’s role is 
portrayed as passive—being ‘induced to feel’, ‘controlled’ or ‘possessed by’. The 
projections seem only to move in one direction—from patient to therapist. The 
possibility that the dynamics of projective identification might sometimes work in 
reverse or even both directions simultaneously in the therapist-patient relationship 
would appear to be largely ignored.
This way of conceptualising the therapist’s, ‘use of self seems to be based on a 
‘separate self or ‘one-person’ psychology, which assumes that a discrete self consists 
of objects and part-objects to which affective. experience is attached. Therefore, 
feelings can be ‘put into’ or ‘gotten back’ in discrete units that are moved about 
between atomistic minds. The therapist becomes the sorter and final arbiter of what 
belongs to whom. Little consideration is given to the ‘space’ between the minds—to 
bi-directional dynamics or co-created fields between therapist and patient. This 
perspective presumes that the therapist is more psychologically mature than the 
patient (like mother to child), and the therapist’s view of ‘reality’ is privileged. In this
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respect it is not unlike the early Freudian perspective. It is perhaps this aspect that has 
generated the most criticism by those who espouse the relational/intersubjective 
perspective.
Relational/intersubjective Perspective: Subject-to-Subject Dialogue
Therapist as ‘selfobject’ and self-reflexive participant. This stance represents yet à 
further expansion and evolution in the use of the therapist’s self in the therapeutic 
relationship. ‘Use of self moves from covert to overt—the self of the therapist 
emerging from the so-called ‘empty container’ to participate both as ‘subject’ and 
‘selfobjecf in the therapeutic relationship.
As ‘subject’ the therapist becomes a self-reflexive and empathie participant in a 
mutual, bi-directional subject-subject dialogue committed to introspective exploration 
of the organization of the patient’s subjectivity (Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 
1995). Clinicians adopting this perspective cringe at phrases like ‘put into’ and 
‘induced to feel,’ preferring to speak of ‘empathie resonance’ and ‘role 
responsiveness.’
Empathie relatedness is central to the relational/intersubjective stance, and it has been 
heavily influenced by the ideas of Heinz Kohut (1959; 1984) and his concept of the 
‘selfobject.’ As ‘selfobject,’ the self of a therapist—by way of the therapist’s 
empathie responsiveness and attunement—is subjectively experienced by the patient 
as a ‘functional component’ of the patient’s self-organisation: “ Once an analyst has 
grasped the idea that his responsiveness can be experienced subjectively as a vital, 
functional component of a patient’s self organisation, he will never listen to analytic 
material in quite the same way” (Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1995, p. 17). 
Much of the therapeutic work consists of working through and seeking to understand 
the patient’s experiences of ruptures in the sense of empathie relatedness (‘selfobject 
failures’).
Psychodynamic practitioners readily identified vrith the relational/intersubjective 
perspective (Mitchell & Aron, 1999) cite the influence of self psychology, field theory, 
systems theory, phenomenology and intersubjectivity, and feminist and social
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constructivist critiques of the ‘separate self in their thinking. Their stance is also 
informed by empirical studies (e.g.. Stem, 1985; Schore, 1994; Beebe & Lachmann, 
2002) of moment-to-moment sequences of affective micro-interactions between 
infants and mothers, which vividly demonstrate that, from birth onward, human 
beings are capable of participating in mutually coordinated relational processes 
mediated by affectivity, and that it is 'within these relational contexts of shared 
affective experience that the psychological ‘stmctures’ organising self experience 
develop.
The relational/intersubjective perspective departs from earlier psychodynamic 
perspectives regarding the therapist’s use of self in three important ways: (1) It is 
rooted in a subjectivist and perspectivalist epistemology (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992), 
and thus, does not privilege the therapist’s version of ‘reality’; (2) The model of an 
internal drive-motivated, atomistic ‘self is replaced by the model of an emergent 
‘selfin-relation’ (Surrey, 1991/1983); (3) The focus of analysis shifts from the 
patient’s presumed ‘transference distortions’ to a collaborative exploration of the 
intersubjective field that is “constituted by the intersection of two subjectivities-that 
of the patient and that of the analyst” (Stolorow, Brandchaft and Atwood 1995, p. 1). 
Each therapist-patient dyad is viewed as an intersubjective system in which a unique 
transference-countertransference relationship will be articulated:
This [the patient’s] unconscious organizing activity is lifted into awareness 
through an intersubjective dialogue to which the analyst contributes his 
empathie understanding. . . .We agree with Schwaber (1983) that what the 
analyst ‘knows’ in the psychoanalytic situation is no more ‘real’ than what 
the patient ‘knows’. All that can be known psychoanalytically is subjective 
reality—the patient’s, the analyst’s, and the evolving ever-shifting 
intersubjective field created by the interplay between them” (Stolorow, 
Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1995, p. 7-8).
Critics of this stance might balk at discarding the concept of ‘objectivity’, 
persuasively arguing that there is a need for therapists to be able to ‘step back from 
the process and view it from a more ‘objective’ or ‘distant’ position as well as from
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within. Could it be that, like Newtonian physics, ‘objectivity’ remains a useful 
construct providing it is always understood to be ‘qualified’? The question could also 
be raised as to whether the relational/intersubjective stance departs so far from earlier 
perspectives that it is no longer ‘psychodynamic.’ This is an argument its proponents 
would vigorously dispute on the grounds that its focus remains ‘lifting into 
awareness’ the unconscious meanings and organizing principles (‘psychodynamics’) 
that pattern the patient’s subjective life and are illuminated in the interplay of the 
patient’s and therapist’s subjectivity (transference-countertransference relationship).
Summary and Conclusions
This essay has examined and compared three stances articulated in psychodynamic 
theory regarding the therapist’s ‘use of self: (1) Freudian; (2) Object Relations; (3) 
Relational/intersubjective. Both the Freudian and Object Relations perspectives 
remain firmly planted in an epistemology that privileges the therapist’s version of 
‘reality’ as ‘objective,’ and their focus of analysis remains the presumed discrepancy 
or distortion between the therapist’s ‘real’ self, and the patient’s ‘fantasy’ of the 
therapist expressed in the transference. Both ‘trust’ the therapist to be able to 
‘objectively’ observe and thus, ‘authoritatively’ interpret the patient’s reality, ignoring 
the impact of observer on the observed. The principal difference between the Freudian 
and Object Relations stances is the use made of the therapist’s countertransference.
The relational/intersubjective perspective, on the other hand, represents a radical 
departure from both earlier perspectives in three important ways: epistemology, 
model o f ‘self,’ and focus of analysis—which shifts from transference ‘distortions’ as 
perceived by the therapist, to collaborative exploration of the intersubjective field 
created by the interplay of the patient’s and therapist’s subjectivities.
How do the differences among these perspectives translate into clinical practice? It is 
generally recognized that theoretical perspectives tend to be more ‘pure’ in theory 
than in practice. Most clinicians will have been exposed and influenced to some 
extent by all three perspectives and many probably incorporate aspects of more than
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one point of view into their way of working. They may, for example, retain the 
‘spirit’ of abstinence, anonymity, and neutrality to the extent they believe these 
guidelines are serving to protect their patients (and themselves), but are likely to have 
adapted them in light of subsequent revelations about the importance of empathy— 
opting for ‘optimal responsiveness’ (Bacal, 1985) over ‘optimal frustration.’ 
Likewise, contemporary clinicians working with the theoretical constructs of 
projection and projective identification may reflect more critically on their own 
contribution to the transference-countertransference dynamic and sit more lightly to 
their interpretations of the patient’s inner world than their earlier counterparts. This is 
not to suggest that real differences do not exist. The relational/intersubj ective 
perspective is still regarded by many as radical and controversial. Even so, chances 
are that many contemporary psychodynamic practitioners will recognise in this 
statement by a relational psychoanalyst, some aspects of the relational/intersubj ective 
perspective that have seeped into their own thinking and practice:
I focus on clinical writers who describe the analytic experience as a cognitive 
and affective interchange between two people, who argue that analytic 
change takes place in and through interaction with the analyst, who question 
rigid analytic employment of conceptions of objectivity and anonymity, who 
see countertransference experience and understandings as resources rather 
than impediments, and who advocate continuous attention to the analyst’s 
subjectivity and participation. And in the current period, it seems to me, 
almost everyone has become some version of a relational psychoanalyst 
(Chodorow, 1999, p. 128).
In conclusion, with respect to the therapist’s use of self, the psychodynamic model 
has demonstrated generative energy and the capacity to integrate new insights, as well 
as to hold tensions between different perspectives. No doubt psychodynamic thinking 
about‘use of self will continue to evolve.
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Dynamics of Shame in the Therapeutic Relationship: The Therapist’s 
Experience of Shame in the Countertransference
Introduction
Shame is reputed to be one of the most painful and complex of human emotional 
experiences, consisting of affective, cognitive, and vivid imagery components 
(Gilbert, 1998, pp. 3-38). Shame has been characterised as a subjective self-reflexive 
experience of a rupture in empathie connectedness between ‘self and ‘other’ (Lewis, 
1971; Jordan, 1997; Schore, 1994) -  a painful disjunction in which the ‘self is 
experienced as devalued in the eyes of a devaluing or contemptuous other causing a 
break in the interpersonal bridge (Kaufinan, 1996). This devaluing ‘other’ can be real 
or imagined (e.g., a hostile audience actually booing one off the stage vs. imagining a 
condemning audience). Gilbert (1998) has argued that the source of shame can be 
external or internal as, for example, shame aroused by the anticipated or actual 
contempt of one’s peers versus shame arising out of internalised self-contenipt.
It has been observed in systematic analysis of social discourse that far from being a 
rare experience, the capacity to experience shame is umversal and the dynamics of 
shame are present in all human relationships, often ftmctioning outside conscious 
awareness (Retzinger, 1995). It has also been demonstrated empirically (Lewis, 
1971) that the dynamics of shame are pervasive in the therapeutic relationship, and 
that ‘unacknowledged’ or ‘bypassed’ shame in therapeutic relationships is implicated 
in therapeutic impasses (Lewis, 1971; Scheff & Retzinger, 1997). The experience of 
shame has been shown to ‘short-circuit’ and interfere with empathy in empirical 
studies of shame affect (Tangney & Bearing, 2002). Whether conscious or ‘hidden’ 
behind other affect such as anger or anxiety, shame is believed to typically elicit 
defensive interpersonal behaviours such as emotional withdrawal and hiding, 
avoidance and distraction, attacks on others in the form of externalisation of cause or 
blame, and attacks on self in the form of self-abnegating behaviours (Nathanson, 
1992, pp. 303-377).
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Very early in the history of psychoanalysis, it was recognized that the experience of 
shame in patients was so acutely painful that it could become a motivation for defence 
(Lansky & Morrison, 1997). Only recently have psychodynamic clinicians (e.g., 
Hahn, 2000; Lansky, 1995; Morrison, 1994) begun asking how they can recognize 
and therapeutically use their own experiences of shame arising in the 
countertransference.
“Countertransference shame is one of the more difficult experiences with 
which we must deal in our clinical work, for we face those very feelings of 
inferiority, ineptitude, and deficit that so much of our professional training 
has been aimed at eliminating. We are confronted with silences that beg for 
response and accusations that we are useless and incompetent in meeting 
their needs by people we are trying to understand and help, and we are 
overtaken by boredom, fatigue, or sexual excitement when we are supposed 
to be energized or containing. We may run from the shame experience by 
blaming the patient for being defensive or for ‘inducing’ feelings in us; by 
tuning out and missing our own distress or that of our patient; or by tacitly 
colluding in agreeing to ‘bypass’ our mutual shame feelings (Lewis, 1971) 
and to focus on something else, like anger or conflict. Alternatively, we can 
attempt to stay with our own shame and leam from it (both about ourselves 
and about our patients’ particular experiences” (Morrison, 1994, p.31).
While much has been written about the psychoanalytic concept of countertransference 
in general, the study of therapist experiences of shame in the countertransference and 
how these experiences might be understood and used therapeutically appears to be at 
an early stage.
“The topic of the therapist’s or analyst’s shame and his or her understanding 
of that shame and reactions to the patient that arise from it are crucial 
dimensions of countertransference that should be understood and studied. 
Studies of countertransference focusing on the therapist’s or analyst’s shame 
are virtually nonexistent (T. Scheff, personal communication, February 16, 
1995)” (Lansky, 1995, p. 1083).
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The remainder of this essay will be a discussion of therapist experiences of shame in 
the countertransference, beginning with ideas put forth in a paper by William Hahn 
(2000). One of few authors to write about countertransference experiences of shame, 
Hahn has proposed a model for recognizing, understanding, and using therapists’ 
experiences of shame that are evoked in reaction to patients’ feelings of shame. In 
critiquing Hahn’s model, it will be argued that, while being very helpful in 
identifying, predicting and therapeutically using countertransferential experiences of 
shame that arise in reaction to clients’ experiences of shame, it falls short of 
considering other perhaps more ‘proactive’ ways in which therapist experiences of 
shame may be manifested in countertransference thoughts and feelings.
Overview of Hahn’s (2000) Model
In Hahn’s (2000) paper on therapists’ experiences of shame, the adult experience of 
shame is conceptualised as a type of identificatory object relations process: “When 
shame is experienced, internal representations become polarized into devalued and 
devaluing introjects, reflecting the rigid and immutable quality of shame where vivid 
images predominate, and words are used obsessively to condemn and humilitate” 
(Hahn, 2000, p .ll). According to Hahn, the affect and vivid imagery associated with 
the activation of these representations of shaming experiences are believed to be so 
intense that individuals typically use the processes of projection or projective 
identification to externalise either the devalued or the devaluing introj ect. If the 
devaluing (shaming) introject is externalised, the individual’s experience will be that 
of exposure to a condemning, devaluing audience, justifying withdrawal and 
avoidance. But, if the devalued introject is externalised, the individual’s experience 
will be one of haughtiness and contempt in relation to an envious other, justifying the 
release of aggression in the form of contempt or rage. Hahn uses this model of the 
phenomenology of shame experiences to conceptualise the dynamics of shame in the 
transference-countertransference relationship.
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Although the implication is that the above process could be activated by the 
experience of shame in either patient or therapist, Hahn (2000) applies the model to 
the patient’s experiences of shame that are seen to give rise to ‘reactive’ shame 
experiences in the therapist as a result of countertransference identifications with one 
or the other of the patient’s polarized introjects. Hahn has described specific patterns 
of ‘concordant’ and ‘complementary’ countertransference identifications with the 
patient’s experience of shame that can be predicted by this model, depending on 
whether the therapist identifies with the part of the patient’s shame experience that is 
internalised and consciously experienced by the patient (concordant identification), or 
with the part of the patient’s experience that is disavowed and externalised through 
the process of projection. These countertransference identifications can be 
experienced as a ‘projective identification’ in which the therapist is seen to be 
unconsciously ‘induced’ to enact the role of the patient’s externalised shame 
experience. For example, if the patient cannot bear to experience shameful feelings of 
inadequacy and incompetence associated with the devalued introject, then through the 
process of projective identification, the devalued introject is unconsciously projected 
onto the therapist who in turn unconsciously introjects it, and is thus, ‘induced’ into 
behaving incompetently, giving rise to feelings of incompetence and shame in the 
therapist. In Figure 1, I have sought to depict schematically some examples of the 
dynamics of transference-countertransference shame that Hahn’s model predicts.
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Figure 1: Examples of some predicted patterns of ‘concordant’ transference-countertransference 
dynamics based on Hahn’s (2000) model of shame dynamics in the therapeutic relationship
PATIENT:
Devalued introject internalised 
(‘owned’)
Devaluing introject externalised 
(‘disowned’)
PATIENT:
Devalued introject externalised 
(‘disowned’)
Devaluing introject internalised 
(‘owned’)
THERAPIST:
‘concordant’
identification
(identification with 
patient’s  internalised 
introject)
Transference:
Patient experience -  intense experience 
of shame—patient expects to be 
rejected and devalued by the therapist if  
sense of inadequacy is allo wed to 
show; patient will tend to withdraw, 
may also engage in self abnegation, or 
attempt to numb shame feelings (e.g., 
through substance abuse, etc.) (p. 13).
Countertransference:
Therapist experience — in the face of 
patient withdrawal or self attack, 
therapist may experience feelings of 
inadequacy, incompetence, 
helplessness. May engage in parallel 
processes of withdrawal as subtle as in 
averting eye contact, or more overt (p. 
13).
Transference:
Patient experience -  others perceived 
as inadequate and to blame for 
client’s difficulties, justifying 
contempt (‘attacks on other’). If 
introject is externalised through 
projective identification, the therapist 
may be ‘induced’ to act out the role 
of th e‘shamed introject’ (p. 13).
Countertransference:
Therapist experience -  in the case of 
simple projection, the therapist may 
join the patient in accusing or 
blaming others, whereas if  the 
devalued object is externalised by 
projective identification, the therapist 
may be induced to ‘act out’ the role 
(p. 17). ‘
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Critique of Hahn’s (2000) Model
Hahn’s (2000) model offers therapists a powerful way to conceptualise their own 
experiences of shame in the countertransference, and a model for sorting out ‘what 
belongs to whom’ in the complex and often unconscious intrapsychic and 
interpersonal dynamics of shame. The specificity of the model is compelling. 
Although Hahn states that in his model countertransference is understood to be “a 
joint creation in which both therapist’s past conflicts and the patient’s projected 
aspects create specific patterns of interaction with the therapeutic process” (Gibbard, 
1993, p. 13, as cited in Hahn, 2000), nonetheless he only considers therapist 
experiences of shame that arise in ‘reaction’ to the patient’s projected experiences of 
shame, overlooking other possible origins of shame-related feelings and thoughts in 
the countertransference such as the therapist’s possible projective contributions to the 
‘jointly created’ countertransference.
The concept of countertransference has undergone considerable evolution and 
reworking. Many contemporary theorists now take a “totalist” position:
“broadly defined as the therapist’s total response to the patient, both 
conscious and unconscious. This ‘total response’ includes all the thoughts 
and feelings that the therapist experiences in reaction to the therapeutic 
interaction whether they are considered to be ‘real’ or ‘neurotically 
distorted.’ The totalist definition includes so-called objective 
countertransference reactions (Winmcott, 1949), which any therapist would 
likely experience in response to a patient in a particular context; it also 
includes what are considered to be the idiosyncratic reactions of the therapist 
arising from the therapist’s own personal conflicts” (Tansey & Burke, 1989, 
p.41).
Adopting a totalist position on countertransference, the next section of this paper will 
consider shame-related or shame-driven thoughts and feelings in the therapist that 
arise not in response to patient experiences of shame, but rather, as a result of the
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therapist’s own life experiences and the larger social and cultural context in which 
both patient and therapist are embedded.
Other Sources of Shame-Related Countertransference 
Shame Conflicts in Therapists
I would like to identify four relational contexts in the life of therapists in which 
experiences of shame might be organised into polarized devalued and devaluing 
introjects, which could be readily activated in the context of the therapeutic 
relationship giving rise to a host of shame-related countertransference thoughts and 
feelings. These four relationships include: (1) the trainee-tutor relationship, (2) the 
therapist-supervisor relationship, (3) professional colleague-to-colleague 
relationships, and (4) the therapist’s internalised representations of shame-laden 
culturally constructed relationships consisting of polarized devalued and devaluing 
introjects corresponding to gender, race, class, sexual orientations, and a dichotomy of 
based on ‘sick patient’ and ‘well therapist’. Each one of these will be considered in 
turn.
Polarized Trainee-Tutor Introjects
Being a ‘learner’ inevitably involves making mistakes, and the nature of training 
processes is such that the ideas and performance of trainees regularly come under the 
scrutiny of tutors—potentially enhancing the shame vulnerability of trainees. Both the 
ethos of the training context (e.g., attitude toward ‘mistakes’ on part of peers and 
tutors) and the trainee’s prior experiences of being a learner will probably have an 
influence on a trainee’s experiences of shame in the learning process. Applying 
Hahn’s (2000) model of shame experiences to trainees, trainee therapists might be 
seen to be walking around with an internalised representation of the devalued trainee 
and devaluing tutor ‘lurking in the background’ and ready to be activated if and when 
trainees feel they have made a ‘mistake’ or ‘got it wrong’ in a therapeutic interaction, 
or have experienced their interventions as ineffectual. In the training context, shame- 
driven countertransference could be experienced as a preoccupation with the 
therapist’s own performance that potentially interferes with empathie attunement to 
the client—possibly manifested in lack of confidence and a certain awkwardness or
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hesitation in therapeutic interactions and/or the use of ‘off the shelf interventions by 
trainees.
Polarized Therapist-Supervisor Introjects
Internalised representations of a polarized therapist-supervisor relationship (whether 
based in ‘real’ experience with the supervisor or a fantasied ‘fear’) could be another 
source of shame-driven countertransference experiences similar to those experienced 
in relation to tutors but slightly different. For example, because of a fantasied risk of 
feeling devalued in the eyes of one’s supervisor, the therapist could experience 
pressure to see a client in a particular way, or to use interventions strongly advocated 
in supervision. As with trainees, such pressure could interfere with therapist’s 
attunement to the client and lead to misattuned interpretations and interventions.
Polarized Colleague-Colleague Introjects
Internalised representations of polarized colleague relationships in which the therapist 
stands devalued in the eyes of devaluing peers could also lead to shame-driven 
countertransference experiences. Retzinger (1998), in analysing Freud’s treatment of 
Dora, has identified what she calls ‘ideological countertransference’ in which Freud 
pressures Dora to accept his interpretation based on his stage theory of psycho-sexual 
development, ignoring all signs that it is not attuned to her experience. This, it is 
argued, stemmed from Freud’s need to avoid possible loss of face among in the 
professional establishment of the time if his theory were not right. This could be 
thought of as an example of shame-driven countertransference arising as a result of 
polarized representations of colleague-colleague relationships.
Polarized gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and sick-healthy introjects
In the above examples, the dynamics of shame emerge within an interpersonal 
context. However, in addition to what each therapist and client bring as individuals 
into a therapeutic relationship, they also bring their social identities, which locate 
them and thus, their relationship within a wider cultural context. Miller (2002) has 
pointed out that group identities such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation are 
imbued with socially constructed status and power differences—some identities 
valued over others within the context of a dominant culture that defines what’s
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normative. Applying Hahn’s (2000) model to understanding the countertransference 
implications of the shame dynamics embedded in such cultural relations, these 
socially constructed identities could be conceptualised as polarized ‘devalued’ and 
‘devaluing’ introjects that have been unconsciously internalised by all members of a 
given culture, akin to Collins (2002) concept of ‘controlling cultural images’—that is, 
images imposed on particular social identities within the wider culture (e.g., 
‘Madonna,’ ‘whore,’ ‘dyke,’ ‘respectable wife and mother,’ ‘trailer trash,’ ‘welfare 
queen,’ ‘nutter’). Unconscious internalisation does not imply conscious agreement! 
These translate into: devalued female introject in devaluing dominant patriarchal 
culture; devalued ‘Non-White’ identity in White-dominant culture, devalued 
gay/Lesbian in relation to straight-dominant culture, devalued working class in 
relation to middle class dominant culture, devalued ‘mentally ill’ patient in relation to 
‘normal’ society.
If the therapist and client differ in identity by race, gender, class, or sexual orientation, 
therapists could find themselves attempting to avert identificatory shame associated 
with the internalised introject on either side of a dichotomy depending on which 
group they belong to—the devaluing dominant culture or the devalued social identity. 
The process of distancing from this ‘shame by association’ could be expressed in the 
various types of shame defenses already mentioned (Nathanson, 1992, pp. 305-314) 
with behaviours such as emotional withdrawal, externalisation of cause or blame, or 
deference and self-abnegation. For example a White therapist might behave 
deferentially toward Black clients trying to prove, “I am not racist (classist, sexist).” 
Such deferential behaviour coming from a ‘minority’-identified therapist, on the other 
hand, could be viewed as an expression of identification with the shamed or devalued 
introject. From either side of the dichotomy, the aim of the behaviour is averting 
shame by association with the devalued or devaluing introjects internalised from the 
wider culture. In this way the Hahn (2000) model is helpful in showing how cultural 
relations might be ‘embodied’ or enacted in a therapeutic dyad.
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Summary and Conclusions
This essay began by asking: How can therapists leam to recognize their experiences 
of shame in the countertransference and therapeutically use those experiences to 
better understand their patients? As has been shown, the way in which therapists’ 
experiences of shame are manifested in countertransference thoughts and feelings is 
not always obvious and easy to recognize, because shame often exerts its influence 
from behind the scenes -  emerging in the countertransference as thoughts and feelings 
driven by the need to avoid or defend against feelings of shame triggered by re­
activation of polarized introjects associated with therapists’ previous or concurrent 
shame experiences (‘real’ and ‘fantasied’). Examples of such shame-driven 
countertransference might include awkwardness in trainees, ideological pressure on 
clients by therapists needing to prove their theories ‘right,’ and interpersonal shame 
defenses against shame-by-association with devalued or devaluing social identities 
internalised within a wider cultural context.
Some therapist experiences of shame will arise in reaction to clients’ shame that 
resonates with therapists’ own previous experiences of shame (addressed by Hahn’s 
model). Other times, however, the therapist’s own internalised relational 
representations of devalued and devaluing introjects will be activated by the 
therapeutic interaction, for example, devalued-devaluing templates (whether - ‘real’ or 
‘fantasied’) of trainee-tutor, therapist-supervisor, colleague-colleague, or the 
intersection of social identities. However shame enters the countertransference, there 
is a danger that therapists’ inability to tolerate and contain their own experiences of 
shame will lead to defensiveness, which shifts the experience of shame to the client 
(e.g, labelling clients as ‘difficult’ or ‘manipulative’ (Jacobs, 1996; Kaufinan, 1992).
So how does a therapist use shame-driven countertransference therapeutically? First, 
it seems important to develop self-awareness -  to become familiar with one’s 
internalised ‘library’ of polarised introjects deriving from previous and current 
experiences of shame and to become conscious of one’s repertoire of shame defences 
(Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Jacobs, 1996; Kaufman, 1992, p.218-224). Second, it seems
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important to begin to monitor the countertransference for manifestations of shame or 
shame-driven defenses. In her paper about shame in the therapeutic relationship, 
Retzinger (1998) asserts, “If one is alert to shame and embarrassment cues, they can 
reveal the state of the therapeutic relationship at any given moment” (p.208). Third, 
when therapists become aware of ways in which their own experiences of shame 
(present and past, ‘real’ and ‘fantasied’) are entering the countertransference, and are 
able to tolerate and acknowledge their own shame (at least to themselves, perhaps 
sometimes to their clients as well) without resorting to shame-driven defenses, this 
shame can be used as a window through which to glimpse and empathically connect 
with clients (Morrison, 1994). Finally, therapists may sometimes find that the power 
of their experiences of shame (current or past, real or fantasied) is such that they will 
need to work through these experiences in their own therapy (Harper & Hoopes, 
1990, chap. 9), where, within an empathically attuned therapeutic relationship, they 
can re-experience their own shame, re-integrating and hopefully repairing the 
empathie disconnections they have internalised in the form of polarized introjects.
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Addressing Problems in the Therapeutic Relationship in Cognitive 
Therapy from a Counselling Psychology Perspective
Philosophical Underpinnings of CBT and Counselling Psychology
“In a nutshell, the cognitive model proposes that distorted or dysfunctional 
thinking (which influences the patient’s mood and behaviour) is common to 
all psychological disturbances. Realistic evaluation and modification of 
thinking produce an improvement in mood and behaviour . . . The therapist 
seeks in a variety o f ways to produce cognitive change—change in the 
patient’s thinking and belief system—in order to bring about enduring 
emotional and behavioural change” (Beck, 1995, p. 1-2).
“It [Counselling Psychology] continues to develop models of practice and 
research . . .  that [among other things] seek to
• engage with subjectivity and intersubjectivity, values and beliefs”
• “to know empathically and to respect first person accounts as valid in 
their own terms', to elucidate, interpret and negotiate between 
perceptions and world views but not to assume the automatic 
superiority o f any one way o f experiencing, feeling, valuing and 
knowing”. (Excerpt firom Professional Practice Guidelines— 
Division of Counselling Psychology, April 2001)
These two descriptions (italics added for emphasis) of therapeutic engagement seem 
to stand in contrast to each other. Philosophically, the cognitive model is rooted in 
rationalism and would appear to assume the existence of an objective reality against 
which perceptions and beliefs can be empirically tested for their validity and be 
discovered as true, not true, or having a grain of truth, depending on the evidence. 
Emotion is construed primarily as a by-product of cognition, and the cognitive is 
elevated over the emotional. In contrast, the guidance for counselling psychologists 
seems to be coming from a postmodern worldview in which ‘reality’ is shaped by
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perspective and thus, understood to be relative. No single way of experiencing or 
knowing is accorded primacy. Although it may be impossible to fiilly reconcile these 
contrasting viewpoints at the philosophical level, at the level of actual practice, 
counselling psychologists have found ways to bring them together with integrity. 
Perhaps this is accomplished in part by locating the process of identifying and 
evaluating the validity and utility of a client’s cognitions within the context of a 
collaborative and transparent therapeutic relationship in which the subjectivities of 
client and therapist as well as the intersubjective nature of their encounter are 
acknowledged. In such a relationship the first person account of the client is 
empathically known and respected in its own right—the client remaining the final 
arbiter as to which cognitions are valid and useful.
It has been suggested (Leahy, 2003) that early on in the development of the cognitive 
behavioural model, the therapeutic relationship was considered somewhat peripheral 
to the process. However, as the model has matured, this has shifted. Changes to early 
formulations of cognitive therapy have included a renewed focus on the therapeutic 
relationship and an increased focus on interpersonal cognitive processes (Gilbert, 
1992, p. vii). This essay will focus on the therapeutic relationship as it has evolved 
within the model—exploring three types of challenges or problems arising in the 
therapeutic relationship that I have encountered in my own practice and the 
approaches I have taken to them: (1) collaboration versus compliance/rebellion, (2) 
balancing empathie validation with challenge to change, (3) activation of therapist’s 
negative cognitions in the therapeutic relationship. To set the context for this 
discussion, I will begin with a brief overview of ‘standard’ cognitive behavioural 
therapy drawing on Beck’s (1995) outline of the basic principles and practice.
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy—Overview
The cognitive model (Beck, 1995; see also Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, 
Freeman, & Associates, 1990; Bums, 1999; Padesky & Greenberger, 1995) was first 
pioneered in the sixties by Aaron Beck as a short-term, stmctured form of therapy for 
depression. Central to cognitive therapy is the idea that the meaning we make of 
something—that is, our beliefs and interpretations (‘cognitions’) about it—will
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influence our feelings. For example, if we think a noise in the kitchen at night might • 
be an intruder, we will likely feel alarmed, but if we think it’s a houseguest getting a 
glass of water, we’ll probably fall back asleep.
Levels of Cognition
Cognitive therapy (Beck, 1995) aims to intervene at the level of cognitions by 
teaching the client how to identify, evaluate, and modify negative cognitions, and in 
so doing, to interrupt their self-reinforcing cycle and experience improvement of 
symptoms such as anxiety or depression. ‘Target’ cognitions include (1) negative 
‘core beliefs’ and schemas^ pertaining to oneself, the world, and others (e.g., ‘I am 
defective’). These refer to the most central ideas about the self and are believed to 
have been forged in early experience and very resistant to change, (2) ‘intermediate 
cognitions’, which are assumptions and rigid rules for living that may be ways of 
coping with a negative core belief (e.g., “I must perform perfectly so no one will see I 
am defective”), (3) ‘negative automatic thoughts’ or ‘self-talk’ habitually triggered in 
stressful situations (e.g., “I’m terrible at this. This is so awful. I’m never going to 
pass”). When activated, maladaptive core beliefs and schemas function as negatively 
biased filters on experience, so that information confirming to the core belief is taken 
in, while evidence contrary to the core belief tends to be discounted. Negative 
automatic thoughts are considered comparatively superficial and easy to change 
(bringing rapid mood relief), but without modification of underlying assumptions and 
core beliefs, relapse is thought to be more likely (Beck, 1995).
'
Process
In the process of cognitive therapy as outlined by Beck (1995), various techmques are 
employed by the therapist to help the client identify, evaluate, and modify the validity 
and usefulness of his/her negative cognitions. The aim is to replace negatively biased, 
maladaptive cognitions with more ‘realistic’ or ‘functional’ ones—sometimes called 
cognitive restructuring. For example, “I must never make a mistake” might be 
replaced with “It’s human to make mistakes and I can use them as opportunities for
 ^Some authors (e.g., Padesky & Greenberger) draw little distinction between core beliefs and schemas, 
while others (e.g.. Beck, et al., 1990; Safran, 2003; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003) consider 
schemas to be internalised cognitive structures of self-other experience, which include core beliefs.
38
learning.” Cognitive behavioural therapy incorporates ‘behavioural experiments’ into 
the process of working with cognitions—for example, in trying out a new behaviour 
and monitoring its impact on thoughts and feelings to test out the client’s negative 
predictions.
Therapeutic Relationship
As outlined in Beck (1995), CBT sessions are structured, goal-focused, and clients are 
expected to do self-help homework between sessions. In the therapeutic relationship 
the therapist assumes an active role in socialising the client to the model, which 
includes collaborative agenda-setting and active empiricism with respect to the 
client’s cognitions. The relationship is typically described as collaborative and 
transparent. The therapist shares his/her formulation with the client, and assumes a 
warm, empathie stance—bringing his/her professional expertise to bear in teaching 
the client how to apply various cognitive behavioural techniques and skills with the 
ultimate aim of empowering the client to become his/her own therapist.
Challenges in the Therapeutic Relationship within the Cognitive Model
Roth and Fonagy (1996) in their critical review of psychotherapy research cite 
considerable empirical support for the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy in the 
treatment of a wide range of psychological disorders. However, despite its many 
successes, there are also a number of clients who do not respond. Leahy (2003) 
suggests that about 40% of patients terminate prematurely, and of those remaining, 
one-third do not improve. As clinicians have sought to address impediments to 
change presented by some clients, the therapeutic relationship itself has received more 
attention (e.g., Gilbert, 1992; Safran & Segal, 1990; Safran, 1998; Leahy, 2003; 
Padesky & Greenberger, 1995), so there is now a helpful body of literature to consult 
when encountering problems in the therapeutic relationship using the cognitive 
model. The remainder of this essay will focus on three problems arising in my own 
experience with this model and my approach to addressing them. This has been 
informed by the contributions of an interpersonal perspective to the cognitive model, 
represented in particular by Safran (1998) and Gilbert (1992).
39
Collaboration versus Compliance/Rebellion
The ability to engage in a collaborative therapeutic relationship is considered crucial 
to effective cognitive behavioural therapy. Given the structured and directive nature 
of cognitive behavioural interventions, without a genuinely collaborative working 
relationship, there is a danger that the therapist’s goals, agenda, and way of seeing 
could come to dominate. Collaboration is a way of reducing (though not eliminating) 
the power imbalance intrinsic to a therapeutic relationship. However, clients are not 
necessarily accustomed to working collaboratively with ‘authority figures’ to set an 
agenda and goals, or to consider together what might be useful self-help ‘homework.’ 
A vision of what it means to work collaboratively cannot be assumed and often needs 
to be modelled (Beck, 1995). For some clients, the capacity to form a collaborative 
relationship does not just involve learning something new, but also means overcoming 
powerful negative beliefs and assumptions about the ‘self,’ ‘other,’ and the use of 
power that originate in early experiences with caretakers and are easily aroused in all 
the client’s relationships with authority figures, including the therapist. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, clients with personality disorders are more likely to have difficulty 
forming a collaborative relationship, and it is suggested that additional time will need 
to be spent in building a secure alliance when working with such patients (Beck, et al., 
1990). In my own experience, certain elements of the cognitive model, like its 
structure and the use of homework, may be especially loaded for clients with past 
relational experiences of power abuses, harsh criticism, or abandonment, and can 
readily become triggers for the activation of emotionally-charged negative 
cognitions—leading to compliance or rebellion, or vacillation between the two, 
undermining the therapeutic alliance. These emotionally-charged cognitions, which 
are activated in the therapeutic relationship have been termed ‘hot cognitions’ (Safran 
& Greenberg, 1998). They have pointed out that, although these cognitions can signal 
ruptures in the working alliance, they also present a therapeutic opportunity—wherein 
the therapeutic relationship itself becomes the crucible for the therapeutic work. 
Resolution of such a rupture begins with recognition and naming of the hot cognition.
For example, in my own experience with the model I have noticed that certain clients 
are more likely to experience homework assignments as triggers for negative
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cognitions and schemas (e.g., T must do what the therapist says, or she’ll kick me out; 
T can’t stand being told I have to do something—if I do it, it feels like I’m being 
submissive or giving into someone else’s agenda’). My first awareness of the 
presence of a ‘hot cognition’ is often when I sense by way of tone or facial expression 
a shift of affect during the session while we are talking about something like 
homework—I try to reflect that back to the client, saying something like, ‘I sensed 
something seemed to shift when we started talking about that, and I was wondering 
what was going through your mind just then.’ Often that can open up a fruitful 
dialogue. When asked what was going through her mind, one client with a history of 
expulsion from three boarding schools for ‘insubordination’ replied that she was 
envisioning herself kicked out of therapy for refusing to be a good girl and do her 
homework. When I empathised with how awftil it must be to feel she had to choose 
between feeling subordinated or being kicked out—her affect shifted and she began 
talking about what it had been like for her growing up. This enabled her to see how 
her earlier experiences were now lenses through which she filters current experiences. 
We were able to move on to looking at ways in which this filter sometimes holds her 
back from doing the very things she knows could help her, because that would feel 
too much like “submission.” This ‘hot cognition’ work enabled us to move toward 
collaboration and facilitated work on a ‘maladaptive schema.’ One of the goals of our 
work together is to help her continue to shift this schema in part by strengthening and 
internalising an alternative self-other image—that of engaging collaboratively in our 
relationship.
Empathie Validation and Acceptance versus Challenge to Change
Another challenge to the therapeutic relationship that I have encountered in my own 
practice with the cognitive model is disruption to the therapeutic alliance when the 
client’s need for empathie validation is not met (Leahy, 2003). When standard 
cognitive techniques are misapplied, they can be experienced as very invalidating to 
the client and create a rupture in the relationship. In my own experience two issues 
seem to be particularly important—timing of the use of certain techniques, and the 
client’s history of interpersonal relationships. If standard cognitive techniques to 
evaluate a client’s negative cognitions are undertaken too quickly before a secure 
therapeutic alliance has had a chance to develop with the average client, or with
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clients who have a history of especially invalidating interpersonal relationships (as in 
the case of clients with personality disorders), there is the danger a client will 
experience the process of testing the validity and utility of his/her cognitions as 
invalidating and counter-therapeutic. On the other hand, as Leahy (2003) points out, 
there is equally the danger that a therapist confronted with demand for validation will 
back off from offering tools that the client needs in order to change, which can also be 
counter-therapeutic. Various ways of holding the tension between the client’s need 
for empathie validation and acceptance on the one hand, and the need for change on 
the other have been proposed. Linehan (1993), in her cognitively based model of 
‘dialectical behaviour therapy’ tailored for clients diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder, has conceptualised empathie acceptance and change as two poles 
in a dialectic that needs to be held in tension. Asserting that clients need both 
empathy and techniques for change. Bums (1999) suggests that there is always a 
kernel of tmth to be found in a client’s perception, however ‘distorted’ it might appear 
from the therapist’s vantage point, and recommends that therapists find and empathise 
with it before moving into any evaluation techniques of associated cognitions.
In my own experience, until clients feel ‘heard’ and ‘understood’ (or at least feel I am 
really trying to understand them), they are unable to make use of the more technical 
interventions used to evaluate and modify cognitions. At best they will find them 
irrelevant, and at worst, my interventions will feel reminiscent of previously 
invalidating experiences. For example, one of my clients who was in her late twenties 
and suffering from major depression, had experienced her mother, a surgeon, as cold 
and unaffectionate, overly rational and invalidating of my client’s emotions 
throughout her life, and has core beliefs about unloveability. Despite reservations 
about her mother’s rationalism, my client found the cognitive model ‘made sense’ and 
was keen to give it a try. We had been working together for three sessions and the 
client had begun identifying and challenging some of her self-critical automatic 
thoughts. Upon arriving at our fourth session, she launched into a very emotional 
account of an incident the previous night in which the two people she “thought were 
my best friends” had confronted her regarding the tendency to put herself down and 
seek reassurance from others, which they characterised as “neediness,” which they 
found very unattractive believed was also a “turn-off” to others. Instinctively I spent
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most of the session listening and empathising with her feelings about the experience, 
which included grief, shame, anger, and a sense of betrayal. As I listened, I could 
sense that the incident was very much reinforcing her core beliefs of unloveability and 
helplessness. I began wondering how to help her to step back and evaluate and 
possibly modify the negative automatic conclusions about herself that she was 
drawing from this experience, or alternatively, to problem-solve how she was going to 
change if that was what she felt she wanted to do.
After listening and empathising for most of the session, I asked what was going 
through her miiid at that point. (“People really do find me unattractive. I will be 
rejected if I share my true feelings with those closest to me.”) Initially I attempted to 
use Socratic questioning to explore different ways that we could look at the incident, 
which didn’t seem to go anywhere. She was convinced she wanted to change, so we 
turned to problem-solving, but it was clear that she felt angry and resentful about the 
idea of changing to make herself more acceptable to others—something I reflected 
back to her. Had I been more experienced and secure in the model, I might have 
found another way to explore the cognitions or stayed longer with the empathie 
listening. I sensed her heart wasn’t really in the problem-solving and also felt 
uncomfortable with it myself. Working on change at this point felt ‘off,’ but I wasn’t 
sure where to go.
By the time the session ended I felt more distance between us, and wondered if, in my 
rush to ‘apply techniques,’ she was left feeling invalidated—as so often had happened 
when she related distressing events and feelings to her mother. In the following 
session, I asked her what it had been like sharing the incident with me—her initial 
response was that it had been helpful but I sensed doubts underlying her tone. I 
decided to disclose my own reaction and told her I’d wondered if, when I began trying 
to use some of the techniques for working with thoughts, it had felt a bit like she was 
relating to her mother—that I wasn’t really understanding how she felt and was telling 
her she should feel differently. When I said this she perked up and said, yes, she had 
felt that way but knew I was “just trying to help.” She said what she really wanted 
was to be able to share her true feelings and have them accepted without someone 
trying to fix them. This felt like a breakthrough to both of us. I believe it illustrates
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the importance of both timing and a client’s previous relationships with authority 
figures in engaging with the client’s need for empathy and the client’s motivation to 
change.
The Therapist’s Negative Cognitions
A final ‘problem’ that I wish to discuss is the therapist’s own negative cognitions 
activated in the therapeutic relationship, a topic taken up by various authors working 
firom some version of the cognitive model (e.g.. Beck, 1995; Leahy, 2003; Padesky & 
Greenberger, 1995; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). What these different writers 
hold in common is the value attached to working with one’s own negative 
cognitions—learning to be alert to those activated in the context of a therapeutic 
relationships in general, and those specific to a client. As a novice cognitive 
behavioural therapist in the first four months of using the model, there have been 
times that my own negative automatic thoughts (e.g.. I’m crap at this; I’ll never 
master all these techniques) and conditional assumptions (Because I’m a ‘learner,’ if 
the client isn’t getting better, it must be down to me) have been triggered in the 
therapeutic relationship, particularly when a client has expressed discouragement or 
seemed stuck. When this has happened I have found the process of exploring some of 
my own negative automatic thoughts in supervision especially helpful. From the start 
I have found it helpful to keep my own thought records and to use the downward 
arrow technique to identify my own core beliefs and schemas when they are activated 
in the therapeutic relationship. As I have become increasingly familiar with my own 
thoughts, assumptions, core beliefs and schemas, I have been better able to recogmse 
when a particular client is eliciting a stronger than usual reaction and to reflect on 
how that might help me identify and understand the core beliefs and schemas of the 
client. I have found Leahy’s list of therapist’s schemas (Leahy, 2003, p. 265) 
especially helpful in identifying some of my own. In applying the model to myself, I 
have gained more empathy for my clients’ experiences using the model, which I 
believe ultimately strengthens our therapeutic relationships.
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Summary and Conclusions
I have discussed three dimensions of difficulties in the therapeutic relationship that 
can arise when using the cognitive behavioural model (though these are by no means 
exclusive to this model), and used examples from my own practice to illustrate how I 
understand and approach them—as problems, but also as therapeutic opportunities. 
My approach is substantially informed by ideas drawn from cognitive behavioural 
practitioners such as Safran (1998), Gilbert (1992), and Young, Klosko and 
Weishaaar (2003), who have integrated ideas and techniques from other models (e.g., 
object relations theory, interpersonal theory, experiential techniques), which 
emphasise the interpersonal dimension of the therapeutic process and the 
interconnectedness of emotion and cognition. I have also found Bums (1999) 
discussion of the importance of empathy and Leahy’s (2003) conceptualisation of 
various forms of resistance and discussion of therapist-client schema interaction 
especially helpful. In thinking about the challenge of collaboration versus 
compliance/rebellion, I found working with the ‘hot cognitions’ (Safran & Greenberg, 
1998) particularly helpful. In holding the tension between meeting demands for 
empathie validation and offering the client tools for change, I found that timing was 
very important, and that when a mpture in the relationship had occurred due to 
insensitive timing on my part, acknowledging the dynamic and my share of 
responsibility in it as well as helping the client to link it to other similar relational 
experiences proved therapeutic. This is very much in line with points made by Safran, 
Crocker, McMain, and Murray (1998) in their discussion on resolving therapeutic 
ruptures. Finally, I have found it useful to continuously monitor and attend to my 
own negative cognitions activated in the therapeutic relationship.
To conclude, for me, using the cognitive behavioural model as a counselling 
psychologist means seeking ways to contextualise within a therapeutic relationship 
that is collaborative, transparent, and mindful of the intersubjective nature of the 
encounter. To this end my approach to the therapeutic relationship has been informed 
by an interpersonal perspective and a greater appreciation for the interconnectedness 
of emotion and cognition than is generally presented in standard cognitive 
behavioural texts. I close with a quote from Leahy (2003): “In fact, it is important to
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recognize that what most therapists are doing when they are doing cognitive- 
behavioral therapy is not cognitive-behavioral therapy; rather, they are relating to 
another person” (p. 259).
46
References
Beck, A., Rush, A., Shaw, B., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy o f depression. 
New York: Guildford Press.
Beck, A., Freeman, A. & Associates (1990). Cognitive therapy o f personality 
disorders. York.: Guildford Press.
Beck, J. (1995). Cognitive therapy: Basics and beyond.'t:^Qv  ^York: Guildford Press.
Bums, D. (1999). The feeling good handbook (Rev. ed). New York: Plume Book, 
The Penguin Group.
Gilbert, P. (1992). Counselling for depression. London: Sage Publications.
Gilbert, P. (2000). Social mentalities. In P. Gilbert & K. Bailey (Eds.), Genes on the 
couch: Explorations in evolutionary psychotherapy (pp. \\S-\50). 
Philadelphia, PA: Routledge.
Leahy, R. (2003). Overcoming resistance in cognitive therapy. New York: Guildford 
Press.
Linehan, M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment o f borderline personality 
disorder. New York: Guildford Press.
Padesky, C,. & Greenberger, D. (1995). Clinician’s guide to mind over mood. New 
York: Guildford Press.
Roth, A., & Fonagy, P. (1996). What works for whom?: A critical review o f  
psychotherapy research.'How York: Guildford Press.
Safran, J. (1998) (Ed.). Widening the scope o f cognitive therapy: The therapeutic 
relationship, emotion, and the process o f change. North Bergan, NJ: Jason 
Aronson.
Safran, J., & Greenberg, L. (1998). Hot cognition and psychotherapy process: An 
information-processing/ecological approach. In J. Safran (Ed.), Widening the 
scope o f cognitive therapy: The therapeutic relationship, emotion, and the 
o/c/zawge (pp. 107-144). North Bergan, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Safran, J., Crocker, P., McMain, S., & Murray, P. (1998). The therapeutic alliance 
mpture as a therapy event for empirical investigation. In J. Safran (Ed.), 
Widening the scope o f cognitive therapy: The therapeutic relationship, 
emotion, and the process o f change (pp. 187-209). North Bergan, NJ: Jason 
Aronson.
47
Safran, J., & Segal, Z. (1990). Interpersonal process in cognitive therapy. New York: 
Basic Books.
Young, J., Klosko, J., & Weishaar, M. (2003). Schema therapy: A practitioner’s 
guide. New York: Guildford Press.
48
THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
DOSSIER
49
Introduction to Therapeutic Practice Dossier
The therapeutic practice dossier includes an overview of each of my four placements 
and my Final Clinical Paper, which offers an account of my approach to therapeutic 
practice.
N.B. As stated in the introduction to the portfolio, all potentially identifying 
information related to clients, including details of placements and supervisors, has 
been changed or omitted in order to protect client confidentiality.
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First Year Placement: Student Counselling Service
October 2001 -  July 2002
During my first year of training I had a two day per week placement in a student 
counselling service located on a university campus in the South East of England. The 
counselling staff consisted of three professional counsellors and two trainees. The 
majority of clients were self-referred or came on a friend’s recommendation and 
tended to be highly motivated to use counselling. Their first point of access was drop- 
in service staffed by the professional counsellors. Each student was initially seen for 
a brief appointment during which presenting issues were identified. Clients were then 
assigned to one of the five counsellors who arranged a first appointment in which the 
client’s goals were clarified and a counselling contract was negotiated. The 
theoretical orientation of the service was predominantly humanistic and client-centred 
with encouragement to draw upon other models according to the needs and goals of 
the client. Most students dealt their issues in 4 -  8 sessions lasting 50 minutes each, 
but longer work was available.
I encountered a broad range of difficulties including anxiety, depression, suicidality, 
self-harming, relationship difficulties, cross cultural adjustment, bullying, identity and 
separation issues—often in conjunction with the developmental transition between 
late adolescence and adulthood. Clients ranged in age from young adult to mid-life 
mature students, with most between 19 and 22. My responsibilities included 
psychological counselling to individual clients assigned to me after the initial intake 
session by one of the professional counsellors, and I received weekly supervision 
sessions from one of the professional counsellors. The supervision was informed 
primarily by a humanistic and client-centred approach, drawing from psychodynamic 
theory in case formulation, and from cognitive behavioural approaches to address 
specific symptoms of anxiety and panic. An emphasis was placed on empathie 
contact with the client and developing awareness of my ‘felt experience’ in the room 
to use in guiding my work. This placement provided me with an excellent 
introduction to the experience of client work and a broad range of presenting issues 
under the supervision of a very containing supervisor who modelled ‘being with.’
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Second Year Placement: A Specialist Eating Disorders Service
January 2003 -  February 2004
After taking some time out from clinical work following my mother’s death during 
the summer of 2002,1 undertook a second year placement one day/week in an NHS 
Specialist Eating Disorders Service located in the South East of England. I was part 
of a large multi-disciplinary team comprised of a clinical director, two medics, two 
psychiatrists, a dietician, two occupational therapists, five nurses, four clinical 
psychologists, a psychotherapist, several psychologist assistants, research assistants, 
three trainee clinical psychologists, and myself.
Patient referrals came from GPs and Community Mental Health Teams contracted 
with the NHS Trust. Following a thorough assessment by specially trained staff, 
patients meeting the diagnostic criteria for anorexia, bulimia, or binge eating disorder 
were allocated (by the team) to one of several treatment programmes. Outpatient 
options included either approximately 20 sessions of cognitive behavioural or 
psychodynamic-behavioural therapy tailored to eating disorders with a typical wait of 
several months for either. Patients who had not previously succeeded with cognitive 
behavioural interventions or patients whose eating behaviours seemed to be linked to 
complex interpersonal difficulties tended to be allocated to the behavioural- 
psychodynamic treatment model. The clients I saw were all female, ranging in age 
from 18 to mid-life.
My primary responsibilities included offering individual outpatient therapy using the 
psychodynamic-behavioural treatment model. This consisted of weekly sessions 
incorporating behavioural strategies (eating plan, weekly weighing, food/feeling 
diary) to address the eating behaviours alongside psychodynamic work with 
underlying issues and feelings that surfaced in the transference. The aim was to 
support clients in working through unconscious feelings and issues being ‘acted out’ 
through the eating behaviours, and in replacing the eating behaviours with healthier 
patterns of relating and coping with difficult feelings. A multi-disciplinary approach 
was taken, which involved liaising with other team members such as the dietician. I
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reported to refeirers at the beginning, middle and ending of therapy sessions with 
recommendations for follow-up according to the goals and needs of individual clients. 
Clients were offered several follow-up sessions at monthly intervals following the 
initial course of treatment. I received weekly individual supervision from the 
psychodynamic psychotherapist member of the team. The emphasis was very much 
on developing my capacity to recognise and interpret unconscious communication 
between the client and myself and be able to use this in the process of working 
through the client’s difficulties.
Additional responsibilities included regular attendance at weekly allocation meetings 
during which assessment reports would be discussed and patients would be allocated 
to specific treatment programmes, and at staff meetings. I also had the opportunity to 
attend bi-weekly therapy seminars and frequent in-service training events, and to 
participate in an in-patient ward round. This placement gave me an introduction to 
working in a large multi-disciplinary team with patients presenting more enduring and 
complex difficulties, and the opportunity to acquire some specialist knowledge and 
experience in the treatment of eating disorders.
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Third Year Placement: Employee Counselling Services 
September 2003 -  July 2004
In my third year I undertook a one day per week placement in an on-site counselling 
service for employees of a large multi-national corporation. The counselling service 
was located within the occupational health department, comprised of a clinical 
director, GP, occupational therapist, physiotherapist, counselling psychologist, a 
counsellor, two dentists, dental hygienists, nurses, and myself—supervised by the 
counselling psychologist who had additional training in psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy.
The service had a well-established reputation among employees as being helpful and 
fully confidential, and the work culture permitted employees to organise their diaries 
to attend counselling sessions without involving line managers. Counselling sessions 
50 minutes in length were offered during working hours—typically on a weekly basis 
with flexibility to organise them around employees travel diaries. The vast majority 
of clients were either self-referred or came on the recommendation of a colleague who 
had previously accessed services. Following an initial assessment session during 
which the presenting issues and client goals were identified, a counselling contract 
was negotiated—often for 4-6 sessions with the option of continuing. Length of work 
varied from 4 sessions to 25 sessions. The service was predominantly psychodynamic 
in orientation adapted to the context and individual client goals and needs.
My responsibilities included conducting assessments, offering individual therapy, and 
preparing monthly statistical reports. I received weekly supervision sessions from the 
counselling psychologist, which were informed predominantly by contemporary 
object relations strands of psychodynamic theory. I encountered a broad range of 
presenting issues including depression and loss of self-esteem, various forms of 
anxiety and workplace stress, identity and life transition crises, relationship 
difficulties at home and work, workplace harassment and bullying, bereavement, 
cross cultural adjustment, and post-traumatic stress. Clients tended to be high 
functioning young to mid-life adults with very high expectations of themselves and 
others. My approach was predominantly psychodynamic with flexibility and
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encouragement from my supervisor to draw upon other models according to the 
client’s needs and goals and the research evidence-base. This placement offered me 
the opportunity to work with clients from many different parts of the world within the 
context of a very flexible and client-oriented service.
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Fourth Year Placement: Specialist Cognitive Behavioural Clinics for 
Recurrent Depression and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
September 2004 -  August 2005
My fourth and final placement was two days per week in Specialist CBT Clinics for 
Recurrent Depression and OCD. The clinics were located within the Specialist 
Psychological Therapies Department of an NHS Trust organised into four teams: 
primary care, psychotherapy, family therapy, and a specialist psychologies team. The 
latter team consisted of a clinical director, one consultant psychiatrist, two clinical 
psychologists, one counselling psychologist, one clinical nurse specialist in CBT  ^and 
myself.
Patients were referred for assessment and therapy by their GP or local CMHT. For 
clinic purposes, recurrent depression was defined as three or more separate episodes 
of depression broken by intervals in which the patient’s functioning was relatively 
unimpaired. OCD treatment was offered to patients meeting a majority of the 
following criteria: symptoms for more than six months, significant psychological 
distress, recurrent episodes requiring medical intervention or where progress toward 
resolution was blocked, and the likelihood of responsiveness to short or medium term 
outpatient intervention.
The therapy paradigm was cognitively behaviourally focused. After an initial 
assessment, a formulation of the presenting problem was explained to the 
patient/client who participated in selection of treatment goals and methods. Clinic 
services were developed in line with research evidence and good practice guidelines 
of the BPS, United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP), and British 
Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy (BABCP). A typical 
therapy pattern included approximately 15 weekly sessions spaced weekly in the 
beginning, moving to fortnightly, with 2-3 follow-up sessions a month apart, but there 
was flexibility for shorter or longer work. Sessions normally lasted 50 minutes but 
longer sessions could be arranged to accommodate behavioural experiments inside or 
outside the clinic.
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My responsibilities included conducting initial assessments and offering individual 
therapy services. In addition I prepared assessment and outcome reports to referrers 
and participated in bi-monthly staff in-service seminars and occasional training events 
and service planning meetings. I received weekly clinical supervision sessions from 
the clinical nurse specialist in CBT with additional input from the clinical director, a 
chartered clinical psychologist. In addition I liaised with local Community Mental 
Health Teams in coordination and planning of care for some patients. This 
placement afforded me the opportunity to work with patients presenting enduring and 
complex difficulties, and to acquire some specialist knowledge and experience in the 
treatment of recurrent depression and of OCD.
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Practicing Counselling Psychology 
from a Relational/Intersubj active Perspective
The present moments that interest us the most are those that arise when two 
people make a special kind of contact—namely an intersubjective contact 
two people see and feel roughly the same mental landscape for a moment at 
least. These meetings are what psychotherapy is largely about (Stem, 2004, 
p. 75).
Introduction
In this paper I describe my journey over the past four years of training to reach this 
place in my ongoing development as a counselling psychologist. Part of my affinity 
for the discipline of counselling psychology has been its integrated approach to 
knowledge and training, recognising the “interdependence of theory, research, and 
practice” (Meara, et al., 1988, p. 368). Here, I aim to explain how my personal 
approach to practice has evolved through an ongoing process of engagement with 
psychological theories and research while simultaneously immersed in the therapeutic 
relationship and process—as a therapist, a client, a supervisee, and a researcher.
In reflecting on the contribution of each of these elements to my development, I begin 
with a brief discussion of my epistemological perspective and values and the 
contribution of my personal experience as a client. From there I trace the evolution of 
my approach to practice over the span of training, considering my exposure to 
research, and to each of the core theoretical models presented on the course— 
humanistic, psychodynamic, and cognitive behavioural—along with the contributions 
of successive placement contexts and supervisors. Clinical examples will be used to 
illustrate the development of my identity as an integrative/pluralist counselling 
psychologist informed by a relational/intersubjective perspective of the therapeutic 
relationship and process.
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Personal Epistemological Perspective and Values
In considering the issue of integration between the personal and the professional. Fear 
& Woolfe (2000) have asserted that, in order to be most effective, practitioners need 
to be working within a theoretical framework that is consistent with their personal 
epistemology and world view. My own epistemological stance could be described as 
“perspectivalist” (Orange, 1992; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) in that, while I believe in 
the “existence” of a psychic reality that can be known, I think it impossible for human 
beings to ever fully step outside of some perspective through which experience, and 
thus, knowledge is inevitably filtered. Contributions to this filter would include 
background culture, social location and group identifications within it, individual 
constitution, and life experience—all of which will, in my view, influence the feelings 
we feel, the questions we ask, the answers we find, and the interpretations we make, 
individually and collectively. In this sense I believe all human knowledge, even so- 
called ‘objective’ knowledge, is ultimately perspective-bound and provisional.
Bearing in mind my position that all human knowledge is ultimately ‘perspective- 
bound,’ I hold (provisionally) a relational view of human nature and psychological 
development (see Spencer, 2000 for a comparison of “relational psychologies”)—that 
is to say, I believe that human beings are fundamentally relational and attachment- 
motivated rather than internal drive-motivated, and that we are exquisitely endowed 
with the capacity for joining and participating in the subjective experience of others— 
not just abstractly, but at the level of ‘felt experience.’ We are able to ‘feel’ the 
perspectives of others. I believe humans not only have this perspective-taking 
capacity, but that the differentiated ‘self forms and reforms through sharing in the 
subjective experience of others, and that lifelong relational/intersubjective experience 
is the crucible of psychological development and healing. This is a perspective that 
has been articulated in various ways by a growing number of practitioners (e.g., 
Beebe & Lachmann, 2002, DeYoung, 2003; Fonagy, Gergley, Jurist, & Target, 2002; 
Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver & Surrey, 1991; Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell & Aron, 
1999; Schore, 1994; Stem, 2004; Stolorow & Atwood, 2002) and seems well- 
supported by an expanding body of research that I discuss more fully later.
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This perspective feels very much ‘in harmony’ with counselling psychology’s 
emphasis on “empathy and respect” for the validity of first person accounts of 
individual phenomenological experience, and on models of practice and research that 
“engage with subjectivity and intersubjectivity” (Professional Practice Guidelines— 
Division of Counselling Psychology, 2001). It also predisposed me to want to train in 
multiple models, which I have come to conceptualise as different modes through 
which to enter into and engage intersubjectively with clients’ subjective experience.
Contribution of My Experience as a Client
My personal experience of therapy as a client influenced my desire to train as a 
therapeutic practitioner and continues to inform my own approach to practice. I grew 
up in California within a subculture where it was assumed that part of the human 
condition is having deficits, conflicts, and problems, and psychotherapy was 
considered a valuable and accepted means of facilitating personal development and 
growth as well as addressing psychological distress. I have had the opportunity to 
undertake therapy as a client several times and experienced several approaches. In all 
I have experienced several years of integrative therapy. I have also worked with a 
Gestalt practitioner, done some brief group therapy with an existential therapist, and 
had six sessions with a psychodynamic practitioner working from a ‘blank screen’ 
approach. I found some benefit in each of these approaches. In the case of the ‘blank 
screen’, this took the form of being very clear about what I did not find helpful and 
sparking my research interest in therapist-client shame dynamics.
My experience as a client sensitised me to the power differential intrinsic to all 
therapeutic relationships regardless of model and has helped me to appreciate both the 
courage and the vulnerability of clients. It has reinforced my view that clients can 
risk bringing more of themselves into the room and experimenting with change when 
they feel empathically ‘met’. It has motivated me to regard my own theories and 
hypotheses about clients with scepticism and to continuously ask myself how what I 
‘bring into the room’ may be influencing how I am participating and being 
experienced. I consider my experiences in the client role to have made an 
indispensable contribution to an experiential understanding of the therapeutic
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relationship and process as co-created and bi-directional, as well as unique to each 
dyad. In the remainder of this paper I will attempt to show how this influence is 
manifest in my practice.
Contribution of Research
In embracing the model of scientist-practitioner and respect for the complementary 
contributions of both qualitative and quantitative research (Woolfe, 1996), the 
discipline of counselling psychology has affirmed the close relationship between 
evidence-informed practice and practice-informed evidence. My aim is to stay 
abreast of new findings that could inform my practice with specific clients and my 
approach more generally—while using practice experience to inform my application 
of them. Here I highlight some recent findings relevant to therapeutic outcome and 
process followed by a brief discussion of how they have influenced my general 
approach across models.
Outcome Research
The importance of the therapeutic relationship to outcome seems to be one of the most 
robust of outcome research findings. Summing up three decades of outcome research, 
Henry (1998) stated:
“As a general trend across studies, the largest chunk of outcome variance 
not attributable to preexisting patient characteristics involves individual 
therapist differences and the emergent therapeutic relationship, regardless 
of technique or school of therapy. This is the main thrust of three decades 
of empirical research” (Henry 1998 p. 128).
In an effort to identify more clearly which specific qualities of the therapeutic 
relationship are empirically stipported, the Division of Psychotherapy within the 
American Psychological Association established a task force in 2000 to conduct a 
review of relevant research. They found that quality of the therapeutic alliance, 
therapist empathy, and goal consensus and collaboration have demonstrated efficacy. 
Positive regard, genuineness/congruence, therapist feedback, repair of alliance
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ruptures, self-disclosure, management of coimtertransference, and the quality of 
relational interpretations of the client’s interpersonal dynamics were found to have 
probable efficacy (Norcross, 2001). Taken together, I believe these findings seem to 
argue for active and overt ‘use of self in the form of collaboration, explicit empathy, 
and close attention to relational dynamics.
Research Relevant to Process
Recently there has been a paradigm shift toward relational and intersubjective 
conceptualisations of human psychological development and motivation as distinct 
firom earlier intrapsychic formulations based on a drive-theory of motivation 
(Spencer, 2000). This shift, which many practitioners believe has significant 
implications for psychotherapeutic theory and practice, is supported by a diverse and 
expanding body of research within the fields of developmental psychology and 
neuroscience. While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, a very 
brief mention of several significant findings is offered here.
For example, developmental research with mothers and infants (e.g., Beebe, 1986; 
Stem, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979) has demonstrated early forms of intersubjectivity even 
in very young infants, supporting the idea that, firom birth, we attune to and participate 
in each other’s mental experience (Stem, 2004). This happens as mothers and infants 
join in moments of ‘feeling felt’ (Siegel, 1999), moving in and out of mutually 
regulated states of connection, disconnection, and reconnection mediated through 
affectivity that is communicated non-verbally through movement and facial 
expressions (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). It is now believed that the maturation of 
certain stmctures in the brain and the ability to regulate affect are contingent on this 
relational experience of empathie connectedness, out of which sense of self emerges 
(Schore, 1994).
Recent findings in neuroscience suggest that the brain is responsive to relational 
experience throughout life at two levels—in the processing of non-verbal cues (facial 
expressions, body language, tone of voice, etc.), and in the processing of verbal 
communication (Siegal, 1999). Additionally, the discovery of ‘mirror neurons,’ 
points to a possible mechanism underlying the human capacity for mutual empathy
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(Stem, 2004). Mirror neurons, which sit next to motor neurons and fire when we 
observe someone else act, enable us to “experience the other as if  we were executing 
the same action, feeling the same emotion, making the same vocalization, or being 
touched as they are being touched” (p. 79). In considering therapeutic implications of 
such findings. Stem concludes,
“Intersubjectivity in the clinical situation can no longer be considered only as 
a useful tool or one of many ways of being with another that comes and goes 
as needed. Rather, the therapeutic process will be viewed as occurring in an 
ongoing intersubjective matrix . . .  Of course, some material comes from the 
repertoire (past and present) of one individual, but even then, its moment of 
appearance on the scene, the exact final form it takes, and the coloration of 
its meaning are fashioned in the intersubjective matrix” (Stem, 2004, p. 78).
How These Findings Inform My Practice
Taken together, I believe these findings support the idea that the human condition is 
fundamentally relational, and that humans gravitate toward, are nurtured by, emerge 
within, and have access to healing within the experience of relationship from birth to 
death. Thus, relational experience becomes a powerful therapeutic intervention 
operating at two levels—in a non-verbal (facial expressions, body language, 
paralinguistic cues) moment-to-moment process taking place outside of conscious 
awareness, and at the level of ‘talking.’ This dual level of processing has become 
very evident to me as I have listened to tapes of my sessions and realised how much is 
communicated through nuances in tone of voice, timing, and other paralinguistic 
qualities—so much so that, in turning down the volume down to the point of not being 
able to make out the actual words, I could still ‘sense’ the emotional ebb and flow of 
the experience without ever knowing what was actually said.
Account of Practice
In the section that follows I give account of the evolution of my approach as I have 
been exposed to the core theoretical models taught on this course: humanistic, 
psychodynamic, cognitive behavioural. In order to contextualise this account, I wish
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to mention my exposure to one additional model. Prior to training I participated in a 
conference co-sponsored by the Stone Center and the Harvard University Medical 
School Department of Continuing Education where I was introduced to Relational- 
Cultural Theory (Jordan, 2001; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991)—a 
theoretical perspective on psychotherapy that has its roots in a relational view of 
human psychological development and a feminist critique of traditional 
psychodynamic theory and practice. The relational-cultural therapeutic model 
informed by RCT is a collaborative ‘work in progress’ that continues to evolve and be 
elaborated through the ongoing practice, research, and theoretical dialogue of an 
expanding network of practitioner-scholars affiliated with the Stone Center and Jean 
Baker Miller Training Institute in Wellesley, MA. Early in my second year of 
training I attended a four-day training institute (accredited by the American 
Psychological Association) taught by Jean Baker Miller and Stone Center colleagues 
in the RCT model. This past year I attended another APA-accredited seminar for 
clinicians on the practice implications of current theory and research in the field of 
attachment taught by Peter Fonagy, Ruth Karlen-Lyons, Bessel van der Kolk, Allan 
Schore, and Miriam Steele. My immersion in a relational/intersubjective perspective 
by way of both these experiences together with my exposure to the three core models 
on the course have significantly informed my practice stance as a counselling 
psychologist.
Over the four years of the course I have been introduced to the ‘classics’ in each of 
the core models—e.g., Rogers for humanistic in Year 1, followed by Freud, Jung, 
Klein, Bion, Kohut, Winnicott, Bowlby, and Sullivan in the psychodynamic Years 2 
and 3, and Aaron Beck, Judith Beck, Padesky, and Bums during the cognitive 
behavioural Year 4. As I have been introduced to each of these models in turn, I have 
also sought out and gravitated toward contemporary practitioners within each model 
whose applications of humanistic, psychodynamic, or cognitive behavioural theory 
seem to be informed by a relational or interpersonal perspective.
Year 1 Humanistic Paradigm
My first placement was in a student counselling service where I had the opportunity to 
do both short and longer-term work with clients presenting a range of concerns
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including depression and suicidality, anxiety, cross-cultural adjustment, bereavement, 
developmental transitions, identity issues, and relationship difficulties.
Central to Carl Roger’s (1951, 1957, 1961) person-centered approach is an emphasis 
on empathie ‘being with’ the client in a relationship characterised by empathy, 
congruence, and unconditional positive regard. My supervisor modelled empathie 
‘being with’ and ‘collaborative exploration,’ which facilitated a relationship in which 
I felt empathically ‘met.’ Her approach encouraged openness on my part, creating 
space for the ‘messy’ process of learning.
‘Journeying with’
The person-centred approach, with its emphasis on respect for a client’s unique 
subjective experience and offering clients the experience of genuine, empathie ‘being 
with,’ afforded me an excellent framework in which to begin my development as a 
practitioner. I enjoyed the challenge of attempting to empathically enter my client’s 
frame of reference and join as a companion in exploring the emotional threads of 
his/her experience. Through the use of interventions—empathie reflecting, clarifying, 
paraphrasing, summarising, challenging—I sought to give the client an experience of 
feeling ‘heard’ and ‘felt,’ and to offer a relational space in which the client could 
safely explore and move toward acceptance of previously denied, unacceptable, 
threatening or otherwise difficult aspects of his/her experience. During this year I was 
also reading the above-mentioned Stone Center ‘relational’ approach (e.g., Jordan, 
2001; Miller, 1988; Miller & Stiver, 1991; Miller & Stiver, 1995; Miller, Jordan, 
Kaplan, Stiver, & Surrey, 1997), which particularly emphasised awareness of the 
relational flow of connection and disconnection in the therapeutic relationship. I 
found this ‘felt sense’ of the ‘we’ in the room useful in guiding interventions and 
believe it enhanced my work in this core model. I believe my relational approach to 
‘empathie being with’ is illustrated in my work with Miss A.
Miss A was a undergraduate student in her first year away from home (overseas). She 
presented with feelings of isolation and loneliness in conjunction with nightly 
episodes of intense anxiety with “bad feelings” about herself and the future, and an 
inability to relax without intense feelings of guilt and self-recrirhination. She recalled
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having similar episodes at times as a child and occasionally as an adolescent— 
especially when faced with new situations. She said she and her mother (described as 
depressed and self-critical) were very close because they were “so much alike.” Miss 
A wanted some immediate help in managing her anxiety, but said she also wanted to 
understand and address its underlying cause. Conceptualised from a person-centred 
perspective, I hypothesised that Miss A may have grown up immersed in her mother’s 
feelings to the neglect of her own, making it difficult for her to differentiate her own 
feelings and self-concept from that of her mother and complicating the developmental 
transition from adolescence to adulthood.
In consultation with my supervisor, we agreed that Miss A would probably benefit 
from a two-fold approach including some information and anxiety management 
techniques aimed at reducing her immediate distress within the broader framework of 
a person-centred relationship emphasising the ‘core conditions.’ The aim was to 
provide a safe space in which to explore the meaning and cause of the episodes and 
begin differentiating her own feelings, needs and emotional processes from those of 
her mother. After offering the anxiety management strategies, it took some time to 
move from the ‘expert’ role into the less directive, more reflective stance of a person- 
centred practitioner. In the first few sessions we spent considerable time exploring in 
detail her phenomenological experience of the episodes. As I sought to enter her 
frame of reference at a feeling level and stay with her experience, I began to feel that 
we were getting caught up going round in circles with both of us feeling stuck and 
anxious. After exploring these feelings in supervision, I decided that the next time this 
happened, I would try to put to her my experience of the dynamic. When it came up 
again, I attempted to step back from and carefully describe my ‘felt sense’ of the 
experience. As she was listening, a look of recognition came over her face, and she 
was able to link my description to a familiar feeling state that she had of “going round 
in circles and feeling more and more anxious” when trying to “make” her mother feel 
better. This marked a turning point in our work—the first step in beginning to 
differentiate her own feelings and experience from those of her mother. From here 
the focus of the work shifted to getting to know and accept herself as an emerging 
adult and explore new ways of being in relationship. There were various ups and 
downs in this process, but as the work progressed, the anxiety episodes disappeared.
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‘Endings’
Several weeks prior to the end of my first year placement I learned that my mother 
was dying and I wanted to be with her in the final weeks. Unexpectedly, I found 
myself negotiating five ‘premature’ endings in the midst of a significant ending in my 
personal life, and I felt concerned about the impact this might have on my clients (and 
me). My supervisor was very understanding and supportive in helping me think 
through how to renegotiate the time frame of the endings with the aim of ‘being with’ 
each client in his/her experience of a ‘good enough’ ending, whatever that might 
mean for that client. I decided to tell each of my clients at the earliest opportunity of 
my need to end three weeks earlier than anticipated because one of my parents was 
gravely ill. To have withheld the reason for ending early would have felt incongruent 
to me and potentially confusing to my clients. I found the experience of having to 
renegotiate the contract based on my own needs difficult, but I learned some valuable 
lessons: First, the process of exploring feelings about the early ending could be 
therapeutically used—the challenge was doing so in a way that my clients’ access to 
the range and expression of their feelings would not be ‘hijacked’ by a need to ‘take 
care’ of me. Second, I may have been overestimating my importance in the lives of 
my clients—though my clients expressed some disappointment, insofar as I could tell, 
they were not as distressed about my need to end early as I had imagined they might 
be.
Years 2 & 3 Psychodynamic Model
Ending the first year early meant carrying over coursework into my second year and 
prompted my decision to complete Year 2 over the space of two years. This gave me 
the benefit of exposure to two excellent psychodynamic supervisors in two very 
different contexts—an NHS eating disorders service, and a corporate employee 
counselling service. I found the diversity and range of psychodynamic literature 
staggering and was grateful to have two years in the model. Psychodynamic theory 
and practice opened up the world of the transference-countertransference relationship 
and gave me a new way of thinking about and experiencing the reactions and 
sensations that I had learned to attune to during the first year. My interest in 
relational approaches and research on shame dynamics took me into developmental
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theory, attachment theory, self psychology, object relations, and the 
relational/intersubjective strands of psychodynamic theory. With respect to 
psychodynamic technique, neither of my supervisors was committed to a specific 
school within the psychodynamic tradition. Both supported me in finding my own 
way of working psychodynamically, so I tried to acquaint myself with a range of 
contemporary thinking about practice, including Bacal (1998), Casement (2002), 
Fosha (2000), Jacobs (1998), Kahn (1997), Lemma (2003), Malan (2001), Mitchell 
(2000), Stolorow, Brandschaft & Atwood (1995), and Beebe & Lachmann (2002). 
On the basis of my reading in the areas of shame affect, attachment, and 
developmental psychology, as well as my own experience as a client, I was most 
drawn toward psychodynamic practitioners who had abandoned classical technique in 
favour of a more explicitly empathie and warm stance, because I believed it to be 
more effective and less potentially harmful for clients—especially clients with a 
history of emotionally invalidating environments: “The safer the patient feels in the 
relationship with the therapist, the more he will be willing to relinquish growth- 
inhibiting defenses and risk new ways of feeling and interacting” (Fosha, 2003, p. 36- 
37).
My first foray into psychodynamic practice was the eating disorders service. There I 
worked with a 20 week integrative model of therapy specifically tailored to eating 
disorders, which combined behavioural symptom-focused strategies (e.g., weekly 
weighing, meal plan, food/feeling diaries) with psychodynamic work on material 
surfacing in the transference-countertransference relationship. Following the example 
of my supervisor, I tended to conceptualise my clients’ experience of eating disorders 
primarily in terms of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1979) and object relations theory— 
particularly drawing upon Winnicott’s (1963; 1971) transitional objects and ‘good 
enough’ mothering, and Kleinian-originated (1946; 1959) concepts of defensive 
splitting and projective identification. I found Malan’s (2001) triangles of ‘conflict’ 
and ‘person’ useful in formulating and reflecting on my interventions.
Working with the transference
Miss B was a woman in her early twenties living with her parents. She presented with 
a seven year history of bulimia alternating with episodes of anorexia, and her body
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mass was in the low normal range. In drawing upon contemporary object relations 
theory (Lemma, 2003) to conceptualise her difficulties, it seemed the primary object 
relationship in her inner world consisted of a helpless, needy child at the mercy of an 
unpredictable maternal object vacillating between the ‘good mother’ (who indulged 
and protected her from the ‘severe father’), and the ‘bad mother’ who was 
experienced as intrusive and controlling, or rejecting. In relationships with parental 
and authority figures and boyfriends. Miss B often experienced herself as a victim. 
She found it difficult to set boundaries and take responsibility for her own feelings 
and behaviours. She had a history of impulsive behaviours (self-harm, overdoses, 
premature endings of helping relationships) in response to situations in which she felt 
controlled, or rejected and abandoned. I conceptualised the bulimic behaviours as a 
way of coping (albeit self-destructively) with unbearable feelings (e.g., neediness, 
dependency, shame, powerlessness, and rage) underlying the dynamics (internal and 
external) of her object relationships. The focus of our work was on exploring and 
understanding these dynamics and underlying feelings as they surfaced in the 
transference.
I struggled with my own reservations about integrating the weekly weighing of my 
clients into a psychodynamic way of working. However, I came to see how the 
transference-countertransference feelings these weighings aroused could be worked 
with to explore the theme of compliance versus collaboration. I found the food/feeling 
diary very compatible with psychodynamic work. With my supervisor’s 
encouragement, I conceptualised the diary as a ‘transitional object’ symbolising the 
client’s relationship with me, rich with transference material in both content and 
presentation. Early on, she would come into the room and present the diary to me 
first thing—as though for inspection. It was neatly filled out but contained little in the 
way of feelings and looked barely handled. As we explored her experience using the 
diary, she said she first wrote somewhere else, then edited and recopied this into the 
diary because she didn’t want to give me something ‘messy’. In a tentative 
interpretation, I linked this to some uncertainty about how I might respond to the 
messy bits, and which led to an exploration of her fantasies about what I thought of 
her and the pressure she felt from her parents to keep her messy bits out of sight. The 
next session she showed up with a very messy and obviously used diary, stating that
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she had decided to start keeping the diary for herself. The content of the feelings 
section began to take on the quality of an ongoing conversation with me. As therapy 
progressed, the bulimia began to diminish. However, in anticipation of a holiday, she 
began restricting her food and her weight started to drop. She was pleased with her 
appearance and described a corresponding upsurge of ‘self-confidence.’ I believe my 
own concern about the restricting interfered with my ability to communicate empathy 
for her frame of reference, which I think left her feeling disconnected and ‘let down.’ 
At the next session she turned up with a nearly empty diary. Although we explored 
her ambivalence about therapy, I believe I missed the intensity of her feelings about 
our relationship. Sadly there was no opportunity to repair this empathie 
misattunemenf. Her mother rang to cancel the next two sessions. Eventually I 
received a letter stating that, after talking with her family. Miss B had decided it 
would be best to end while she was feeling better since she would be left on her own 
in a few weeks anyway. Given that Miss B had a history of impulsive behaviour and 
premature terminations, it was not surprising that the relationship might end in this 
way. However, I was left with countertransference feelings of failure and 
abandonment and wanted to learn from the experience. My supervisor was 
enormously helpful in making sense of the process and my countertransference as we 
reflected on my own, the client’s, and the system’s contribution. I came to see that my 
feelings of failure, loss and abandonment were partly to do with my own insecurities 
as a trainee, but also a glimpse into the feelings that she was trying to avoid by pre­
empting the ending. With my supervisor’s help I also concluded that, although my 
misattunement probably contributed to the premature ending, it is likely that her 
mother and the family system also played a significant part.
Using my countertransference
The generalist nature of my placement in the employee counselling service contrasted 
vdth the eating disorders service. The work varied in length from brief to longer- 
term, and encompassed a range of presenting difficulties, such as depression, anxiety, 
low self-esteem, relationship problems at work or home, workplace stress, workplace 
bullying^ bereavement, cross cultural adjustments. My supervisor was a counselling 
psychologist completing training as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist who drew upon 
a range of psychodynamic theory—especially object relations. She encouraged me to
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adapt the psychodynamic frame to the setting and to draw from other models when it 
seemed most suited to the client’s needs and goals. In this placement I continued 
learning how to use my countertransference.
After sessions I would sketch out verbatims, noting my own reactions and 
emotionally charged moments in the interaction, which I would then process in self- 
reflection and supervision. Adopting a ‘totalist’ perspective (Tansey & Burke, 1989), 
my supervisor and I considered all feelings and reactions aroused in work vdth a 
client to be the co-creation of both client and therapist, and therefore of potential use 
in understanding the client’s internal and external relationships. This way of using 
countertransference taught me to pay close attention to my embodied experience in 
the room. Every feeling and reaction, however baffling or embarrassing was of 
potential interest and value. Projective identification was not necessarily considered a 
pathological defense, but was often understood as an unconscious form of 
communication that could show me what it felt like in the client’s skin. My aim was 
to ‘contain’ and understand this feeling and find some way to offer it back to the 
client in the form of an interpretation (Bion, 1967). I found this way of working very 
creative, and the clients I worked with were responsive.
This is illustrated in my work with Ms. C, a woman in her thirties who presented with 
acute distress and anxiety about the state of her marriage, which had deteriorated after 
the birth of their first child. She said her husband had shifted all his love and 
affection to the child. She recalled feeling very lonely and unlovable as a young child 
following her parents’ divorce, which had meant loss of contact with her father and 
loss of her mother to preoccupation with a new partner and stepchildren. Ms. C 
described a history of love triangles in which she would be intensely infatuated, the 
relationship inevitably ending when she or the partner fell for someone else. I 
hypothesised that her early losses of the ‘idealised object’ were possibly being re­
enacted in the pattern of love triangles, and again in her experience of the marriage. I 
also thought her intense anxiety might be related to conflicting feelings of love and 
envy toward her child. The focus of our work became exploring the dynamics of the 
relationship with her husband and its links to her earlier experiences of loss with the 
aim of allowing her to mourn the loss of the idealised object, so that she would be
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better placed to decide what she wanted to do about her marriage. As we sat in the 
room together interacting, I realised that my countertransference experience often 
seemed to give me a glimpse into one of her relational positions—sometimes I felt 
idealised, other times the object of her disappointment, and other times kept at a 
distance. As I was able use my experience of these various ‘felt’ frames of reference 
to inform my interpretations and interaction with Ms. C, over time she began to 
recognise these dynamics as she was replaying them in her relationship with her 
husband and child, and felt empowered to take responsibility for her part in resolving 
them.
Year 4 Cognitve Behavioural (CBT) Model
During my final year I worked in the Specialist Therapies Department of an NHS 
Trust in cognitive behavioural clinics for recurrent depression and for obsessive 
compulsive disorder. This was perhaps my most challenging placement experience as 
I struggled to shift firom less structured humanistic and psychodynamic ways of 
working rooted in emotional experience to the more structured and cognition-focused 
CBT model. My primary supervisor tended to be ‘purist’ in his own practice of CBT 
but encouraged me to find my own way of working and was open to cognitive 
approaches that incorporated ideas firom other models. I found Gilbert’s (1992) 
cognitive interpersonal approach to depression, Safiran’s (1998) work on the 
therapeutic relationship in CBT, and ideas firom Young, Kosko, and Weishaar’s 
(2003) schema-focused integrative model particularly helpful. After an initial period 
of feeling overwhelmed by the dazzling array of ‘techniques,’ I settled in and began to 
appreciate the therapeutic potential of CBT—especially in working with OCD. I 
enjoyed the collaborative and transparent approach to the therapeutic relationship 
built into CBT. I experienced myself as a collaborator in helping the client to achieve 
his/her goals—a potential ally and companion with specific expertise who would ‘put 
my cards on the table’ in offering the client an initial formulation and proposed 
therapy plan (negotiable). In the event that the client wanted to proceed, the work 
would begin, as was the case with Mr. D.
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‘Doing with’
Mr D, in late middle age, presented to the OCD clinic with intrusive thoughts and 
images in which he was responsible for causing harm to someone. At the start of 
therapy these obsessions were occupying most of his waking hours and had left him 
unable to function in his job. Research evidence supports the use of cognitive 
behavioural therapy for the treatment for OCD (Roth & Fonagy, 1996). Cognitive 
conceptualisations of OCD (e.g., Salkovskis, 1988) suggest it is not intrusive thoughts 
themselves, but rather, dysfunctional appraisals of them (e.g.. If I think something 
bad, it will happen) coupled with futile attempts to suppress them that maintain the 
vicious cycle of OCD. Therefore, the aim of therapy was not to eradicate Mr. D’s 
thoughts (an impossible task), but instead, to help him acquire the ability to ‘step 
back’ and begin to recognise, re-evaluate, and modify his appraisals as to their 
credibility, validity, and meaning—learning how to challenge them.
The way I have come to conceptualise this therapeutic activity from an 
intersubjective/relational perspective, is that, through the processes of our 
intersubjective contact, Mr. D and I were able to participate in each other’s ‘felt’ 
experience. In this way we each gained access to another frame of reference with the 
possibility of using this to step momentarily outside our own frame of reference and 
reflect on it—to ‘see through the eyes of the other’ (at least to some extent). As a 
therapist this gave me information that I needed in trying to understand Mr. D and 
offer him the experience of feeling ‘heard’ and ‘felt’. As a client, Mr. D had access to 
an alternative ‘felt’ sense (mine) of his intrusions in which they were not experienced 
as threatening. The structure of the cognitive activities served to focus this 
intersubjective engagement on the subjective experience of his OCD intrusions.
As we began working together, I was acutely aware of my lack of experience with 
OCD and recall feeling overwhelmed by the level of his anxiety, the sheer volume of 
his material, and his high expectations of treatment. It seemed that one of the most 
important and therapeutic interventions that I could offer was to listen without alarm 
or disgust and help him to see that what he was experiencing could be understood. 
Psychoeducation about OCD helped him to feel validated and offered a more benign 
way of making sense of his experience.
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With the encouragement of my supervisor I introduced the use of standard CBT 
‘thought records’. Each week he arrived with copious thought records, which he said 
were helpfiil in getting the thoughts out of his head and onto paper. He said he also 
liked knowing that I would know how he was getting on from day to day, which 
seemed to be a validation of the therapeutic significance of the relationship and point 
to the possibility that the thought records fimctioned in some way as a ‘transitional 
object’ between sessions.
Next, drawing on the Hyman and Pedrick (1999) model, I introduced the concept of 
identifying cognitive reactions to intrusions that are commonplace in OCD (e.g., 
thought-action fusion, overestimation of risk or danger, superstitious thinking, 
perfectionism, etc.) and learning how to challenge them with ‘coping self-talk’. We 
added a fourth column to his thought records in which he could practice using ‘coping 
self-talk’ to counter the distressing thoughts (e.g.. This is just another OCD false 
alarm which is annoying, but I can ignore it.)
As the sessions progressed, he reported that the intrusive thoughts, while still present, 
felt further away, less aggressive and demanding. His thought records gradually 
became more concise and clearer. His scores on a standardised measure of OCD 
symptoms showed the obsessions had shifted from occupying most of his waking 
hours to causing occasional interference.
I found the work with Mr. D very challenging in that he was one of my first clients 
with OCD. It was also very rewarding to feel I had been able to contribute to his relief 
after so many years of suffering. The work vdth Mr. D demonstrated for me the value 
of symptom-specific techniques at the same time it reconfirmed in my mind the 
centrality of the therapeutic relationship in the change process. Looking back it is 
difficult to imagine how Mr. D could have progressed without the use of specific CBT 
interventions tailored to OCD. By the same token, according to Mr. D, one of the 
most therapeutic aspects of our work was disclosing the content of his thoughts and 
discovering that I did not consider him weird or dangerous—that in fact, his 
experience was ‘normal’ for someone with OCD (though very distressing for him).
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I believe that much of the therapeutic benefit could also be explained using an 
intersubjective application of object relations theory. Stem (2004) has argued that 
intersubjectivity “involves the mutual interpenetration of minds that permits us to say, 
T know that you know that I know’ or T feel that you feel that I feel’” (p. 75). 
Applied to my work with Mr. D, we could say that his opportunity to ‘feel’ me 
‘feeling’ his ‘felt’ experience of the terrifying intmsions without being terrified of 
them or him, both modelled and gave him as i f  experiential access to a more benign 
interpretation of his ‘felt’ experience, and a different way of relating to the intrusions 
that could challenge and contribute to modification his existing internal model of 
himself.
Concluding Comments
In this paper I have attempted to reflect upon the various contributions to my 
development to date as a counselling psychologist and have sought to show how my 
relational/intersubj ective understanding of the therapeutic relationship has informed 
my approach in each of the core models. I have found the process of training very 
rigorous, longer than I had anticipated, and at times very difficult. But ultimately the 
process has been richly rewarding, and I am grateful to many who have contributed, 
but most especially to the clients and supervisors who have made my journey 
possible.
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RESEARCH DOSSIER
80
Introduction to the Research Dossier
The research dossier is comprised of three pieces of research conducted during the 
course: a literature review, a qualitative project, and a quantitative project. They 
represent successive approaches to exploring the practice implications of therapists’ 
emotions aroused in the therapeutic relationship with a particular focus on shame and 
guilt affect.
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Elephant in the Consulting Room: 
Therapists’ Experiences of Shame and the Therapeutic Process 
A Review of the Literature
Abstract
This first review of the literature found numerous anecdotal accounts by practitioners but 
curiously few empirical investigations of therapists’ feelings of shame aroused in 
therapeutic work. In the literature it is widely held that such experiences are 
commonplace and represent a powerful affective dynamic in the therapeutic process that 
can be used to the benefit or detriment of clients depending on the practitioner’s self- 
awareness and capacity to non-defensively acknowledge, tolerate, and resolve shame. 
Recent evidence suggests that, although shame outside therapists’ awareness can lead to 
disruptive interpersonal defenses, therapists can learn to use their own shame cues to 
monitor the state of the therapeutic alliance and gain empathie insight into a client’s 
experience. Implications for practice and research are discussed.
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Introduction
In the past twenty years there has been an explosion of theoretical interest and empirical 
investigation devoted to understanding shame phenomena (e.g., Broucek, 1991; Gilbert & 
Andrews, 1998; Goldberg, 1991; Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Kaufinan, 1992, 1996; Lansky 
& Morrison, 1997; Lee & Wheeler, 1996; H. B. Lewis, 1971, 1987; M. Lewis, 1992; 
Morrison, 1989, 1998; Morrison & Stolorow, 1997; Nathanson, 1987, 1992; Retzinger, 
1987,1991,1995; Scheff, 1997, 1998; Scheff & Retzinger, 1997; Schore, 1994; Tangney 
& Bearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1989; Tomkins, 1987; Wurmser, 
1981).
Much of the writing about shame is located within the psychotherapeutic literature and 
has predictably focused on the clinical management of clients’ experiences of shame 
from a range of theoretical perspectives (e.g.. Possum & Mason, 1986; Gilbert, 1998a; 
Goldberg, 1991; Harder & Greenwald, 2000; Harper & Hoppes, 1990; Hartling, Rosen, 
Walker, & Jordan; Jacoby, 1991; Jordan, 1997; Kaufinan, 1992, 1996; Kilbome, 1999; 
Lee & Wheeler, 1996; H. B. Lewis, 1971; 1987; Lichtenberg, 1999; Mollon, 1993; 
Morrison, 1994; Wurmser, 1981). It is only in the last decade as theoretical and 
empirical interest in the bi-directional and ‘intersubjective’ dynamics of affect within 
therapeutic dyads has evolved and expanded (e.g., Aron, 2000; Beebe and Lachmann, 
2002; Jordan, 2001; Mitchell & Aron, 1995; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, 
Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1995; Stone, Xh.at therapists’ own experiences of shame 
and the possible implications of those experiences for therapeutic practice have begun to 
receive attention in the literature. However, insofar as it has been possible to ascertain, 
this is the first time this small but growing body of material has been reviewed.
The central question addressed by this review was: “What do we ‘know’ about
therapists’ experiences of shame in therapeutic work and their implications for the 
therapeutic process and relationship?” This review assumes that all ‘knowledge’ is 
ultimately perspective-bound and provisional, so that this review represents an attempt to
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identify and critically reflect upon the range of current perspectives on the subject at hand 
as understood through the interpretative lens of the reviewer.
Relevant literature was identified through a search of online academic databases in 
psychology (PsychlNFO), social sciences (Psychology & Behavioral Sciences 
Collection), and psychiatry (Medline), and reference lists of articles and books identified 
in this manner were then scanned for additional sources with the aim of locating as much 
of the relevant material as possible. Key search words included various spellings and 
phrases comprised of the following: therapist, psychotherapist, counsellor,
psychoanalyst, psychologist, countertransference, shame, self-conscious, emotion, 
feelings, affect, psychotherapy, therapeutic, counselling, psychoanalytic, process, 
relationship, dynamics, interaction, transaction, exchange, interpersonal, systemic, dyad.
The empirical literature specifically addressing therapists’ experiences of shame and the 
therapeutic process was found to consist of only one quantitative study Livingston & 
Farber (1996) and several qualitative studies (Dunn, 1987; Retzinger, 1998; Scheff (1987, 
1998). In addition, there are various anecdotal accounts and theoretical reflections 
written by practitioners representing a broad spectrum of theoretical orientations, 
including classical, Jungian, object relations, self psychology and 
relational/intersubjective strands within the psychodynamic perspective (e.g., Amati-Sas, 
1992; Bacal and Thomson, 1996; Bierenbroodspot, 1991; Bohm, 1996; Broucek, 1991; 
Carr, 1999; Goldberg, 1991; Gump, 2000; Hahn, 2000; Jacoby, 1993; Kaufinan, 1992, 
1996; Kometsi, 1999; Lansky, 1994; Mindell, 1994; Morrison, 1989, 1994; Nathanson, 
1987; Ricci & Broucek, 1998; Schneider, 1987; Stein, 1997) as well as à cognitive 
behavioural perspective (Gilbert, 1998a), family systems perspective (Harper & Hoopes, 
1990), feminist relational-cultural perspective (Jordan, 1997), Gestalt perspective 
(Jacobs, 1996), and multi-cultural perspective (Parker & Schwartz, 2002).
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Definition of Shame Experience for Purpose of this Review
There are many ways of defining and describing shame phenomena—cognitively, 
affectively, neurologically, somatically, phenomenologically, intrapsychically, 
interpersonally, and systemically. Shame is generally understood to be a universal and 
complex self-reflexive emotional experience in which the “self’ is experienced as 
deficient or undesirable (Gilbert, 1998b). Though theorists differ in emphasis, there is 
wide agreement that shame experiences involve affective, cognitive, and imagery 
components and may be evoked in many different contexts, giving rise to a wide range of 
shades and gradations of feeling and subjective meaning. Feelings such as inadequacy, 
unworthiness, unacceptability, “loss of face,” and inferiority are examples. Most theorists 
distinguish between shame and guilt. Whereas guilt is said to involve feelings of regret 
about specific actions (temporal and specific in nature), shame involves feelings about 
the acceptability of oneself as a person—the key difference being between what one does 
and who one feels oneself to be (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 24-25). Beyond this, 
however, there is considerable debate among shame theorists about what should be 
included within the family of shame variants. For example, Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Barlow (1994) have argued that embarrassment differs more from shame than guilt and 
should be considered a distinct emotion, whereas others (Jordan, 1997; Nathanson, 1992; 
Scheff & Retzinger, 1997) consider embarrassment to be a generally mild and transient 
shame variant within a broad spectrum of possible shame experiences.
Shame theorists also differ as to whether the emotional experience of shame should be 
considered fundamentally maladaptive, or is better conceptualised on a continuum 
ranging from adaptive to maladaptive dependent on intensity, duration, frequency, and 
context. Tangney and Dearing (2002) have taken the position that shame is a “primitive” 
emotion and have questioned whether it any longer serves an adaptive purpose (p. 126- 
127). Other theorists have argued that shame functions adaptively to protect boundaries 
and privacy (Schneider, 1987), to regulate social distance and intimacy (Retzinger, 1998), 
and to alert us to actual or potential threats to social bonds and individual dignity (H.
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Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1998; Scheff, 1987). Shame cues function as a signal that we 
feel we have breeched or are at risk of breeching the limits of being experienced as 
acceptable, respectable, desirable social beings (Jordan, 1997; Mindell, 1996). Closely 
related to this is disagreement over the concept of unconscious or “bypassed shame” (H. 
Lewis, 1971), which has been criticized by Tangney and Dearing (2002) for making 
shame into an “elastic construct” used to explain everything (p. 8). Other theorists, 
however, believe ‘bypassed’ shame can function as an outside-of-awareness ‘driver’ of 
consciously felt anxiety or rage, which is fundamental to understanding the implications 
of shame dynamics in therapeutic relationships (e.g., Hahn, 2000; Morrison, 1989, 1994; 
Stein, 1995; Scheff, 1987, 1998). Not surprisingly, those whose definition of shame is 
least ‘elastic’ and most focused on the intense end of the spectrum argue that shame may 
have become obsolete and maladaptive (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, 
theorists who maintain a broader, more inclusive definition of shame (e.g.. Harder & 
Greenwald) have argued that maladaptive shame is a matter of degree. They argue that 
insensitivity to shame cues and the experience of “too little” shame (“shamelessness”) as 
well as the experience of “too much” shame (“shame-proneness”) can be maladaptive 
(Harder & Greenwald, 2000; Jacoby, 1993; Schneider, 1987; Stein, 1997)—much the 
way that generalised anxiety would be considered a maladaptive variant of fear.
For the purpose of this review, in order to avoid omitting important contributions to the 
literature about therapists’ experiences of shame and the therapeutic process, a broad and 
inclusive definition of shame has been adopted that takes into account the milder end of 
the spectrum and the idea that shame sometimes exerts influence outside conscious 
awareness. Thus, the entire spectrum of therapists’ shame experiences that have been 
identified as such by practitioners themselves within literature are considered. Given the 
exploratory nature of this review, it seems preferable to err on the side of inclusion and 
offer the reader the opportunity to engage with arguments involved in drawing the 
boundaries.
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Review of Empirical Literature — Quantitative and Qualitative Studies 
Quantifying Therapists’ Shame and Its Impact
Despite extensive searching, only one quantitative investigation Of therapists’ shame in 
the therapeutic relationship (Livingston & Farber, 1996) could be found. This study 
sought to examine the relationship between therapists’ ‘shame-proneness’—defined as 
the dispositional tendency to experience shame (Tangney, 1990)—and therapists’ 
responses to clients exhibiting strong shame affect. Shame-proneness is typically 
measured using global adjectives (e.g., ‘embarrassed,’ ‘mortified’) rated by the 
participant for how often or how well each adjective describes the self, or by using 
everyday scenarios depicting failures or mistakes followed with phenomenological 
descriptions of possible emotional reactions ft-om which participants are asked to choose.
Livingston and Farber (1996) hypothesized that more shame-prone therapists would have 
more difficulty in responding to clients’ shame affect. In looking at the relationship 
between shame proneness scores of 45 trainee therapists’ shame-proneness scores 
(measured by the scenario-based Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA): Tangney, 
Wagner & Gramzow, 19,89) and their self-reported emotional responses (recorded on a 
form devised for the study) to watching videotaped enactments of client shame states by a 
professional actor, Livingston and Farber (1996) found that trainees with higher shame- 
proneness scores “appeared to be less confident about their ability to work with angry 
shameful affect” (p. 609). While acknowledging limitations of the study (e.g., the 
artificiality of the exercise compared to in vivo therapy and sample limited to trainees), 
Livingston and Farber concluded: “Regardless of training stage, it may be critical for 
therapists to be mindful of their particular shame-proneness; especially how it affects 
their empathie responsiveness towards their clients” (p.609). Since this appears to be the 
extent of studies involving quantitative measurement of therapists’ shame-proneness, it is 
unlikely that many therapists are in a position to be mindful of their particular proneness 
to shame responses and its effect on their empathie responsiveness.
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In their review of empirical findings on the interpersonal implications of guilt and shame 
generally, Tangney and Dearing (2002) cite eleven independent studies of various age- 
groups that found individual differences in shame-proneness to be inversely related to a 
dispositional capacity for empathy. One additional study demonstrating that ‘induced’ 
experiences of shame “short circuited” empathy even among those identified as “low 
shame-prone” (p. 88-89). Considering the therapeutic importance accorded to therapists’ 
empathie responsiveness, these findings argue for fiirther study aimed at understanding 
the relationship between therapists’ shame-proneness and their capacity for empathie 
responsiveness in the context of therapeutic work.
In summary, few attempts have been made to quantify therapists’ experiences of shame 
and their impact in the context of therapeutic work. What little data there is has relied 
exclusively on the measurement of ‘shame-proneness’ confined to a small sample of 
trainee therapists. It would be useful to have more data on shame-proneness in therapists 
as a subgroup, particularly the relationship between shame-proneness and empathy. 
There are, however, problems with defining and measuring therapists’ experiences of 
shame exclusively in terms of shame-proneness. Because shame-proneness measures 
rely on self-reported shame, many of the shame experiences discussed in the literature 
(such as by-passed shame or transient and subtle shame cues) would not be accessible to 
investigation. In addition it is conceivable that a therapist could be ‘shame-prone’ yet 
sufficiently self-aware and skilful in the processing these feelings to put them to 
therapeutic use in service of the client. This would suggest there may be a need for 
development and investigation of other constructs as, for example, shame-awareness and 
affect-processing skill.
Qualitative studies of therapists’ shame and its impact
Importance o f shame-awareness. Retzinger (1987, 1991, 1995, 1998) and Scheff (1987, 
1997, 1998) have developed a strand of research aimed at analysing shame dynamics 
embedded in verbatim transcripts of therapeutic dialogue in order to investigate the “in
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vivo” moment-to-moment impact of therapists’ shame on the therapeutic process. In 
most cases the transcriptions have been made from audio-recordings so that some 
paralinguistic data (e.g., pauses, speed, volume, etc.) as well as verbal data has been 
available for analysis. The aim has been to link “each outer expressive term with its 
corresponding inner emotion” and analyse the meaning of the affect within its relational 
context (Scheff, 1987, p. 110). “Observables” such as words and nonverbal sounds in the 
recording (where available) are used to infer the unstated implications and emotions that 
underlay the dialogue (Scheff, 1998, p. 101-102) and to analyse changes in the emotions 
over time—changes that are viewed as indications of the state of the relationship 
(Retzinger, 1995, p. 1107). Cues for shame in the dialogue (verbal and nonverbal) are 
discerned using content analysis, drawing upon the lexicon of code words and phrases 
included in the Gottschalk et al. (1969) content analysis scale, along with additional 
categories of verbal cues and paralinguistic markers for shame that have been developed 
and added by Scheff & Retzinger (see Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Retzinger, 1987; 
Retzinger, 1995). The analyses themselves read like something of a cross between 
discourse and conversation analysis, perhaps best described as “relational analysis” based 
on tracing the flow of affectivity inferred from the linguistic and paralinguistic features of 
the dialogue informed by the context.
Their analyses of shame phenomena in the therapeutic dialogue have made several 
theoretical contributions to understanding the implications of therapists’ shame within the 
therapeutic process: (1) the phenomenon of the “shame-rage spiral” (Scheff, 1987) in 
therapeutic dyads, wherein a therapist’s unacknowledged embarrassment for having 
forgotten a session (in this example) results in a defensive response to the patient’s anger 
about the missed session, becoming a further source of shame to the patient and setting 
the stage for an ensuing spiral of defensive comments and retorts in which therapist and 
client each feel contemptuously treated by the other; (2) the phenomenon of ‘ideological 
countertransference ’ (Retzinger, 1998) in which a therapist becorhes so personally 
invested in a particular theory that the therapist’s interpretations and interactions with the 
patient come to be driven by his or her need to avoid the anticipated shame of being
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wrong, foreclosing the prospect of a genuine empathie connection; and (3) the idea that 
therapists can use their own shame cues and those of their client to monitor the state of 
the therapeutic bond and build the therapeutic alliance (Retzinger, 1998; Scheff, 1987, 
1998).
How should these analyses be evaluated? The strength of the Scheff and Retzinger 
approach is that therapists’ in vivo experiences of shame are examined within their 
relational context affording a rich and contextualised rendering of shame dynamics. 
Also, the “observational” nature of the method allows for investigation of shame 
experiences that may be outside conscious awareness and thus, inaccessible to methods 
that rely on self-reported experience. However, the use of coding schemes to identify 
shame in running text has been criticized by Tangney and Dearing (2002), who describe 
as “disappointing,” evidence for their reliability and validity, citing Binder (1970), 
Crouppen (1976), and R. Smith (1972). In considering these criticisms, it seems 
important to keep in mind the overall aims (contextualised ‘in vivo’ analyses) and 
approach (qualitative) of Retzinger and Scheff. Lexicons of words and phrases and 
paralinguistic “gestures” are used to identify possible locations of shame in the relational 
dynamic, but context is the final arbiter of meaning. Their objective is not to quantify 
bits of shame, but to analyse the meaning of its flow in context. Because the approaches 
qualitative (versus quantitative), credibility of the analyses may be more appropriately 
assessed using evaluative criteria for qualitative research such as (a) internal coherence, 
(b) adequate presentation of the evidence, (c) triangulation, and (d) internal audit (e) 
disclosure of researcher’s perspective (f) credibility checks (see J. Smith, 1996; Elliott, 
Fischer, & Rennie, 1999; Yardley, 2000) for discussions of evaluative criteria for 
qualitative research). Applying these criteria, the Scheff and Retzinger analyses appear to 
“triangulate” with the practice-based observations of clinicians and, in the opinion of this 
author, demonstrate internal coherence. Ample raw data from the transcripts is included 
to allow the reader to follow the logic of the analyses. Weaknesses include the failure to 
include a step-by-step outline of the process, particularly as it relates to coding, any 
mention of credibility checks such as a second person checking the data against the
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results, and they do not make their own perspective available. However, despite certain 
shortcomings, their work would seem to have made a valuable contribution to 
understanding therapists’ shame and its implications in the therapeutic process—offering 
a contextualised and fine-grained perspective that quantitative approaches are unable to 
achieve.
Sources o f therapists ’ shame. The only other qualitative study of therapists’ experiences 
of shame that could be found is an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Dunn, 1986/1987) 
that identified 28 clinical accounts of “countertransference shame” in case studies 
compiled from questionnaires and interviews with psychoanalytic psychotherapists. 
“Therapists’ self-perceptions as weak, inferior, and ineffective” were dominant in the 
questionnaires and interviews, and the subthemes that emerged included “sexuality, 
insufficient empathy, aggression, and impulsiveness leading to altered therapeutic 
boundaries” (Dissertation Abstracts International, p.4646-B). This study stands out as an 
early attempt to understand the impact of therapists’ experiences of shame on their 
therapeutic work, the findings of which are echoed in subsequent practice-based 
reflections of practitioners, particularly the subthemes pertaining to boundaries and 
empathy.
Theoretical Literature
This consists primarily of practitioner reflections on their own experiences of shame in 
clinical work as well as scattered papers and chapters with observations and guidance 
written by shame theorists.
‘Universal’ Sources of Shame for Therapists
Harper and Hoopes (1990) and Kaufman (1992) have identified a number of sources of 
shame as intrinsic to the role of therapist and “universal” in the sense that most therapists 
can expect to experience them: These include (a) feelings toward clients that are
withheld (e.g., erotic feelings or anger), (b) uncertainty about disclosure after revealing
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personal information or being asked a direct question, (c) uncertainty or embarrassment 
about touch, (d) uncertainty about responding to clients’ dependency needs and requests 
(e) shame about lack of progress and clients’ discouragement (f) shame in facing and 
owning up to inevitable mistakes and limitations.
Harper and Hoopes (1990) have pointed out that these sources of shame tend to be 
clustered around inevitable “uncertainty” in the role of the therapist whose responsibility 
it is to make ethical and professional judgements that regulate boundaries of intimacy and 
dependency in the therapeutic relationship—decisions that will sometimes be subject to 
second-guessing and self-doubt signalled by the experience of transient shame felt as 
“awkwardness” or “embarrassment,” with novice therapists likely to be extra susceptible.
Systemic Sources of Shame for Therapists
Another recently recognised potential source of shame for .therapists involves shame 
arising out of the larger social context in which both client and therapist are embedded-— 
that is, therapists’ experiences of shame that result from identification with either the 
devaluing or devalued identity in socially constructed polarized systems such as race, 
gender, class, and sexual orientation. In Gump’s (2000) commentary on Altman’s (2000) 
case study of his own failed therapeutic relationship with a black client, Gump contended 
that it was Altman’s shame about his own racism that had prevented him from being able 
to use the therapeutic skills he possessed—for example, in his avoidance of certain 
issues. Gump suggested that shame is apt to be a significant part of the affective dynamic 
in a therapeutic dyad consisting of opposite members of socially constructed 
polarizations based on race, class, and so forth, because one of the members will come 
with constructed inferior status and the other with the fact of constructed superiority, both 
of which are likely to be sources of shame in interactions with the ‘other’. Along similar 
lines, Parker and Schwartz (2002), who facilitate multi-cultural training, have reported 
shame among White trainees that tends to arise as they become more aware of racial 
prejudice and stereotypes. Parker and Schwartz suggest that this shame can hinder
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empathie understanding and have recommended that white trainee counsellors “increase 
their self-awareness of, monitor, and actively work through shame” (p. 311).
Individual Dispositional Differences in Shame Sensitivity
Beyond so-called universal and systemic sources of shame, each therapist is thought to 
have a unique temperament and history of shame experiences, a “shame profile,” 
(Kaufman, 1992, p. 222) that will determine the valence of that therapist’s shame 
response at a given moment within a particular context. The resulting individual 
variability among therapists in susceptibility to shame, awareness and tolerance of shame 
experiences, and the management of shame feelings has been conceptualised in a variety 
of ways.
Jacobs (1996), a Gestalt therapist, has divided therapists’ shame experiences into three 
categories: (a) “shame proper,” (b) “shame anxiety,” and (c) “shame potential” (p. 300). 
According to Jacobs, within the context of a therapeutic relationship, the majority of 
therapists will experience transient shame episodes of the first two types, but a few 
therapists will “be sensitive to shame as a potential in all interactions,” developing a 
character style such as “defensive grandiosity” or alternatively, “hiding and dissembling” 
that is “meant to counteract” the possibility of shame (p. 300). Such character styles, she 
contends, fiinction largely outside of awareness and tend to “constrict” the capacity to 
function therapeutically.
Harper and Hoopes (1990), writing from a family systems perspective, have 
conceptualised therapists’ individual differences in another way, suggesting that most 
adult feelings of shame derive from the “shaming” (via lack of empathie reception and 
acceptance by important others) in childhood of intimacy needs (a need to feel 
emotionally close to others and be able to trust that one’s feelings will be accepted), 
and/or dependency needs (a need to feel secure that one is wanted, will be looked after, 
and can ask for help). According to Harper and Hoopes (1990), all children have 
experienced shaming of these needs from time to time, so therapists will typically find
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themselves sensitive to shame arising around specific dependency or intimacy issues in 
clients that resonate with their own histories. However, if as a child, a therapist has 
consistently experienced shaming of both intimacy and dependency needs, that therapist 
is said to have “internalised shame,” which will magnify his or her shame vulnerability in 
the therapeutic relationship, resulting in shame-defensive behaviors that may interfere 
with the healthy working through of issues of intimacy and dependency as they arise in 
the therapeutic relationship. All therapists, according to Harper and Hoopes, need to be 
aware of and continually work through their own shame and related defenses in order to 
function effectively.
Writing from a self psychology perspective, Bacal and Thomson (1996) have introduced 
the idea that, like clients, all therapists bring certain needs for “selfobject relatedness” 
into the therapeutic relationship. They have suggested that, just as clients have a healthy 
need for empathie mirroring and affirmation by their therapists, so too, therapists 
typically need from clients to be seen (“mirrored”) as “decent, well-motivated human 
beings” (p. 19). They argue that such needs should be regarded as “healthy,” contending 
that mutual selfobject relatedness benefits the therapeutic process. Bacal and Thomson 
hypothesize that, when therapists’ healthy needs for selfobject relatedness are not met (as 
in the case of clients who talk without pause or make sustained attacks on the therapist’s 
integrity or competence), feelings of inadequacy, anger, self-disappointment and shame 
may arise in the therapist from which the therapist must “decenter” in order to remain in 
empathie contact. “Normal” needs for selfobject relatedness on the part of therapists are 
distinguished from the excessive neediness of therapists “for whom the meeting of these 
needs is at the center of their general raison d’etre,” and whose work with patients “may 
serve to repair defects in self-structure that arose from a requirement to accede to the 
archaic selfobject needs of their caretakers” (p. 23).
While differing in terminology, all three ways of conceptualising individual differences 
among therapists distinguish between therapists’ shame experiences regarded as ‘normal’ 
and to be expected, and a predisposition to shame experiences that is out of the ordinary
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and likely to distort and impair the therapeutic process (thought to be rare by Jacobs, 
1996). This latter has been variously referred to as “characterological shame,” 
“internalised shame,” and what might be called “narcissistic vulnerability” by self 
psychologists. All ways of formulating a maladaptive propensity to shame experiences, 
these terms are not necessarily synonymous. Harper and Hoopes (1990) have suggested 
that it is both necessary and possible, with adequate support, for all therapists, including 
those with “internalised shame” to work through and resolve their shame, and have 
presented suggestions for such a process (see pp. 181-186). This, however, would only 
seem applicable to therapists with awareness of shame as an issue, whereas the therapist 
with a characterological predisposition to shame, according to Jacobs (1996), is more 
likely to be unaware (as in the case of defensive grandiosity). Lack of awareness is also 
implied in Bacal and Thomson’s (1996) description of the narcissistically vulnerable 
therapist. A concern about shame outside the therapist’s awareness is the danger that this 
shame may be unconsciously ‘transferred’ to the client by way of shame defensive 
behaviours (Jacobs, 1996). There is the notion that one aspect of each therapist’s unique 
shame profile will be a set of preferred shame defenses. “It behoves therapists to be 
aware of what situations typically evoke their shame and shame anxieties and the 
defenses (especially shame transfer) they use to protect themselves” (Jacobs, 1996).
Shame Defenses and the Therapeutic Process
Interpersonal shame defenses. Strategies intended to ‘defend’ against feelings of shame 
in interpersonal contexts have been theorized based on empirical studies of shame in the 
context of everyday life. Nathanson (1992) has grouped interpersonal shame defenses 
into four categories, including “emotional withdrawal,” “avoidance,” “attacks on self,” 
and “attacks on other.” Within the literature particular to therapists’ shame experiences, 
there are many references to ways in which these may be enacted by therapists in the 
therapeutic process. For example, when therapists are in the throes of full-blown feelings 
of inadequacy and self-doubt, perhaps in the face of sustained client discouragement or 
angry attacks, they may find themselves engaging in emotional withdrawal from clients 
(Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Kaufman, 1989; Jacobs, 1996; Lansky, 1994; Morrison, 1994)
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which can be as subtle as averting eye contact or more overt as in preoccupation with 
technique (Hahn, 2000). Avoidance, on the other hand, is more apt to be used as a way 
of coping with anticipated shame (Nathanson, 1992), and may take the form of colluding 
with a client to avoid certain topics that the therapist finds shame-provoking (Hahn, 2000; 
Stein, 1997), or colluding in blaming others for the clients’ difficulties to avoid the 
possibility of client disappointment in the therapist felt as shaming (Hahn, 2000). 
According to Nathanson, attacks on self generally take the form of compliant, submissive 
behavior and are more apt to be the defense of choice when one has less power or status 
in a relationship, or has more at stake in the relationship than the other person. 
Interestingly, they don’t come up as such in practitioners’ writing about shame defenses, 
but one could imagine that trainees might at times behave submissively in an effort to 
‘hang onto’ clients and avoid the shame of having a high DNA rate. Finally, attacks on 
other most often occur in response to feeling actively shamed or the anticipation of being 
shamed and involve a “turning of the tables” in which the other is shamed. Such 
externalisation of shame has been identified as one of the principal ways in which 
therapists’ shame can harm clients (Bohm, 1996; Jacobs, 1996; Jordan, 1997; Lansky, 
1994; Morrison, 1994). Examples include interventions that invalidate the client’s 
experience as in the case of representing a client’s angry feelings toward the therapist as 
transference ‘distortion’ or using labels that devalue clients: “Labels such as ‘This patient 
is resistant; this patient does not want to get better; or this patient is manipulative’—in 
other words labels and feelings that in some form devalue the patient, often have their 
roots in shame-based interactions. By blaming the patient the therapist can free him or 
herself of a possible sense of shame and inadequacy” (Gilbert, 1998a, p. 256).
Intrapsychic shame defenses. The processes of projection and projective identification 
have also been used to conceptualise shame defenses (e.g., Hahn, 2000; Morrison, 1989; 
Spero, 1984). Although the theoretical possibility of therapists’ projected shame is 
acknowledged, discussions in the psychotherapeutic literature have tended to position the 
client as projector and therapist as receiver. Hahn (2000) has presented a model for 
understanding “reactive” shame experiences in therapists arising fi*om
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countertransference identification with a client’s projected shame that has resonated with 
aspects of the therapist’s past experiences of shame.
The phenomenology of a shame experience leading up to the projection of shame has 
been described by Hahn (2000) as a type of object relations process: “When shame is 
experienced, internal representations become polarized into devalued and devaluing 
introjects, reflecting the rigid and immutable quality of shame where vivid images 
predominate, and words are used obsessively to condemn and humiliate” (p. 11). 
According to Hahn, the affect and vivid imagery associated with the activation of these 
representations of shaming experiences is thought to render them so intense and difficult 
to contain that individuals typically use the defensive processes of projection or 
projective identification to externalise either the devalued or the devaluing introject. If 
the devaluing (shaming) introject is externalised, the individual’s experience will be that 
of exposure to a condemning, devaluing audience, justifying withdrawal and avoidance. 
But, if the devalued introject is externalised, the individual’s experience will be one of 
haughtiness and superiority, justifying the release of aggression in the form of contempt 
or rage.
For example, if a client cannot bear to experience shameful feelings of inadequacy and 
incompetence associated with the devalued introject, then through the process of 
projective identification, the devalued introject may be unconsciously externalised and 
projected into the therapist who, in identifying with it, may be unconsciously ‘induced’ 
into behaving incompetently, experiencing the client’s externalised feelings of 
inadequacy and incompetence very directly at the same time that the client identifies with 
feelings of contempt. According to Hahn’s (2000) model for the projective identification 
of shame, at any given movement the client may identify with either the shame or 
contempt side of the coin, while therapist identified with the opposite. These kinds of 
dynamics are believed by some to underlie the phenomena of shame-contempt exchanges 
in therapeutic dyads, characterized as a “frequent component of the analyst-patient 
interaction” (Reed, 1999). Reed has suggested that shame-contempt exchanges may
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represent re-enactments of the shamed child and the shaming adult in the therapeutic 
relationship. Figure 1 is an attempt to summarise in schematic form some examples of 
the therapist-client shame dynamics predicted by Hahn’s model.
Figure 1
Examples o f some predicted patterns o f transference-countertransference derived from 
Hahn’s (2000) model o f shame dynamics in the therapeutic relationship
-
Patient
Patient identifies with “shamed-side** 
o f shaming interaction and projects 
contempt- side onto/into therapist who 
is experienced as contemptuous and 
devaluing.
Patient
Patient identifies with “contempt-side** 
of shaming interaction and 
externalises shamed-side into therapist 
who is experienced as devalued.
Transference:
Patient experience -  intense experience 
of shame—expects to be rejected and 
devalued by the therapist if  feelings of 
inadequacy are allowed to show; may 
tend to hide feelings and withdraw, or 
engage in self-abasement (‘attacks on 
self), or attempt to numb and avoid 
shame feelings through substance 
abuse, etc. (p. 13).
Transference:
Patient experience -  others perceived 
as inadequate and to blame for client’s 
difficulties, justifying contempt or 
aggression, defensive ‘attacks on other’ 
(p. 13).
Therapist
—identifies with side o f 
shame experience that is 
* owned* by the client
Concordant Countertransference: 
Therapist experience -  in the face of 
patient withdrawal or self attack, 
therapist may experience feelings of 
inadequacy, incompetence, 
helplessness. May engage in parallel 
processes of withdrawal -  as subtle as 
in averting eye contact, or more overt, 
as in preoccupation with technique 
(p.l3).
Concordant Countertransference: 
Therapist experience— may join the 
patient in accusing or blaming others, 
colluding with client to avoid shame by 
projecting it onto others (p. 17).
Therapist
— identifies with side of 
shame experience 
^disavowed* by the client 
and projected into the 
therapist— ^projective 
identification*
Complementary Countertransference: 
Therapist experience—in the face of 
patient withdrawal, may ‘give up’ on 
patient, concluding that patient is 
beyond helping, doesn’t want help, or 
can’t be helped; may vilify patient; may 
feel contempt in face of patient’s shame 
avoidance defenses such as alcohol 
misuse (p. 15).
Complementary Countertransference: 
Therapist experience—may become 
target of hostile or contemptuous 
attacks and begin to feel or act in an 
incompetent manner, with both 
members of the dyad exaggerating 
mistakes or momentary lapses in 
empathie attunement (p. 17).
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Hahn’s model offers therapists a powerful way to conceptualise their own experiences of 
shame in the countertransference, and a model for sorting out ‘what belongs to whom’ in 
the complex and often unconscious intrapsychic and interpersonal dynamics of shame. 
The specificity of the model is compelling. Although Hahn states that in his model 
countertransference is understood to be “a joint creation, in which both therapist’s past 
conflicts and the patient’s projected aspects create specific patterns of interaction with the 
therapeutic process” (Gibbard, 1993, p. 13; cited in Hahn, 2000), nonetheless he only 
considers therapist experiences of shame that arise in “reaction” to patient’s experiences 
of shame, so it is not clear how the model might be applied to understanding therapists’ 
‘proactive’ contributions to bi-directional and co-created shame dynamics.
Relationship between Therapists’ Shame and Therapeutic Model and Technique
The impact of therapeutic model and technique on shame dynamics in the therapeutic 
dyad is a recurrent theme in the literature, with concerns and critiques focused on two 
areas: first, the impact of epistemological stances in which the therapist’s subjectivity is 
privileged as “real” and “objective;” second, the impact of classical psychoanalytic 
technique based on principles of therapist neutrality, abstinence, and anonymity. Both 
have been criticized for intensifying asymmetry in the dyad and structuring the 
therapeutic relationship in such as way so as to minimize its shaming potential for 
therapists at the expense of shaming clients. It has been argued that interacting with 
clients in an affectively “neutral” and “abstinent” manner can be highly shaming and 
countertherapeutic because it replicates the experience of unreciprocated empathie 
responsiveness that gives rise to shame in early relationships with caretakers (e.g., 
Broucek, 1991; Jordan, 1997; Ricci & Broucek, 1998). Similarly, epistemological stances 
that privilege therapists’ view of reality have been criticised as being shaming to clients’ 
whose subjective experience is thus devalued and invalidated as “distorted” at the same 
time that therapists’ subjectivity is elevated to the stature of objective truth and cloaked in 
authority (e.g., Jacobs, 1996; Jordan, 1997).
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In a provocative analysis of what have been described as the “unanalysed shame 
dynamics . . .  unconsciously institutionalised in the principles of neutrality, abstinence 
and anonymity” (p. 39), Ricci and Broucek (1998) have asserted that origins of these 
principles can be traced to “certain potentially shame-evoking personal and cultural 
considerations with which Freud had to deal” such as the need to position psychoanalysis 
as a credible science and a morally respectable endeavor at the time, as well as Freud’s 
own need for personal privacy (p. 53).
To the extent that the clinicians included in this review are representative of practitioners 
who have been sensitised to the potential impact of their own shame in the therapeutic 
process, it seems that with this sensitivity often comes advocacy of an intersubjective 
stance emphasizing mutual relatedness (e.g., Bacal & Thomson, 1996; Broucek, 1991; 
Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Jacobs, 1996; Jordan, 1997; Kaufman, 1996; Stein, 1997).
Recommendations for Managing Feelings of Shame in the Therapeutic Process
A number of practitioners have presented case examples to illustrate the management and 
therapeutic use of their feelings of shame in the therapeutic process (e.g., Bacal & 
Thomson, 1996; Bohm, 1996; Broucek, 1991; Carr, 1999; Goldberg, 1991; Hahn, 2000; 
Jacobs, 1996; Mindell, 1994; Morrison, 1994; Stein, 1997). In reviewing these, five 
common themes emerge. These include (1) the need for therapist self-awareness vis-a- 
vis shame profile and preferred defenses, and the therapist’s capacity to tolerate the 
experience of shame, (2) the need for active monitoring of shame cues (therapist’s and 
client’s) in the therapeutic relationship and a recognition that conscious feelings of shame 
or anticipatory shame in either party may represent the experience of an actual or 
impending break or rupture in empathie relatedness, variously referred to as a break in 
the interpersonal bridge (Kaufman, 1992), a rupture in selfobject relatedness (Bacal & 
Thompson, 1996), an empathie disconnection, (Jordan, 1997), (3) the therapist’s capacity 
for non-defensive self reflection to explore possible origins of shame experiences when 
they arise, such as uncertainty in the role of therapist (Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Kaufman, 
1996), unacknowledged selfobject needs (Bacal & Thomson, 1996; Morrison, 1994),
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resonant identifications with clients’ projected shame (Hahn, 2000; Stein, 1997), systems 
such as racism (Gump, 2000; Parker & Schwartz, 2002), or failures in the ‘here-and-now’ 
relationship (Jordan, 1997; Retzinger & Scheff, 1997), (4) the therapist’s ability to 
consider his or her own contribution to the rupture and to contain his or her own shame 
so as to scrupulously avoid interventions that might transfer the therapist’s shame to the 
client (Mindell, 1994; Jacobs, 1996), and finally (5) the use of judicious self-disclosure in 
order to restore empathie contact when ruptures do occur:
The goal is to develop a collaborative endeavor in which the devalued and 
devaluing introjects become available for discussion, rather than being 
unconsciously enacted by both parties. In the course of this exploration, it is 
appropriate for therapists to acknowledge that they have identified with a 
devaluing introject as a way to avoid experiences shame. This self-disclosure 
will strengthen the therapeutic alliance. By taking responsibility for their 
affective reactions and containing both the devalued and devaluing introjects, 
therapists help patients pursue their own affective intergration (Hahn, 2000, p.
19).
Conclusions
The central question of this review has been: “What do we know about therapists’ 
experiences of shame and their impact on the therapeutic process?” In attempting to 
answer this question, a critical review of the limited empirical and more extensive 
theoretical literature encompassing a continuum of perspectives has been undertaken. So 
far, some potential sources of therapist shame and some potential hazards of therapists’ 
shame defenses have been identified. Additionally, it would appear that individuals vary 
in their degree of shame sensitivity, and ‘shame proneness’ has been shown to interfere 
with empathy in the general population (Tangeny & Dearing, 2002) and in a small 
sample of trainee therapists when faced with clients’ angry shame affect (Livingston & 
Farber, 1996). However, because there has been so little investigation into how therapists 
go about recognising and processing shame experiences in therapeutic work, it is unclear
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what other factors (e.g., self-awareness, capacity to tolerate, contain, and process one’s 
own feelings of shame non-defensively) might mitigate hazards associated with shame- 
proneness, if not turn shame sensitivity into a potential asset.
It would also seem that choice of theoretical model and technique may be important 
factors in the potential impact of the therapist’s shame on the therapeutic process, and 
that models in which the therapist’s explicit empathie responsiveness is withheld (e.g., 
classical psychoanalytic ‘blank screen’), or the therapist’s experience of reality is 
privileged over the client’s, may be functioning (however unintentionally or 
unconsciously) so as to reduce the therapist’s shame vulnerability at the expense of 
increasing the client’s.
Overall what stands out across the literature is a growing body of evidence that 
therapists’ shame experiences can play a constructive or detrimental role in the 
therapeutic process largely determined by the therapist’s capacity for shame-awareness 
and non-defensive self-refection and engagement in the therapeutic process. These 
qualities seem to underpin therapists’ ability to (a) use shame cues effectively in 
monitoring the state of the therapeutic bond, (b) use shame experiences as an aid to 
understanding clients projected shame, (c) recognize and disengage from phenomena 
such as ideological countertransference, shame-rage spirals and shame-contempt 
exchanges, (d) acknowledge their part in empathie ruptures and repair empathie contact, 
(e) judiciously use self-disclosure of their own shame feelings, and (f) seek external 
support when needed to work through their own shame experiences.
In light of these practice implications, this review found a curious dearth of systematic 
investigation and gaps in the literature. For example, we don’t know how shame-prone or 
shame-aware the ‘average’ therapist might be. Beyond isolated accounts, we know little 
about how therapists recognise and process their own self-conscious feelings when 
aroused in therapeutic practice. Some authors cited a general neglect of shame
102
phenomena in their training—particularly the therapist’s experience of shame (e.g., 
Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989).
In seeking to understand why more hasn’t been done, hints can be found in the literature 
itself. For example, therapists would appear to be no different than most people in being 
reluctant or reticent to draw attention to their experiences of shame. Nathanson (1992) 
described a participant in his first shame workshop who came up afterward to thank him 
and offer a bit of “firiendly advice” that it might not be a good idea to keep doing shame 
workshops, lest he get a reputation for doing that topic. “In that moment I realised that 
the very idea of shame is embarrassing to most people” (p. 15). So it seems that shame is 
commonly experienced as shameful—by therapists and clients alike. Shame also clashes 
with the image most therapists wish to maintain of themselves internally and externally. 
Hahn (2000) has pointed out that feelings of inadequacy or self-doubt associated with the 
experience of shame are “anathema the competent and compassionate self-image of most 
therapists” (p. 10). And, among psychoanalysts, there is the “professional superego” and 
the ever-present threat of the label “unanalysed analyst” (Bierendbroodspot, 1991, p.71). 
Additionally, shame has been portrayed as a “primitive,” “maladaptive,” and “toxic” 
emotion with links to a host of psychopathologies (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, pp. 125- 
127). There has been some tendency to pathologize shame despite its being widely 
regarded as an emotion that is both innate and universal, perhaps the result of too narrow 
a focus on the intense and chronic end of a continuum of shame experiences, akin to 
pathologizing fear on the basis of paranoia. Nonetheless, this discourages therapists firom 
laying claim to shame. Finally, there may be a concern about over-emphasising the role 
of shame experiences in the therapeutic process at the expense of other affects and 
dynamics. “Shameniks” (nicknamed by Helen Block Lewis) are not oblivious to this 
concern: “While we emphasize the failure to recognize and appreciate the significance of 
shame, we wish also to avoid the other extreme of overemphasizing shame to the 
exclusion of balanced attention to other clinical phenomena” (Lansky & Morrison, 1997, 
p. 4).
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Obviously it is difficult to study phenomena that subjects do not wish to claim and 
sometimes may not even recognise as such. Thus, this review has been entitled: 
‘elephant in the consulting room.’ However, the very reasons it is difficult to study 
therapists’ shame are reasons it deserves greater attention. It is precisely because shame 
can generate defensiveness and sometimes exert influence outside of conscious 
awareness that there is so much to gain from further exploration of therapists’ 
experiences of shame. Morrison (1994) has summed up the stakes:
Countertransference shame is one of the more difficult experiences with which 
we must deal in our clinical work, for we face those very feelings of inferiority, 
ineptitude, and deficit that so much of our professional training has been aimed 
at eliminating. We are confronted with silences that beg for response and, 
accusations that we are useless and incompetent in meeting their needs by 
people we are trying to understand and help, and we are overtaken by boredom, 
fatigue, or sexual excitement when we are supposed to be energized or 
containing. We may run from the shame experience by blaming the patient for 
being defensive or for ‘inducing’ feelings in us; by tuning out and missing our 
own distress or that of our patient; or by tacitly colluding in agreeing to ‘bypass’ 
our mutual shame feelings (H.B. Lewis, 1971) and to focus on something else, 
like anger or conflict. Alternatively, we can attempt to stay with our own shame 
and learn from it (both about ourselves and about our patients’ particular 
experiences (p. 31).
Tangney and Dearing (2002) have hypothesised:, “It is our guess that unrecognised 
bouts of shame are a critical component of many negative countertransference 
reactions . . .  effectiveness may be enhanced to the extent that they [therapists] can 
recognize and work through associated feelings of shame” (p. 179). In conclusion, 
based on this review of the literature, their hypothesis would seem to be well- 
founded and a strong argument for further empirical investigation of this familiar but 
under-researched phenomenon in the consulting room.
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“Use of Self’
In reflecting on my ‘use of self in this project, I feel it is largely personal experience 
with the emotion of shame both inside and outside the therapeutic relationship that has 
most significantly influenced my choice of topic and also enabled me to bring multiple 
frames of reference to this review of the literature. These different perspectives include 
‘insider’ experiences of shame aroused in me both as a client and a trainee therapist. 
Alongside this is a personal inventory of more general shame experiences, which I 
believe are an inevitable part of the human condition. Sometimes I have been a 
participant and sometimes more of an observer.
My experience and interest in shame have a long history. In my growing up, my parents 
rarely resorted to smacking or spanking me, but the words, “We are so disappointed in 
you” had a searing power nonetheless. It was only later as an adult in personal therapy 
that I came to understand this power was to do with the intensity of my parents’ own 
shame being ‘transferred’ onto/into me on top of whatever I might have felt on my own. 
My therapist’s conceptualisation of shame as a systemic dynamic resonated strongly with 
my first-hand experience of shame in the parent-child relationship and has influenced my 
way of understanding shame dynamics in other significant and power-imbalanced 
relationships, including the therapist-client relationship.
My personal experiences of the therapeutic relationship as a client have also contributed 
significantly to this project—in the formulation of questions and interpretations of the 
literature. I have experienced one therapist who adopted a ‘blank screen’ approach. My 
other therapists have each been affectively responsive and participatory in their own 
ways. In contrast to the latter, which I have found therapeutic, I experienced the ‘blank 
screen’ approach as uniquely and profoundly shame-arousing. This experience was a 
primary motivation in wanting to look at the therapists’ experiences of shame with an 
interest in whether/how therapists’ own shame might be transferred onto/into clients
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(however inadvertently). It further reinforced the idea of shame as a systemic dynamic 
rather than an entity solely located inside one person or the other.
Finally, several experiences have impressed upon me the social and political implications 
of shame, which I believe can also be manifested in the therapeutic relationship by virtue 
respective social locations therapist and client bring into the room. It was in the context 
of “prejudice reduction training” as a peace educator that I first experienced the power of 
shame in socially constructed systems such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and class. 
I was a bwhite, middle class, heterosexual, female participant in a very diverse group. 
As the training exercises allowed me to begin to “see through the eyes” of those who 
were “other” to me, I became increasingly aware of unearned privileges that my social 
location had “blinded” me to—particularly in terms of race. I (and others “like me”) 
began to feel shame, in this case, I believe, ‘healthy’ shame that needed to be 
acknowledged and ‘owned’ if we were to be able to bridge and begin to repair the 
empathie divide it signalled and become authentic allies in dismantling racism. I had 
another opportunity to observe similar dynamics from the ‘outside looking in’ when I led 
a travel seminar to the Middle East and watched shame dynamics at work in the divide 
between Israelis and Palestinians.
As a ‘foreigner’ living in the U.K., I became aware of the social importance of shame 
cues in a new way—it took me time to ‘pick up on’ subtle shame cues in the culture, 
which gradually clued me in to how to behave ‘appropriately’ to the cultural context—for 
example, not acting ‘too familiar’ too soon. Feelings of mild shame aroused in me as I 
picked up on subtle changes in the facial expressions, tone of voice, posture of those 
around me, functioned as cues that I had broken some sort of unspoken social code, 
disclosing to everyone present my ‘outsider’ status—something that again has not only 
interpersonal but also intergroup implications.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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Based on all these experiences I wanted to learn more about shame but wondered where 
to start, as the literature is so vast. Initially I began reading round relational therapy and 
shame, and for a time thought I might review relational approaches to the treatment of 
shame. However, I began to come across therapists’ reflections about their own 
experiences of shame (e.g., Judith Jordan, Andrew Morrison, Ruth Stein) and found that 
their writing resonated with my own instincts (biases) and left me wanting to read more.
Throughout the project, I have been on placement as a trainee therapist. I have become 
increasingly aware of the power of my own shame to influence interventions— 
sometimes for the better I think, and sometimes not. For example, I have been aware of 
anticipatory shame sometimes when I have been about to self-disclose that causes me to 
stop and think before proceeding, and I sometimes feel shame when I have made a 
‘clumsy’ interpretation. It marks for me something to pay attention to and can be a cue to 
something I need to speak about in supervision. I have become more concerned about 
shame that I may not be so aware of—shame that could unconsciously be ‘turned back 
upon a client’ in the form of a subtly shaming interpretation.
When I came across the Livingston and Farber (1996) study and June Tangney’s work, I 
found myself asking. Am I shame-prone? And if so, what does that mean for me, for my 
clients? I don’t yet know the answer to either question, but I am convinced that there is a 
need to know much more about therapists’ experiences of shame (both conscious and 
unconscious) and its significance in the therapeutic process.
I am left with a fantasy of a social system where we all carry a “fair share” of shame— 
that is, we all have transient experiences of shame from time to time that remind us we 
are not the centre of the universe—but none of us is designated to be a ‘shame-carrier’ for 
another individual or group on the basis of age, gender, class, race, religion, sexual 
orientation. Children are not designated to carry shame for parents, and one generation is 
not designated to carry shame for another.
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Given that human beings are fundamentally social and relational, one of the most 
powerful sanctions that exists is the power to evoke shame in another person—and we are 
most apt to do so when we are important to someone else, or are feeling the need to 
defend against our own shame. The power imbalance intrinsic to therapeutic relationships 
magnifies the potential for shaming of clients. Out of my experience both as client and 
therapist, I came into to this research project already convinced of the need to “own” my 
own shame, but I leave the process with a somewhat better understanding of why and 
how.
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‘Elephant’ in the Consulting Room: 
An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of Therapists’ Accounts 
of Their Own Shame Aroused in the Therapeutic Relationship
Abstract
This paper explores therapists’ accounts of their own shame activated during client 
work—a little-studied phenomenon with important implications for the therapeutic 
relationship. Interviews exploring therapists’ reconstructions of specific experiences of 
shame were conducted with seven practicing therapists at varying levels of experience 
working from various theoretical orientations. These were qualitatively analysed using 
interpretative phenomenological analysis, yielding 9 themes grouped into two domains 
(1) Shame ‘coming alive’ in a session—disorientation and misalignment, (2) Managing 
shame—reorienting and realigning. Results highlight practice implications for clinicians, 
and the need for a training and supervision culture that supports therapists in developing 
awareness of their own shame cues and the capacity to use them therapeutically.
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N.B. Reflections on my ‘use of self in this project havC been integrated into the text and 
are delineated with brackets.
Introduction
Although there has been an explosion of psychotherapeutic interest in shame during the 
past decade, most of this has focused on the client’s experience. Little attention has been 
paid to therapists’ experiences of shame in therapeutic work. However, current 
understandings of shame phenomena suggest a need for greater understanding of this 
particular dimension of the therapist’s affective experience: (1) There is empirical
evidence suggesting that the arousal of strong feelings of shame can interfere with 
empathy (Tangney, 1991; 1995); (2) Shame is a powerfully aversive affect that tends to 
trigger interpersonal defences such as avoidance, withdrawal, and counter-shaming, 
which can be damaging to relationships (Nathanson, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002); 
(3) Shame is believed to have evolved as an adaptive affective signal alerting humans to 
adverse shifts and potential threats to their social bonds (Harder & Greenwald, 2000), and 
is thus, a potentially important cue to therapists about the state of a therapeutic bond (e.g., 
Scheff & Retzinger, 1997); (4) There is evidence of considerable shame-arousing 
potential within the psychotherapy process for both clients and therapists—owing to its 
structure (private and confidential, power imbalance), the expectations of both parties, 
and the substance of therapy itself (e.g., Jordan, 1997; Retzinger, 1998).
To date there have been a handful of empirical studies devoted to understanding 
therapists’ experiences of shame in clinical work and their implications for the 
therapeutic process and relationship. Dunn (1986/87) qualitatively analysed 28 shame 
events among psychoanalytic therapists and found their shame related to themes of 
sexuality, inadequate empathy and altered boundaries. Scheff (1987, 1998) and Retzinger 
(1998) studied transcripts of therapy sessions using a form of discourse analysis to tracé 
the thread of the therapist’s shame through the therapeutic dialogue and demonstrated the 
potential hazard of shame outside the therapist’s awareness. They have proposed that the
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therapists’ own shame cues can be used to monitor the state of a therapeutic bond (Scheff 
& Retzinger, 1997). In the lone quantitative investigation of the practice implications of 
therapists’ shame, Livingston and Farber (1996) assessed the relationship between an 
individual therapist’s vulnerability to shame as measured by a shame proneness score and 
the therapist’s response to shame affect expressed by clients. They found that those with 
higher shame proneness scores felt more unnerved by clients’ angry shame affect and 
advocated awareness of personal shame vulnerability and defenses on the part of 
therapists. Beyond this handful of studies, there are scattered papers and chapters by 
practitioners (e.g.. Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Hahn, 2000; Jacobs, 1996; Kaufman, 1996; 
Mindell, 1994; Morrison, 1994; Stein, 1997) suggesting that therapists’ experiences of 
shame can be a potent dynamic in the therapeutic relationship—potentially harmful or 
usefiil—depending on how the feelings are understood and processed.
As recent research has afforded a deeper glimpse into the moment-to-moment processing 
that goes on in human relationships, it seems increasingly clear that the affective 
experience of each participant in a dyad is both internally generated, and mutually 
constructed and regulated within the relationship (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). 
Furthermore, each participant’s moment-to-moment subjective experience of ‘self and 
‘other,’ and the state of the relational bond is continually updated and mediated through 
co-constructed affective experience. As clinicians (e.g., Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; 
Dreher, Mengele & Krause, 2001) have begun to apply this expanded understanding of 
human relational ‘process’ to therapeutic relationships, a new appreciation of the 
therapeutic implications of the therapist’s moment-to-moment affective experience and 
its engagement in the therapeutic relationship continues to emerge.
Bearing this in mind, and given the limited investigation of therapist’s shame experiences 
to date, it would seem useful at this point to explore therapists’ in-depth accounts of 
specific experiences of shame in client work, including their descriptions of (1) what 
gives rise to such experiences, (2) becoming aware of the feelings in a session, (3) their 
perceptions as to what happens with the feelings, and (4) how they understand their
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influence on the therapeutic process and relationship. Such an investigation could 
contribute to a fuller understanding of the therapeutic potential and hazards of such 
experiences and therapists’ perceptions of the challenges encountered in negotiating 
these. This understanding could help inform therapists’ interventions and perhaps have 
implications for training and supervision. This study sought to advance such an 
understanding by way of a qualitative analysis of therapists’ accounts of specific 
experiences of shame in sessions.
Method
A qualitative method known as interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Smith, 
1995; Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999) seemed well-suited to the aim of exploring 
therapists’ perceptions and understandings of their own shame experiences in therapeutic 
work. IP A is a method of qualitative data analysis that seeks to interrogate and explore 
participants’ accounts of the phenomena under investigation from their own perspectives, 
while also recognising that any emerging understanding will be influenced by the ideas 
that the researchers bring to the interpretative process (Smith, 1995; Smith, Jarman, & 
Osborn, 1999). Thus, IPA is concerned with developing an understanding of participants’ 
views and experience of an event (filtered through the interpretative lens of the 
researcher) rather than finding out ‘what actually happened’ (Smith, Jarman, & Osbom, 
1999). The methodology for this study was guided by general principles of IPA outlined 
in Smith (1995) and the suggestions for idiopathic analysis described in Smith, Jarman, & 
Osbourn (1999). Smith, et al. (1999) caution against using their descriptions of IPA as a 
“prescriptive methodology,” suggesting that IPA should remain a creative process 
allowing for the particular interpretative contribution of the researcher (p. 238). In this 
investigation the aim was to try and understand the content and complexity of 
participants’ accounts through an interpretative engagement with the transcripts of their 
interviews, which was informed by, but not structured by the researcher’s pre-existing 
understandings of shame phenomena and psychotherapeutic process.
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Participants
Participants were recruited at meetings and conferences by word of mouth and 
announcements. Bearing in mind the general advice that participants should be 
reasonably homogenous (Smith & Jarman, 2003), all participants had to be practicing 
counselling or clinical psychologists, psychotherapists, or psychoanalysts—fully 
qualified or in their final year of training. However, because the aim was to develop an 
understanding of therapists’ shame experiences that would transcend particularities of a 
single theoretical model or level of experience, the concept of ‘purposive sampling’ 
(Robson, 1993) was applied, wherein, rather than random recruitment, a multiplicity of 
perspectives was deliberately sought in order to identify important common patterns 
(Clark, 1998). An attempt was made to recruit therapists from contrasting theoretical 
orientations at various stages in their professional life—ranging from advanced trainees 
to practitioners with many years experience. Out of 14 therapists who were contacted, 7 
agreed to participate. All were White, including 4 British therapists and 3 of other 
nationalities. The group included 5 women and 2 men ranging in age from 29-57 (mean 
age 36, SD 8.5). They ranged in experience from the final year of practitioner doctorate 
training to 16 years post-qualification practice. Four were clinical psychologists and 
three were counselling psychologists. Three described themselves as CBT in theoretical 
orientation, three as psychodynamic (two worked part-time in the CBT model), and one 
as integrative.
Researcher
The interviews and analysis were conducted by myself, a 53 year old White American 
woman, at the time of the study completing my second year of a ‘practitioner doctorate’ 
training programme in psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology at the University of 
Surrey. [My motivation to undertake this study as well as my understanding of the 
therapist’s experience of shame prior to this study originate in first-hand experience with 
this difficult emotion of shame in the therapeutic process—both from the perspective of 
therapist (in training) and client. I would describe my own theoretical orientation as
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integrative—strongly influenced by relational and feminist perspectives that have 
evolved within and beyond psychodynamic theory (e.g., DeYoung, 2003; Jordan, 1997).
In thinking about exploring this topic, I became aware early on of a certain ‘shame about 
shame’ that has been referred to by others (in the literature and in this study). When I 
told people about my research interest, some ‘connected’ with it immediately while 
others seemed a bit taken aback and looked puzzled, as if to say, ‘Why would you want 
to study something like that?’ In part, I wanted to know how similar other practitioners’ 
experiences might be to my own experiences negotiating self-conscious feelings as a 
novice practitioner. I also wanted to know how experienced practitioners handled such 
feelings. I was very drawn to practitioners who wrote about using their own affective 
experience in the process of therapy, and particularly those who wrote about their own 
experiences of shame (e.g., Jacobs, 1996; Jordan, 1997; Morrison, 1994). In reviewing 
the literature, it became clear that not much empirical work had been done on the topic, 
so I decided to take that for the focus of my own work. Subsequently I had the 
opportunity to meet with two shame researchers, Suzanne Retzinger and Thomas Scheff, 
and was invited by them to join an online network of shame researchers. When I 
presented the idea for a small in-depth qualitative study of therapists’ experiences, 
members of the network encouraged me and made helpful suggestions. It was this 
encouragement and receptivity along with that of my supervisor and some of my student 
colleagues that enabled me to get past some of the initial ‘shame about shame,’ which I 
encountered in myself and others.]
Interview Procedure
Before the interview, each participant was sent an information sheet (Appendix A) 
describing the study’s aims and procedures. Given the sensitivity of the topic, participants 
were encouraged to have a support person in mind beforehand in the event that the 
interview proved disturbing. At the time of the interview, after a review of the study’s 
aims and procedures, written consent (Appendix B) was obtained from each participant, 
and participants were asked to provide some demographic information on a brief form
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(Appendix C). Next, semi-structured face-to-face interviews lasting approximately one 
and one-half hours were conducted with each therapist. The semi-structured interview 
provides a framework outlining areas to be discussed, thus facilitating the disclosure of 
relevant data, while remaining sufficiently flexible to allow participants to expand and 
elaborate their narratives (Smith, 1995). Because of this balance between focus and 
flexibility it is widely used and recommended for IPA studies (Smith, Jarman, & Osbom, 
1999).
Given the above advice on data collection, initial questions in the interview schedule 
(Appendix D) sought to elicit participants’ detailed description of a shame experience in 
order that their subsequent accounts of shame experiences in clinical work would be 
grounded in their own operational definitions of shame rather than a definition or 
example of shame imposed by the researcher. The interview schedule proceeded from 
open-ended questions of a general nature about therapists’ experiences of shame (e.g.. As 
a starting point, when you hear the word shame, what comes to mind? How would you 
describe what the experience of shame feels like to you?) to open-ended questions that 
invited them to retrospectively reconstmct and reflect upon specific instances of shame in 
sessions with clients ( e.g. How can you tell when you are experiencing some form of 
shame in your work with a client? If you think back to a specific session when this has 
happened, what can you recall about the moment you first became aware of the 
feelings?). Audio-recordings were made of each interview and transcribed by myself 
(sample transcript. Appendix E). Given the sensitive nature of the topic, prior to analysis 
each participant was given the opportunity to review the transcript for removal of 
potentially identifying material, and all names of people and places were changed or 
omitted. Had time permitted, participants could also have been invited to review and 
comment on the researcher’s interpretations, a strategy sometimes used in qualitative 
research to strengthen the credibility of an analysis (McLeod, 2003). However, given 
the time constraints for this study, an alternative ‘credibility check’ was employed 
(following the example of Macran, StileS, and Smith, 1999, and Goldsworthy & Coyle, 
1999). This involved having a second individual (in this instance a research supervisor)
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check that the researcher’s emerging themes and interpretations appeared grounded and 
supported in the data.
[One of the challenges that weighed heavily was how best to create a safe interviewing 
space for participants to share as much as they wanted to, but not more. I was asking 
people to talk about shame-laden experiences and I did not want them to have later 
regrets or feel the need to retract. It was also important to me that their accounts be used 
in a way that respected their vulnerability but did not compromise the integrity of my 
analysis. In my contact with participants I sought to ‘own’ my ‘insider’ perspective in the 
sense that I was a therapist who had experienced shame in sessions with clients and had 
some idea how difficult it was and how vulnerable it could feel to talk about the 
experience. In the way that Tasked questions and responded to their answers I tried to 
communicate the importance of sharing only what they felt comfortable sharing. I was 
aware that the sensitivity of the topic could place us at the edge of a boundary between 
therapy and research, and tried to tread carefully. Several participants said they had 
found the interview both helpful and ‘therapeutic.’]
Analysis Procedure
The analysis procedure generally followed the outline for idiopathic analysis by Smith, 
Jarman, & Osbom (1999). After all the interviews had been transcribed and quickly 
scanned, the audio-recording and printed transcript of the first interview were listened to 
and read through several times by myself, I underlined and made notes in the margins 
next to any statement that seemed potentially relevant and interesting. Marginal notes 
included summaries, associations, and potential interpretations. Possible theme titles— 
either because they recurred or seemed part of a pattern—were also noted. After reading 
and re-reading the first transcript, all the ideas that seemed salient were excerpted and 
grouped together to create a first representation of possible themes and related passages. 
The steps in this process were then repeated with each subsequent transcript, so that a 
theme and passage list were created for each transcript, which was then added to the 
emerging master list. As each transcript was added, new understandings and themes
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emerged, leading to creation of new themes through the clustering of several original 
themes, and commonalities began to emerge across the range of experiences. Individual 
differences, however, were not ignored, and it was often variability in the data that led to 
the creation of new themes. In this way, a ‘master list’ of themes was arrived at through a 
largely bottom-up, organic process—grounded in participants’ accounts. [While I tried to 
be very systematic about this process, it proved the most difficult, time-consuming, and 
messiest! part of the study—when I realised the density of the data I had collected, I felt 
overwhelmed. The most difficult part was distilling the final themes so they could 
‘carry’ as much of the meaning of participants’ accounts as possible. The emergent 
‘master list’ of themes was so long that I ultimately cut it into bits, which I organised and 
reorganised in piles on my floor in the process of getting to the final themes.
In the process of analysing the data, I tried first to imagine I was completely new to the 
subject and wanted to learn everything I could about it fi-om these accounts. Obviously 
one cannot ever escape one’s own perspective, but I tried to ‘bracket it’ insofar as 
possible in order to listen carefully to what the participants were saying. After doing that, 
though, I ‘re-owned’ my perspective and sought to ‘triangulate’ what I had ‘heard’ from 
participants with my own life experience and ‘insider’ perspective as a therapist as well 
as the writing of others in an effort to peer a bit more deeply into the accounts and their 
possible meaning.]
Although participants’ perspectives are necessarily viewed through the interpretative lens 
of the researcher, IPA is based on an assumption that meaningful interpretations can be 
made regarding the experience of the participants (Smith, et al, 1997)—providing that 
care is taken to ensure that the emerging analysis is ‘grounded’ in the data set with 
sufficient examples presented “to allow the reader to interrogate the interpretation that is 
being made” (Smith, 1996, p. 192). Various authors (e.g., Stiles, 1993; Elliott, Fischer, & 
Rennie, 1999; Yardley, 2000) have proposed evaluative criteria for qualitative research, 
from which the following have been drawn that might be useful in evaluating this study: 
(1) the sample is sufficiently described to enable readers to judge how widely results
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might apply, (2) there are ‘credibility checks’ such as having a second person and/or the 
original informants check results against the data, (3) a detailed outline of the analytic 
procedure renders it transparent to the reader, (4) the interpretation should be internally 
coherent and persuasive, and (5) the researcher’s perspective has been made available to 
the reader.
Analysis
The analysis yielded 9 themes that have been clustered into two domains (1) Shame 
‘coming alive’ in a session—disorientation and misalignment, (2) Managing shame—re­
orienting and realigning. These themes are listed in Table 1 with the number of 
participants who displayed each.
Each theme is considered in turn and illustrated with verbatim excerpts from the 
transcripts. In presenting these passages, minor hesitations and repeated words (e.g., 
repeated words, “um”) have been deleted for readability. Ellipses . . .  indicate deleted 
material. Brackets [ ] indicate inaudible words, or words added for clarification.
Table 1
Themes grouped into Domains_______________________________
1. Shame ‘coming alive’ in a session—disorientation and misalignment
• Not feeling like a ‘good enough’ therapist (7)^
• The ‘feeling’ of shame coming into awareness (7)
• Experiencing the therapist’s self on a ‘split screen’ (5)
2. Managing Shame—reorienting and realigning
• Struggling to contain the feelings and return to the client (7)
• Figuring out ‘what belongs to whom’—mine, yours, ours? (7)
• ‘Turning a sow’s ear into a silk purse’—using shame (7)
Number of transcripts in which it appeared
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• Retreating into ‘safe mode’ when the feelings are too ‘hot’ (5)
• Getting stuck in shame (4)
• Afterward—the power of talking about shame (5)
I. Domain: Shame‘coming alive’ in a session—disorientation and misalignment
This domain is concerned with participants’ accounts of shame entering their 
consciousness in a session and the resulting impact on the relationship. It encompasses 
their understandings of what has given rise to the feelings, and also their 
phenomenological descriptions of the ‘feeling state’ itself—up to the point that their 
descriptive focus shifted from the ‘feeling’ of shame coming into the session to what 
happened afterward. This domain has been called ‘disorientation and misalignment’ 
because that seems to sum up the experience they described of shame ‘coming alive’ in a 
session—something that could happen in the space of a few seconds or more gradually.
Lapses in the experience o f oneself as a 'good enough ’ therapist. Participants reflected 
generally on the experience of shame in client work, and offered in-depth accounts of 14 
specific shame experiences. This was the most predominant sub-text running across the 
therapists’ accounts of what had given rise to their shame. Shame seemed to ‘come alive’ 
when sorhething in the moment-to-moment experience of the relationship happened that 
left participants feeling they were out of sync with what a ‘good enough’ therapist would 
feel, think, say or do in the situation.
So I opened the door in my bathrobe with a towel wrapped around my head, and there was my male patient 
(laughing). So I fe lt. . .  it was one of those moments when you think ‘Oh my God,’ um . . .  but there was 
nothing I could do.. .  And there was shame—also there was guilt that I’d forgotten, but also that feeling of.
. . how just, how outside the professional frame this was, and, and a kind of a very big failure in terms of 
what we’re normally kind of expecting to provide our clients with. Carol
I knew it as soon as I opened my mouth, you know, before the full sentence was out. . . and you know, 
that I think is an example of shame, because I felt that I’d kind of broken my own code. I knew that there 
was a kind of boundary that shouldn’t be overstepped, and although it wasn’t perhaps a gross breach, there 
was a hidden communication there, that somehow I was available. . . Um and I felt ashamed for that. I
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mean I feel shameful recounting it to you as we’re speaking now, you know.. .  but I’m using it because it’s 
a powerful example that brings up the feelings as I speak. James
In contrast to the two more representative examples shown above, there was one quite 
unique example of a participant who repeatedly Tost’ the sense of herself as a ‘good 
enough’ therapist in relating to an anorexic client who was a third generation Jewish 
holocaust survivor. Shame attached to the therapist’s being German and the possible 
meaning of this for the client was repeatedly activated very intensely in contacts with this 
client, as for example, when the therapist had to introduce herself during a social skills 
lunch group.
I remember how worried I was just to say that I am German, and how I kind of really felt ashamed just 
saying it-that I’m German-and one girl reacted very positively, which actually made me even more 
ashamed . . .  I think I must have known by that time that this other girl is Jewish. I think I must have 
known because I felt very uncomfortable because I didn’t want to discount what might have happened to 
her family, or just for her being Jewish, what it means then for me, you know, what Germany means to her. 
Greta
Practitioners reflecting on the potential impact of racism in therapeutic dyads have 
observed that feeling identified (not by choice, but by a fixed aspect of identity) with the 
oppressor or victim side in a culturally constructed system like racism can give rise to 
shame dynamics in relationships with the ‘other’—dynamics that can be intensified and 
complicated by the already ‘charged’ power dynamics of therapeutic relationships (e.g., 
Altman, 2000; Gump, 2000). This would appear to be an example of this phenomenon in 
relation to the holocaust.
The feeling’ o f shame coming into awareness. Participants’ phenomenological 
descriptions of what shame ‘feels’ like ‘coming into their awareness’ in a session were 
rich and varied.
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I don’t think it’s something I get an awful lot, but I think when you get it with a patient, you’re aware that 
suddenly you’re not that connected with the patient, and maybe you’re almost outside of yourself having a 
thought. .Sandy
In contrast, Carol described picking up first on the visceral sensations, which on occasion 
were detached from any thoughts or feelings:
How I usually recognise it now-I mean normally it’s the actual physical sensations that I have, so I can 
feel that kind of blush for instance. Sometimes it’s very physical and I can feel myself tightening. I c^ , I 
feel very much the physiological response. That’s my first signal usually that’s what alerts me, and then 
feelings that accompany that. . . And sometimes I’m aware of the physiological sensations where I’m not 
actually aware of any feelings of shame. I can feel that my body is sometimes more alert to it than my 
emotional whatever -  radar, if you like . .  I’m very much more aware recently of how it can be translated, 
transmitted from unconscious to unconscious —also that either party really, I think, feeling it, but getting the 
sensations, so that it’s very primitive. And it feels like a very primitive response, shame, actually to me— 
almost before the time of language even. Caro/.
Sometimes shame ‘blipped’ into awareness as a ‘fleeting moment’ or ‘flinch’ that 
registered internally but passed quickly. These rather low-level ‘twinges’ of shame 
seemed to be fairly commonplace among participants.
And I thought ‘Oh, wow you know, you are assertive with me,’ but at the same time I flinched, and I also 
felt quite rejected in that moment, but I just went with the positiveness of it, because I thought she needs to 
become more assertive . . .  but for me it was still like ‘Oh,’ but I just tried to contain it for myself-it wasn’t 
a major feeling of shame. It was just this flinch kind of thing. Greta
There were also descriptions of feeling ‘plunged’ into awareness of a very sudden and 
sharp experience of shame—more like a sudden fall into a hole than a misstep or stumble.
And the next feeling I thought was kind of like a real mortification, like ‘oh he’s right. I am so, it’s like 
I’ve made myself so vulnerable. I’ve put myself in this position. I really shouldn’t have done this. You 
know. I’m not kind o f  . .  .It’s almost like he made me feel like I wasn’t professional. . .  I wasn’t doing this 
properly, like a child who didn’t know how to look after herself. It was a whole gamut of feelings like 
that—just from this one—it was not the comment, it was the way he said it. Carol
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In contrast to either the ‘blip’ or the ‘sudden plunge,’ there were accounts of ‘sinking’ 
into shame as the therapist could feel an emotional chasm opening up in the relationship, 
and effort after effort to connect with the client, failed.
In the situation fm  thinking about, the client isn’t really engaging in therapy and I blame myself and so, 
uh, I suppose the trigger is her not engaging . . . and in the room I suppose a sense of distance between 
myself and the client.. .  Yeah, so the distance is both a trigger and then a . . .  a kind o f . . .  I mean I suppose 
that the thing is about shame, I suppose the anxiety about shame is if I don’t manage it well, it’s likely to . .
. to create more distance. Sara
The therapist’s shame could be precipitated by something said by either therapist or client 
and range from quite fleeting and transient to very intense. Yet, what all the examples 
seemed to have in common was the experience of a rupture (however momentary) in the 
therapist’s sense of orientation within the relationship as someone usefiil, attuned, 
dependable, professional (whichever ‘good enough’ dimension might be involved). The 
therapist was left feeling anywhere from slightly off-balance to ‘reeling,’ and the 
therapist’s attention was pulled away from the client and into a focus on the self, which
was elaborated in participants’ accounts as an internal dialogue.
Split-screen experience o f self: the shamed and the shamer inside my head. Five of the 
participants’ shame accounts contained descriptions of an internal process in which their 
subjectivity seems to move back and forth between a shamed self and a shaming self,- 
sometimes joined by a chorus of shaming others.
Peter, new to a team, described the process of being drawn into an internal dialogue 
(italics added) involving shaming colleagues as he was struggling to engage with a 
patient whom he was told should be easy.
It seemed like more and more we just weren’t getting anywhere because . . .  so as that was happening I 
was, that’s when I became more aware of those feelings, and as I started to realise that. . .well I started 
thinking in the back of my mind that. . . other people I knew had the opinion that this patient was not too
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difficult to work with. So there was the contrast between feeling that I was getting stuck. . . and feeling 
that somehow. . .  it would be construed by the team as if I was doing something wrong.
James’ internal dialogue, on the other hand, sounded more like the replay of a parent 
reprimanding a child, his identification going back and forth between the shaming parent 
and the shamed child.
And actually, so I think that in the moment I immediately felt kind of /  began to kind of tell myself off, and 
I think also I also, at that same time as a consequence of that I  think Ifelt bad about it, and so immediately 
you know . . .  uh I suppose in some ways it’s kind of adding insult to injury, but you’re then taking yourself 
even further away from the client, because you enter into some, I think I probably entered into some kind of 
internal dialogue, which switched me off even further from focusing on the client, you know. . .
When Greta’s research on holocaust survivors was unexpectedly brought to the attention 
of the ward team, she felt the shame dynamics of the holocaust erupt inside her mind as 
her identification began oscillating back and forth between a chorus of shamers (who 
including herself) and the ‘shamed ones’—a position to which she felt bound by virtue of 
German identity.
And um, but the weirdest experience actually was that then we had a ward, a big meeting—we are quite a 
big team-and the family therapist. . . talked about how this girl was impacted by the holocaust and her 
family, and then she said to the group that I had given her all this research about it. And I just thought ‘oh 
no.’ I wanted to die in that moment. . .  I just. . .  because I thought ‘oh no—you know they must think I am 
like those crazy Nazi doctors who do research on something,’ and that was like the worjf thing.
The ‘internal dialogue’ of shamed and shamer is a prominent feature of shame 
experiences. From a psychodynamic perspective it has been explained in terms of 
internalised object relations (Hahn, 2000) or a superego attack on the ego (Wurmser, 
1981)—in the language of cognitive behavioural theory, as a pattern of automatic 
thoughts originating in core beliefs and schemas (Gilbert, 1998). Regardless of model, 
these internalised attacks on the self are considered very aversive and difficult-to-contain 
experiences in which intrapsychic defenses such as splitting and projection of the shamed 
one or the shamer, and powerful interpersonal defenses, such as avoidance, withdrawal,
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or ‘blaming and shaming’ counter-attacks tend to be mobilised (e.g., Nathanson, 1992; 
Tangney & Bearing, 2002). Not only can the therapist feel disoriented, but there can also 
be a corresponding shift in the therapist’s alignment with the client from being 
‘alongside’ to becoming defended. Sandy and Sara’s descriptions convey the loss of 
orientation and shift in alignment with the client.
So sometimes, yeah, if  you’re aware that you’re not that aligned with the patient as you are normally, that 
might be a sign to me that I’m feeling a bit shamed or if it’s very difficult to think about where you’re 
going. Sandy
And emotionally I’m sure the connection is diluted, and the distance feels greater because part of my mind 
is on my own sense of inadequacy rather than what’s going on for the client . . .  I actually think I’m 
probably coming across as more formal—that I am less present because I am anxious . . .  Sara
II. Domain: Managing shame: Regaining sense of orientation and realigning with 
the client
This domain is concerned with participants’ descriptions of what happened once they 
became aware of the feelings—what they can recall ‘doing’ with the feelings, how they 
made sense of the feelings in the session and afterward, and their understandings of how 
the therapeutic relationship was affected.
Struggling to set the self-experience aside and return to the client. All the participants 
described instinctively trying to set aside the internal process in order to prevent it from 
fiirther coming between theniselves and the client. However their accounts attested to the 
struggle this could involve whilst in the throes of a powerful shame experience.
Yeah, I thought at the time . . .  well, I tried not to show those feelings in the session. So I tried to continue 
with the session, focus on what we were doing in the session rather than . . . you know, letting these 
feelings take over I guess. Peter
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Well, what happened that time was that, although I thought I’d cut off enough from them—I kind of put 
them to one side is what I felt I was doing . . . All I could do was have them sitting there at the side 
simmering away thinking ‘Oh my God, Oh my God’ from time to time, and from time to time I could feel 
the-the kind of—the heat almost of the shame kind of flow through me, and just having to put it aside again 
and focus on what was happening in the here and now. Carol
Figuring out ‘what belongs to whom —mine, yours, or oürs? Participants talked about 
the need to figure out where the feelings were coming from and described trying to 
‘apportion’ feelings in the relationship. This seemed to be part of getting the measure of 
what had happened and trying to get re-oriented in the relationship and decide how much 
shame‘belonged’ to them.
And I was questioning myself, so it was kind of split. Part of me was saying this is not something to do 
with you. This is something to do with the patient, and another part was saying well maybe you just don’t 
know what you’re doing, or you just don’t know how to engage this particular patient, and you should just, 
you know, be using another strategy, try something else, and should just be able to do it. Peter
I knew that it was partly my thing, but that there was a very strong possibility that it wasn’t only my thing- 
that I was picking up something. And then she [the client] interestingly called it concentration camp 
afterwards in the next open group, so it became much more of an issue, and at that point I started to do 
research. Greta
The importance of being aware of their own ‘flashpoints’ and vulnerabilities came up in 
several accounts. In addition, Carol’s account illustrates the adoption of a ‘both and’ 
approach to apportioning feelings.
I kind of know what my own flashbacks are, if you like, what’s likely to arouse those feelings in me 
because of my own experience, but even then-even though I know it’s hooking into something in me-that 
doesn’t mean it’s not hooking in, it’s not come from them as well, it’s not a communication about how they 
might be feeling too . . .  I would normally not think-even though it’s my own stuff-of not maybe looking 
for that as well, because I do think even if  it hooks into, it hooks us where we’ve got vulnerable point, but 
in the service of something that’s happening in them, in the client or patient as well. Carol
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Not surprisingly, therapists felt they were most successful in setting the feelings aside in 
instances of milder shame, and they described becoming more confident with experience 
in teasing out the relationship between their feelings and what was going on with the 
client. Both capacities seemed part of preparing to ‘turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse’— 
that is, finding a way to ‘use’ the feelings therapeutically and also avoid deploying any 
relationally disruptive shame defenses.
Struggling to turn a sow ' ear into a silk purse—Using shame therapeutically. There was a 
perception among the participants, that, despite the challenges and perils of shame 
experiences, the feelings could be therapeutically useful.
I think the good thing is though that there’s always, generally, as long as it doesn’t happen in the final 
session, there’s a chance to kind of then use that experience between you and client to kind of deepen your 
relationship after all. So there’s always a chance that, to turn, you know, a sow’s ear into a silk purse so to 
speak. James
Joan, for example, described feeling ‘a bit shameful’ about blaming thoughts toward her 
client—and was motivated by her ‘fleeting moment of shame’ to ‘get back on track’ with 
her client.
I didn’t do anything, but in my mind I’m thinking ‘oh for goodness sake,’ and that made me feel, a bit, you 
know -right or wrong-shameful about saying or having those thoughts really . .  . For me it is a cognitive 
thing that I actually tell myself-I just say ‘come on this is not about her- it’s not helpful to be sitting here 
almost kind of blaming her for not changing. . . Let’s get back to concentrate on what she’s saying and 
thinking about how we can. . .  continue to use the process of the therapeutic alliance’ . . .  And I don’t know 
that all that would be going on . . .  But it might be as simple as me saying ‘get back on track— you need to 
just focus in on her’ . . .  I mean I think that it meant that the patient got a consistency in treatment, which is 
that, you know, you maintain the therapeutic alliance that this is a safe place for the person to come to, 
versus maybe, had I not picked that up, her picking up that I was getting irritable. And that’s quite 
important to this person because their family gets irritable. Joan
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In reflecting on the incident later, Joan realised it had been a ‘bit of shame’ about not 
having done a better job when she saw the client previously—along with a hectic 
afternoon—that had led to the blaming feelings toward her client, but she had not been 
aware of this in the session at the time the blaming feelings came up.
And so the combination of a bit of shame that maybe, you know, if  I had treated them better, we wouldn’t 
have been in this position where we were repeating the material again, as well as being irritable because I’d 
seen .so many people that day . . .  in the room I became aware of the more ‘I’m being irritable -  this patient 
doesn’t deserve to have me having these thoughts because I’ve seen six other patients when I haven’t 
planned my sessions better’ . . . But the second one, where my irritability in part was about the fact that 
perhaps I was a bit shameful that I had not done better earlier on—one was done in the room, and one is 
kind of now reflecting upon it. Joan
It has been suggested that sometimes a therapist’s own feelings of shame regarding a lack 
of progress in therapy can underlie ‘blaming’ feelings toward a client—that ‘blaming’ the 
client can function as a ‘defence’ against the therapist’s shame (e.g.. Harper & Hoopes, 
1990; Jacobs, 1996; Gilbert, 1998). In this instance, Joan’s self-awareness and 
undefensive self-reflection allowed her to pick up on the ‘shame factor’ in her blaming 
feelings toward the client. And interestingly, it was her responsiveness to the later ‘bit of 
shame’ about ‘almost kind of blaming the client for not changing’ that motivated her to 
disengage from the blaming feelings and realign herself with thé client. This is an 
example of shame cutting both ways—first in contributing to a momentary disruption of 
the therapist’s empathy, and later in triggering the therapist’s repair.
There was a process going on in my head. I might have had a blank look briefly, but that is ok, because I do 
that when I think sometimes. So that may have been the only kind of thing that was happening for her-was 
that I looked a bit blank for a minute, but then kind of came back together and talked through what the 
issues were about not changing. . .  Joan
Another example of the therapist ‘turning a sow’s ear into a silk purse’ involved 
acknowledgement of mistakes and willingness to apologise to the client—described by 
Peter as part of modelling a healthy way of dealing with shameful feelings. The theme of
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the therapist modelling how to ‘own’ and express difficult feelings came up in several 
accounts.
I’ve most often talked to the patient about it, and been quite open about how I feel, and I’ve found that their 
reaction, let’s say for an example I said I would try and organise something for the next session, and for 
some reason I haven’t managed to do it. Then the patient is disappointed, and then I will say ‘sorry, I didn’t 
get around to it, so it’s my fault and let’s try and arrange it for the next session.’ But try to acknowledge it, 
because I think it’s about modelling a way of dealing with feelings, you know, in a healthy way . . . that 
you acknowledge them and you don’t just hold them and pretend, but that you let them, let yourself 
experience them and you express them I think it’s important to communicate that you don’t have to be 
afi-aid of these feelings, and you don’t have to be afi-aid of others’ reactions when you express your feelings 
openly. Peter
Both of the above examples, which involve relatively mild and transient shame (probably 
co-mingled with guilt) triangulate with the ideas of Retzinger and Scheff (1997) and 
others who have argued that the therapist’s own shame cues can be very important in 
monitoring the state of the therapeutic bond and participating sensitively and respectfiilly 
in the relationship. However, for that to be possible, therapists need to be able to keep 
their shameful feelings from escalating, and there is an interesting example of Joan 
drawing on her own ‘internal therapist’ to help accomplish this.
I think it is a fleeting moment where I have a thought that—well I guess the thought leads to shame. This is 
going to be my cognitive behavioural therapist hat (laughing). That I shouldn’t have sat there being 
appalled at this person, the fleeting moment of shame and then my other cognitive based way that I work in 
the world for myself is ‘come on, you know you’re not perfect, let’s just kind of work with it.’ Joan
A further way of ‘using’ the therapist’s feelings of shame was elaborated in the accounts 
of participants working from a psychodynamic perspective. They focused especially on 
their feelings of shame as emotional responses (‘countertransference’) elicited in the 
process of engaging with a particular client, which could then be put to use in 
understanding and working therapeutically with the client’s issues. In participants’ 
descriptions, the process of coming to understand links between the therapist’s feelings 
and the client’s issues might take several sessions, and also the intensity of the feelings
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could make it difficult to use them ‘in the moment,’ so the therapist might hold off and 
‘use’ them in a later session.
More and more I suppose I might be open about-if I do think it’s more about the therapeutic relationship 
between us and that there is some kind of countertransference process that then, although , . ,  and I suppose 
you were talking about how it would affect that session—but in terms of how it might affect the next 
session, I might, given time to reflect on . . .  why this session was particularly difficult, and aspects of that 
that relate to the client’s difficulty relating to others, and how that’s coming into the room-then I would try 
and link that in a helpful and appropriate way. Sara
Afterward, when I had time to reflect on it a bit more, I did feel that it probably had been really very 
powerful for him in terms of his relationship with his mother, and, and his whole feelings about sexuality 
too, and I was able to kind of help him think about it a bit there, but not very much. It was as if, having not 
dealt with it when it happened at the time, it became a bit taboo—it was . . . you couldn’t—you couldn’t 
resurrect the heat of the moment, and it was a very hot moment, and . . .  and it went. Carol
Although the various ways of ‘using’ the therapist’s feelings described above might be 
more associated with one theoretical orientation or another, there may be more overlap 
than commonly assumed. All the therapists in this sample—regardless of orientation— 
seemed to view the therapist’s experience of shame both as an important signal about the 
immediate state of the therapeutic relationship, and also, at least sometimes, as very 
much linked to the client’s issues and the process, not just the therapist’s. However, 
because in this investigation the aim was to focus on themes transcending therapeutic 
model (and the sample was very small), intra-group differences pertaining to therapeutic 
model have not been analysed in detail.
When feelings are too ‘hot’ to touch—retreating into ‘safe mode’. There were times 
when the feelings were so disorienting that participants seemed unable to ‘make a sow’s 
ear into a silk purse’ in the immediacy of the session. They described retreating into a 
more superficial and distanced type of relating, which I have called ‘safe mode.’
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The other thing, I think it kind of makes . . .  my sense was after that that I rather kind of pulled into myself 
a bit, so instead of perhaps saying things that might have been useful and perhaps even a bit challenging, or 
challenging and as a consequence, useful, I think I ended up saying things that were rather inane and safe—  
safe but not kind of therapeutically particularly powerful, because of a fear o f . . .  I kind o f . . .  I did then 
kind of censor myself I think fi*om what I said, and so in that way I think it can disrupt, and certainly in that 
particular instance it disrupted I think that therapy session quite a lot. . .  James
I think I probably also cope by falling back on lower level skills, or I sort of slow down in session and I 
kind of -because I know that my thinking isn’t going to be sharp enough . .  . I’ll do more reflecting back, 
more kind of, I suppose I’d work less actively in a sense than I might do normally. And how, so it affects 
the work in that it’s . . .  I think in those sessions where it’s strong, it turns into more of a holding session 
than a working session. Sara
‘Safe mode’ seemed to serve at least two purposes. First it seemed to be a way of ‘taking 
time out’ from the therapeutic ‘work,’ which gave the therapist a chance to recover a 
sense of emotional equilibrium while minimising the risk of further stumbles in the form 
of any clumsy or ill-conceived interventions. However, this damage limitation came at 
the price of greater distance and more superficial engagement in the relationship— 
something that participants seemed aware of in their descriptions. These accounts of 
‘safe mode’ link to the issue of the therapist’s own shame defences, and might be 
understood as a way of using withdrawal to ‘cool off shame and avoid anything that 
might add fuel to the fire.
Getting stuck in shame. Safe mode was something that participants described using in 
the immediacy of a session when the feelings were very hot. Participants also described 
occasions when their feelings of shame began to carry over from session to session— 
most often when the client was experienced as chronically passive or hostile, which left 
the therapist feeling ‘ashamed’ or ‘shamed’ accordingly. In several examples, the 
therapist had been in training or newly hired at the time and described feeling 
predisposed to attribute the relationship difficulties therapist inadequacy rather than the 
client’s process. Peter’s account describes spiralling shame in connection with an
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unresponsive and passive client, while Carol’s is an account of feeling chronically 
shamed by a hostile client. Carol’s account highlights the value of adequate support.
So I felt really bad about the whole thing, because whatever I felt, I felt was probably partly to do with me, 
I kind of blamed myself, so I felt ashamed for not being able to know how to handle the situation—not 
being able to manage it better. I felt angry towards him for kind of putting me into the situation where I 
couldn’t do a good job, and I felt bad about being . . .  or I felt ashamed probably about being angry with 
him, because I knew that it wasn’t his fault. And I felt nervous about failing, and that anxiety then grew 
over time as the sessions went on. And I realised that we were falling behind in terms of what we should 
be doing in the sessions. Peter
She was so attacking, so . . . and could make me feel such a bad therapist, and I suppose that’s shame as 
well—there’s that whole experience of feelings that I, that I’m just not a good therapist, that I can’t get it 
right for her, that I can’t tune into her properly. . . Sometimes I just thought I can’t take this tonight, so I 
just withdrew a bit . . . protected myself that way. . . I mean when I was able to address the attacking 
directly, that was okay. But other times when I just retreated from it, I think she felt very bad. I think she 
felt it very damaging—that’s what she had felt as a child, you know that she had the power to damage her 
objects, and she did punch holes in them, and she punched a lot of holes in me too along with way, and it 
took a lot of supervision and holding for me to kind of really stay with it—ffiat that was what was 
happening, and not that I was just useless in helping this woman. Carol
Afterward: talking and not talking about shame— ‘elephant’ in the consulting room. This 
theme included participants’ reflections on the powerful experience of talking about their 
experiences of shame—and «0 / talking about them.
The most helpful thing to do is to kind of get it out and share it and be supported, and get some reality 
check on it, but getting it out is a scary thing to do. 5ara
For Greta, it was in talking about her shame with ‘the other’ (a second generation 
holocaust survivor who had already worked through the feelings and could offer her 
space and support to work through her own), which helped her contain and process her 
shame, freeing her to be more present for her client.
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And then the doctor came and one from Israel, I told him . . .  I think the good thing was that I think he has 
worked through his own feelings about it, and he told me that he was a second generation survivor, and 
when we talked and that he could accept me even though I am German and even though he’s a survivor, so 
that meant a lot to me. Greta
Even as participants spoke of the value of talking about their experiences, they remarked 
on the lack of attention given to this topic in training and supervision, where there 
seemed to be space to talk about the client’s shame but not the therapist’s.
I still don’t think it’s awfully well known—about a lot on shame. I don’t think it’s something in terms of 
my supervision or my training that people particularly said, ‘oh did you feel x with this client?’ or ‘if you 
were to reflect on those feelings, would shame be the one that you would talk about?’ We had a lecture on 
shame -mainly clients’ I’m sure—we reflected on shame in ourselves in that lecture, but apart from that, 
not really.. .  I think in general as far as I am aware, it’s a fairly new topic. Sandy
We’ve talked about it working with clients in terms of their shame—not in terms of ours. I would say that 
my course is one of the less self reflective courses, despite being very theoretically based—it’s all about the 
client. . . The clearest we have . . .  recently there’s been a support group set up by the trainees that’s 
facilitated by external facilitators, and shame-related issues have come up there. . .  Sara
One participant suggested the prevailing ethos in some workplaces could also make it 
hard to talk about shame.
But if  you are in a situation like the situation I was in then, where you can’t openly discuss those feelings, 
and you don’t feel you have space to explore . . .  you don’t have enough room to actually try to understand 
what’s going on . . . then that creates problems because it doesn’t allow you to restructure in your mind 
what is happening and put it back into perspective. Peter
Supervision seemed to be the place participants felt most vulnerable in talking about their 
experiences of shame with clients.
And then I think again when it came to supervision, the shame maybe came back . . . And thinking about 
maybe, you know, my supervisor was going to sit there and say ‘well no wonder that happened—look what 
you’ve just done,’ or not think that it was inappropriate what the client did. Sandy
141
Yet, when this vulnerability was met with sensitivity and respect, supervision had the 
potential to be a very ‘de-shaming’ experience, perhaps especially so when a supervisor 
was willing to ‘own’ having come through their own experiences of shame.
Supervision I found was just incredibly helpful for dealing with them, not least because my supervisor was 
kind of calm enough to just sit and listen, and kind of contain, so there was a kind of peaceful, tranquil, 
calm listening which was great. But also, and this was an interesting thing, but my supervisor revealed 
shameful experiences that she’d had as a therapist herself to me her supervisee.. .  she said . . .  you’ve used 
supervision in a way that’s very praiseworthy -  uh, so that was quite a powerful experience, because it 
made, and it did take a Iqt of heat out of the experience actually, which was great. You know, so there was 
something about, well if she can accept me for that, perhaps I can accept myself then. James
Overview
Taken as a whole, the findings of this study lend further credibility to much that has 
already been written in the empirical and theoretical literature about therapists’ 
experiences of shame, such as: (1) the nature of the situations and triggers that are likely 
to give rise to shame in the therapist (Dunn, 1986/87); (2) the challenges and perils 
encountered in processing them (e.g., Scheff, 1987, 1998; Retzinger, 1998; Tangney & 
Bearing, 2002); and (3) their latent therapeutic potential (e.g., Hahn, 2000; Morrison, 
1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 1997).
Observations made by the practitioners in this study triangulate with many of the 
observations made by individual practitioners who have written about their own 
encounters with shame in the clinical setting. For example, the commonplace nature of 
mild and transient episodes of shame in the clinical setting (e.g.. Harper & Hoopes, 1990; 
Jacobs, 1996), and the possibility of using this low-level shame therapeutically as a 
means of monitoring the state of the therapeutic bond (Scheff & Retzinger, 1997)—also 
in understanding the therapists’ feelings of shame as an identification with projections of
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the client’s shame, which can thus be ‘mined’ for understanding of the client (Hahn, 
2000).
Perhaps what this study adds to existing understanding is a more intimate glimpse into 
the interior of therapists’ shame experiences by way of therapists’ detailed descriptions of 
specific experiences—understood through the interpretative lens of the researcher. In 
focussing on details of therapists’ moment-to-moment encounters with shame, it 
contributes to building up a finer-grained picture of what is involved for therapists in the 
process of recognising, regulating and potentially using these feelings when they arise in 
a session.
This study illuminates some specific ways in which the therapeutic relationship can be 
influenced—both for better and for worse—depending on how the feelings are processed 
in the moment and between sessions. It reiterates the importance of therapists’ self- 
awareness—particularly of their own shame ‘flashpoints’ and defences—and of the 
capacity for undefensive self-reflection. With regard to opportunities for development of 
these capacities, this study highlights therapists’ need to ‘own’ and talk about shame in 
order to fully process and resolve it. However, this is set against the backdrop of a 
training and supervision ethos in which the subject of therapists’ shame remains largely 
unexplored and perhaps even a bit taboo. This finding suggests there might be 
justification for giving the topic more explicit attention in supervision and training, 
particularly in terms of creating a climate of openness on the part of trainers and 
supervisors and in facilitating adequate opportunities for peer-sharing and support among 
trainee therapists.
In order to focus on the fine-grained detail of participants’ experiences, the findings of 
the study are necessarily based on a very small sample of therapists. Participants with a 
diversity of theoretical backgrounds and levels of experience were recruited, so that 
salient themes transcending those differences could be identified, and while the influence 
of theoretical model is evident in some of the accounts, many commonalities emerged
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across participants’ experiences. However, this picture of therapists’ experiences of 
shame is by no means complete. For example, it is quite likely, given both the small 
sample size, the intrinsic tendency to hide the most shaming experiences, and the 
inevitably social nature of an interview that the experiences explored in this study 
represent the less threatening end of the spectrum of possible shame experiences. Certain 
topics were conspicuous in their absence, for example, client suicide and sexual fantasies 
and behaviour in relation to clients. In addition, because the findings are based on self- 
reports, aspects of the phenomenon that remain outside the therapists’ conscious 
awareness or memory are beyond the scope of this study. It must be remembered that 
these accounts represent participants’ retrospective reconstructions of shame experiences 
and their reflections upon them. As such they cannot be taken as literal accounts of ‘what 
actually happened.’ However, this in no way negates their value in offering a glimpse 
into the meaning such experiences can have for the therapist, and the challenges 
encountered in processing them.
The claim that can be made for the results of this study is that they represent more a 
picture of what is possible than what is probable within the realm of therapists’ 
experiences of shame and their understandings of them. Although this necessarily limits 
generalisability of the findings, it does not diminish their value insofar as adding to an 
understanding of the texture and richness of their experiences and flagging up potentially 
fiuitfiil lines of inquiry for fiirther research. These could include, for example, the use of 
interpersonal process recall interviews (Kagan, 1975; Elliott, 1986) or more observational 
methods such as split-screen videotaping of therapy sessions (Dreher, Mengele, and 
Krause, 2001) to investigate fiirther the interplay of the therapist’s and client’s affective 
experience in a session paying close attention to the dynamics of shame.
The results of this investigation would appear to support the same conclusion about 
therapists’ shame experiences that Harder and Greenwald (2000) reached in regard to 
clients’ shame: “While traditionally, shame theorists and researchers have focused on the 
negative effects of excessive shame experience, insufficient responsiveness to shame
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presents just as much a shame-related problem as excessive shame and creates just as 
many difficulties for the client” [or, in this case, ‘therapist’]. They argue that shame is a 
“useful, even necessary” emotion that can “guide adaptive behaviour,” asserting that “the 
problem of shame is not that it exists, but that it can be felt either too keenly or lightly”— 
and suggest that the goal should be to “optimise the level of shame responsiveness” (p. 
322). Optimal shame responsiveness would seem to be a good goal for therapists as well 
as clients—one that could benefit the therapeutic work they do.
This study, in line with previous explorations of therapists’ shame experiences, has re­
confirmed that they can be a potent dynamic in the therapeutic relationship while 
contributing to a fuller understanding of their potential implications—benefits as well as 
risks that are of value in informing both the practice and training of therapists.
[At the beginning of this study I felt a certain embarrassment about my choice of topic 
(my own ‘shame about shame’). Certainly one motivation was to find out how my own 
experiences as trainee therapist might compare to those of others. I believe it was 
inevitable that throughout the study I drew upon my own experiences as a client, 
therapist, and supervisee as well as my background in peace and social justice and 
exposure to the shame literature in seeking to understand and interpret the accounts of 
participants. I think my previous professional background was especially influential in 
my analysis of the systemic shame dynamics in Greta’s account. I believe my own 
multiple frames of reference regarding shame experiences have enhanced my ability to 
both enter into and step back from the frame of reference of my participants, undoubtedly 
influencing what Tasked, what I noticed and focused upon, and the conclusions I drew. 
Clearly my analysis is perspective-bound and whatever it adds to the overall picture is 
provisional as, I believe, all analyses will be. It came as a relief to discover that transient 
experiences of self-consciousness and shame in the course of training were familiar to all 
the practitioners I interviewed and that they had lessened in frequency and intensity (but 
not disappear) with experience. It was also interesting to discover that, consistent with 
the ‘elephant in the consulting room,’ practitioners generally found it hard to
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acknowledge and talk about such experiences regardless of level of experience. I now 
consider this difficulty ‘laying claim to shame’ to be a routine defense against ‘shame 
about shame,’ and a strong indication that such experiences must be talked about and 
explored if we as practitioners are to develop our capacity to recognise, tolerate, contain, 
and use our own shame experiences in the service of our clients.]
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Appendix A
INFORMATION SHEET FOR VOLUNTEER THERAPISTS
Purpose and Objectives of the Research
This is a qualitative study of therapists’ experiences of difficult emotions activated in therapeutic 
work with clients, focusing particularly on the therapist’s feelings of defensiveness and shame. 
Objectives include (1) learning more about therapists’ experiences recognizing and managing 
these feelings when they arise in work with clients, and (2) exploring therapists’ perceptions of 
their meaning and influence within the therapeutic process and relationship. To date there has 
been limited systematic investigation of this dimension of therapists’ affective experience and its 
significance for therapeutic work. The purpose of this study is to add to current understanding 
and identify some key issues that could be taken up in further research.
Method
In the context of a semi-structured interview, therapists will be invited to reflect in as much detail 
as possible on their experiences of defensiveness and shame arising in work with clients. The 
interview will be recorded and transcribed, then analysed applying the principles of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, et al, 1999). Participants will have the opportunity to review 
the transcript of their interview prior to analysis in order to remove any potentially identifying 
material. Findings will be presented in a research report made available to participants. It is 
estimated that the interview will last between one and two hours. All information gathered in the 
study will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
Potential Benefits and Risks of Participation
Participation in the interview process is an opportunity to reflect in a focused way on particular 
emotions activated during therapeutic work with the potential for increased self-awareness of 
processes used in recognizing, managing, and understanding them. It is also an opportunity to 
contribute to an increased understanding of this dimension of the therapist’s affective experience 
that may have implications for practice, training and supervision, which could be of benefit to 
yourself and others. There is some risk that you could find the interview distressing. You are fi*ee 
to terminate the interview and withdraw from the study at any point. In addition, you are 
encouraged to identify in advance a colleague or supervisor with whom you could discuss any 
lingering concerns should they arise.
Researcher: Donna Miller, PsychD student
Supervisor: Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz, PhD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Contact: miller.donna@zen.co.uk or 01483 689 441
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Appendix B
CONSENT FORM FOR VOLUNTEER THERAPISTS
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. The nature and purpose of 
this research project have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss 
details and ask questions.
I understand that every effort will be made to keep my involvement in this study 
confidential and to protect my anonymity in any published reports of the research, and 
that I will have the opportunity to review the transcript of my interview prior to analysis 
in order to remove any potentially identifying material of concern to me. I understand 
that all information will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
I fiilly and freely consent to participate in this study and to the audio recording of my 
interview.
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason.
Participant Name (BLOCK CAPITALS):
Participant Signature:
Date:
Researcher/witness Signature: 
Date:
Researcher: Donna Miller, PsychD student. Psychotherapeutic and Counselling 
Psychology
Supervisor: Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz, PhD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey.
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH 
Tel: 01483 689 441
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Appendix C 
Background Information
As part of the interview process, you are asked to provide the following background 
information, which is requested in order to give readers of the research report some idea 
of the range of participants in the study. All information will be handled in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. If there are any questions you do not wish to answer, 
please feel free to skip them, and please note that you may withdraw from the study at 
any time.
Age . [ ] years
Gender [] female [] male
Which (if any) of the following terms best describes your ethnic background?
[] Black-African 
[] Black-Caribbean 
[] Black-Other 
[] Chinese
[] Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
[] White-British 
[] White-Irish
[] Other (please specify) ___________
What professional qualifications have you obtained? (please tick all that apply)
[] Clinical Psychologist 
[] Counselling Psychologist 
[] Psychotherapist 
[] Psychoanalyst
[] Currently training - Clinical Psychologist 
[] Currently training - Counselling Psychologist 
[] OihQV (please specify)___________________
Registered with (please tick all that apply):
[] BACP [] BCP [] BPS [] UKCP 
[] Other (please specify) __________
Theoretical Orientation:
Years of post-qualification practice:_____  Number of client hours in training:
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Appendix D
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Preliminaries:
Reviewing aims and procedures of study including participants’ rights and consent and 
confidentiality issues and giving opportunity for questions; obtaining demographic data 
and signed consent form
Questions to elicit participants’ general reflections on shame experiences with clients
1. As a starting point, when you hear the word ‘shame,’ what comes to mind?
2. How would you described what the experience of shame feels like to you? (get as 
much detail as possible)
3. How can you tell when you are experiencing some form of shame in your work 
with a client? (get as much detail as possible)
4. When is that most likely to happen? (prompts: for example, what contexts, 
situations, etc.)
5. Can you think back to a specific session when this happened? Do you feel open 
to talking about what happened in as much detail as possible? (give them space to 
think back and then say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to this)
Questions to be asked around each ‘event’ of shame-related feelings identified bv the 
therapist (onlv ask directlv if it doesn’t come out in the account):
1. What can you recall about the moment you became aware of the feelings?
2. What was going on for you in the moments running up to that moment?
3. What happened next for you? Next? Next? (trying to get a sense of the flow)
4. Can you recall shifts in your frame of reference? (for example, moving between 
past and present, or moving between imagining ‘seeing’ fi-om your client’s 
viewpoint and ‘looking out’ from your own)
5. If so, what was your experience of each of those perspectives?
6. What do you recall about your experience of your client at the time?
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7. What do you recall about your experience of the connection between the two of 
you at the time?
8. What do you recall about any sense of the meaning attached to feelings at the 
time?
9. What can you recall of your goals and intentions in the process at the time?
10. From where you are now, how do you understand the feelings and their 
relationship to the process?
Concluding questions:
1. Have you ever found yourself disclosing feelings of shame in a session with a 
client?
2. What do you find most challenging about managing feelings of shame in a 
session?
3. How does it feel talking about feelings of shame that come up in client work?
4. What ideas or theories have informed your thinking about shame?
5. Is there anything you would like to add?
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Appendix E
TRANSCRIPT#?
. . .  = pause in speaking
[ ] = missing word or words, or words covered by chuckle/laughter, or guesses at 
words
( ) = some sort of action during interview, e.g., (turned over tape)
Just as kind of a place for us to start, when you hear the word shame, what kinds of 
images or ideas. . .  what comes into your mind.
Well, the first thing that comes into my mind is, I suppose this is from my own past 
experience really, it’s a little girl standing on a stage frozen. And I guess that relates to 
my experience when I started dancing classes when I was very little, and I got terrible 
stage fright, you know, when we had to do a performance. So [ ] freeze, and I was
standing at the front of the stage, and everybody else would have gone and done 
something else. So that’s one of the things, the images. Another one is just, just being--! 
suppose it’s kind of exposed—caught—like not properly dressed, or something, half 
dressed. Blushing is another thing that comes to mind when I think of shame, somebody 
with just kind of red [ ] and wanting to hide. And humiliation . . .  I think I do associate 
it with, with a child, with the image of a child, and it reminds me of one of the early 
clients I had when I was doing my training, in fact, who was telling me a story about 
when she was a child, and she was the youngest in the family and her brothers used to 
tease her a lot, and they would do things like ask her, ‘what’s the capital of London?’ and 
she said, and then they would laugh because she would say England or Scotland, because 
she couldn’t work out what the question meant. And it was a terrible, terribly humiliating 
for her. And I remember that as a story which spoke to me a lot about how you engender 
shame in a child-without meaning to, through that kind of teasing, and by giving them a 
question they can’t possibly answer impression they can’t possibly answer and laughing 
at them. So that’s some of the kinds of things that it kind of brings to mind as well as the 
images.
And if you were to describe what it feels like, you’ve started to do that a little bit— 
physically, what kind of things go on in your mind when you’re experiencing it, 
what happens when you’re kind of in it-how would you describe what that feels 
like, what goes on?
I think it’s like . . .  for me it’s like a feeling of wanting to disappear into a hole, of 
wanting to, to just be invisible, and the feeling of very bodily feelings of blushing, of 
blood rushing to the head and the heart beating faster, kind of panicky—that kind of 
feeling about it. And ju st. . .  I suppose the strongest is just wanting the ground to kind of
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open up and disappear into it... terribly humiliated, and somehow it includes a bit of not 
quite knowing . . .  what you’ve done to deserve it, or what you’ve done that’s been so bad 
. . .  this feeling of somehow being-bad as well—not quite right.
So, I mean if you think about that kind of experience, those kinds of feelings and 
you move into the context where you’re a therapist and you’re working with a 
client, you know, can you think of times when that kind of experience or something 
like it has been part of your experience as a therapist?
I want to make a distinction, because I noticed in the thing you gave me to read that there 
was, you mentioned shame along with defensiveness, and I think they’re two very 
different feelings for me . . .  yes, shame can make me feel defensive, but I can also think 
of times when I felt very defensive and I felt under attack—that something’s been under 
attack-that I wouldn’t necessarily associate with shame, so I’m going to stick to the ones 
that are associated with shame
Yeah, um, and maybe if you’re able to think about where the line is between the two 
and what would come, what kind of defensive experiences might be connected to 
shame, that as well, but yeah . . .  your sense of it.
There’s a couple situations that come to mind that are quite, quite different actually. And 
one was . . .  with a client who I’d been seeing for quite a while who I knew well. . .  who 
came twice a week, and he asked to change his session time, which he did from time to 
time, because he had a lot of commitments that meant he couldn’t always make the time 
he came, which was usually mid-afremoon, or late afternoon. And I agreed to the change 
of time, and he was going to come quite early in the morning—seven-thirty or eight. And 
I forgot. And I was in the shower when the bell rang, and I thought it was the postman— 
it rang again, so I thought I’d better go see who that is. And it still didn’t click. So I 
opened the door in my bathrobe with a towel wrapped around my head, and there was my 
male patient [laughing]. So I felt. . .  it was one of those moments when you think ‘Oh 
my God,’ um . . .  but there was nothing I could do. He was there, and . . .  and I mean I 
did, I got round it by, by laughing, and I think that’s quite often what I would do when 
you do something that’s [laughing covering words]. It’s not a disaster, let’s, let’s just sort 
of, so I laughed . . .  and he laughed as well, and I just had to ask him if he’d give me a 
few minutes to get ready. It was clear I’d forgotten it, so there was no point in that, and 
then we were able to look at it in the session a bit. I couldn’t do too much with it that 
session. I was too shocked and taken aback by it myself. . .  but it did tie in very much, 
and I was very aware that it tied in—that it would tie in for him with a very powerful 
memory of seeing his mother half-naked . . .  half-dressed, and there was I in a similar 
position, so there were things that I could do with it later, but I couldn’t do much with it 
that day—except just to recover enough to get myself ready and, and have his session... 
And there was shame—also there was guilt that I’d forgotten, but also that feeling of... 
how just, how outside the professional frame this was, and, and a kind of a very big 
failure in terms of what we’re normally kind of expecting to provide our clients with. It
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was not a safe situation for him—especially as a man somehow—and a man who was a 
priest as well, so that’s one time where I remember feeling it really badly.
And do you want to say a little bit more, what it, what it was like for you actually 
then, in the session. Was it, were you aware of it sort of staying in the background, 
or was it, what do you think happened with the feelings as you were in the session?
Well, what happened that time was that, although I thought I’d cut off enough from 
them—I kind of put them to one side is what I felt I was doing—enough to kind of be 
professional and get on with the session—but I was aware that they were sitting there by 
my side, kind of rumbling away. And part of me wanted to kind of really address them. I 
couldn’t process them. I couldn’t think, I didn’t have space then to really think about 
them, and it might have been more helpful to have given us a bit of space then . . .  for 
both of us to think about what had happened and what the impact was, but I wasn’t 
experienced enough to do that at the time. All I could do was have them sitting there at 
the side simmering away thinking ‘Oh my God, Oh my God’ from time to time, and from 
time to time I could feel the—the kind of—the heat almost of the shame kind of flow 
through me, and just having to put it aside again and focus on what was happening in the 
here and now. So I didn’t deal with it very well. I wasn’t able to use it very 
constructively. I was able to use it a bit more later—when I had had time to process it 
myself. But at the time I just split it off, didn’t manage it altogether—but I was aware of 
it—I had this uncomfortable thing sitting here beside me, at the time.
And what’s your sense of any awareness on his part, or any? What might have 
been, any connection between what you were feeling with those feelings being on the 
side, and what, what do you think was going on for him?
I think—I think that he probably felt very uncomfortable and very embarrassed as well at 
having taken me by surprise. He probably felt it was his fault—just as I would say it was 
my fault, but as he’d asked for the change of time, and he’d put me in this position, and I 
think he was probably working very hard to forget it as well, and to kind of ignore it and 
say, ‘oh let’s just get on with i t . . .  let’s not deal with this, this feeling. And I was 
colluding with that in just saying, ‘oh yes, let’s not deal with it right now. Let’s, let’s just 
go on as if nothing had happened.’ . . .  Not at all the way to deal with it, but that was the 
best I could do at the time with it, and I think I was . . .  he was in a very similar place. 
But—but we both found it very difficult to talk about it as well. But I think he also . . .  
and I also gave him the message that it wasn’t safe to talk about it. I think he probably 
felt he had wrong-footed me, and that I . . .  that he had to give me time to kind of get my 
balance back.. And that’s what I was feeling too. I had been wrong-footed and I needed 
time to get my balance back, and I think there was, it was probably very much what’s 
happened for him too. Afterwards, afterwards when I had time to reflect on it a bit more,
I did—I did um . . .  feel that it probably had been really very powerful for him in terms of 
his relationship with his mother, and, and his whole feelings about sexuality too, and I 
was able to kind of help him think about it a bit there, but not very much. It was as if, 
having not dealt with it when it happened at the time, it became a bit taboo—it was . . .
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you couldn’t-you couldn’t resurrect the heat of the moment, and it was a very hot 
moment, and . . .  and it went. And that was fairly much what had happened throughout 
his life-there were really hot moments in his life that he had not been able to deal with. 
The feelings had just got split off, and he’d gone on as if nothing had happened in his 
nice friendly way, just like I did.
Um . . .  You mentioned coming back to it at a later point.
Well, I think when he came -the next time he came—as far as I remember—this is a long 
time ago now—we talked about it. I was, he brought it up in the context of his mother 
again, and I was able to link it with this experience o f . .. of catching me out, as it were, 
half-dressed . . .  and how difficult that was for him too. And that, that he might have felt 
toward me some of the anger that he had felt towards his mother for puttiiig him in that 
position, but he couldn’t relate to that. I remember that very clearly. He could not, he 
could not get in touch with the anger with me for putting him in that position. He was 
very, it, he was able to kind of step back in and be very indulgent, kind of parental 
towards me, the child who was being caught out, so it was very reversed.
Is there anything else around that particular time?
No I don’t, I do think now it was, there’s a lot more . . .  it could have been a lot more 
fruitfiil than-than it was. And interestingly, what I at the time thought was me being 
professional-making it alright very quickly so that we could, we could laugh about it, 
that it, and not let it kind of become too big a thing, was actually me cutting off 
[laughing] from all sorts of feelings that were too difficult and uncomfortable. And I 
think that’s sometimes, we do use that professionalism to-to hide from some feelings 
that are quite difficult—to smooth them over.
You mentioned that there were a few sort of quite different experiences.
The other one that stands out in my mind is one I haven’t actually thought about as much, 
but it came back to me when I was thinking about what we were going to be talking about 
it. And it was a strange little incident really, and again it was with a man. And it’s in 
my, it was in my flat. And I was seeing people in my flat at home. And I was living on 
my own at the time—it was in the time before I was with my partner. And I saw this man 
as a favour, really, and I didn’t think it was very appropriate, but I was working with his .
.. his wife was a colleague at the health centre where I worked, and she asked if- if  I 
would see him, because she felt he really needed some help, but he wouldn’t quite agree 
to it. She asked me if I’d see him as a one-off and just chat with him about what might be 
helpfiil for him . . .  because she felt she couldn’t get through to him. And I felt very 
doubtful about it, but in the end I agreed to see him as a one-off, and so I saw him on one 
evening. And somewhere during the session, there was this noise from a cupboard in the 
room. I think it was probably the meter. It was ju st.. . it just started ticking, but it just, 
it intruded into the session, and he looked a bit startled, and then he said to me, ‘Are you 
on your own here?’ And, as he said it I was just filled with, first with panic, like are you
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on your own here, but he went on to say, ‘Don’t you think it’s a bit dangerous seeing, 
seeing a man you don’t know-a strange man on your own in a flat. Anything could 
happen.’ And the next feeling I thought was kind of like a real mortification, like ‘oh 
he’s right. I am so, it’s like I’ve made myself so vulnerable. I’ve put myself in this 
position. I really shouldn’t have done this. You know. I’m not kind o f .. .It’s almost 
like he made me feel like I wasn’t professional. . .  I wasn’t doing this properly, like a 
child who didn’t know how to look after herself. It was a whole gamut of feelings like 
that—just from this one—it was not the comment, it was the way he said it. There was 
something in here which made me feel really . . .  it made me feel really small. . .  and- 
and incompetent.. . Which now that I’m thinking about it again, actually, may well have 
been how he was feeling about having to come, having been sent by his wife to come and 
talk to this counsellor. And maybe it was a way of establishing himself and saying, ‘I 
don’t need this; it’s you who needs to be looked after. It’s you who, who needs 
somebody to be looking after, to be kind of taking care of you.’ But there was, there was 
also something quite threatening in it. There was certainly quite a sexual innuendo and 
you know-a kind of feeling of well-what could a man do to you if you’re on your own. 
Yu- ihhhhlll! ! It was, it was a very powerful moment of both shame . . .  and shock. . .  
and I didn’t feel a real danger from him—and I wasn’t-in  the reality of him and me 
sitting there—but it opened up a whole . . .  a whole kind of sense o f . . .  things could 
happen. I could be very vulnerable. And it wasn’t that I hadn’t thought about this, and 
that I didn’t take care about who I saw at home. I . . .  they had to be people I knew and 
feel reasonably safe around. So it wasn’t that I hadn’t thought about that, but it was as if 
I hadn’t . . .  as if I was suddenly shown up . . .  as this rather. . .  sort of less competent 
woman. Why would you do this? . . .  So that was a different. . .  it was a different. . .
It had a different feeling to i t . . .  And so as that was happening to you, sort of 
thinking about what that was, what it felt like, I mean when you became aware of 
feeling very small, very helpless, what happened to those feelings? I mean, what, 
how did the session sort of move on? What is your sense of it?
That I can’t remember very clearly. I think what I did, was . . .  was um . . .  quickly try 
and turn it round, actually, and I think I said to him something like. You seem very 
concerned about me, and I can’t remember how he took that. But I think I related it to 
something he’d been saying about himself and his wife, and so I deflected it, I think. I ..
. I turned it back to, to what he’d been talking about with . . .  in relation to himself and his 
wife, which is not inappropriate I think, but it also felt like a deflection, getting him away 
from this . . .  this focus on me, which was making me feel so uncomfortable, and I felt 
uncomfortable for the rest of the session. I couldn’t wait to get to the end of it, and get 
him out—not because I felt he was a danger, but because I was very, very uncomfortable. 
And I felt. . .  I felt my instinct initially had been right about. . .  it was not appropriate for 
me to have seen him at all really. And I should have stuck with that. And that he also 
felt it wasn’t appropriate, because it was neither a consultation really, or an assessment 
for therapy. . .  really. I wasn’t going to be offering him therapy. He didn’t think he 
needed therapy, but I think, you know, she was talking about splitting up and leaving 
him, and as far as he was concerned there was nothing therapy could do about that. He
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couldn’t see . . .  he could not see that he might have had a part to play in that. He was 
very, very defended against any responsibility . . .  taking any responsibility for his part in 
it—at least he wasn’t going to acknowledge to me that he recognized that he had any part 
in it at all. So it was her. . .  her having problems mid-life and all that sort of thing he 
wanted to explain it away entirely in those terms. So for him, what was he doing there?
So at the time that you kind of felt this way and you turned it around and asked him 
the question, were you, was there awareness on your part that that was what you 
were doing, and that’s, or was it? How did you understand it at the time—if you 
remember?
I don’t think I was aware of what I was doing until later. I think I responded 
instinctively, and there was a . . .  it was really about trying to get back some sense of 
being in charge, and . . .  and one way to do that was to say, well, to put it back to him to 
put the focus on what’s going on for him, father than get into and let him keep focusing 
on me—to deflect him back into thinking about himself.
And then in terms of, for you after the session, what happened to those feelings that 
you sort of had during the session?
I remember afterward really, kind of being really puzzled by the strength of my response 
to it and wondering what, what else was around there for alarm bells that were ringing for 
me. But I think what I did then-because I wasn’t going to see him again-there was not 
going to be any more contact-I think it was just very easy to clock it as one of those 
things I don’t understand, and just leave it. But it has stayed with me, and I think that is 
because I didn’t take it any further really. I struggled with it a bit and what it was about,. 
. .  but I . . .  I didn’t, I didn’t get to any. Different things would occur to me, but nothing 
really fitted. That reminds me o f . . .  well, of childhood fears, for instance waking in the 
night and feeling that there’s or that there might be burglars in the house, o r . . .  and 
hearing noises. I think it was the combination of the noise and this very strange way he 
said this-as if there was an intention to scare me, which I, and I found him, perhaps from 
the beginning . . .  actually, I had found him very unlikeable. And I had found myself 
wondering how did this woman come to be with this man, but that may also haVe been 
part of his defensiveness. But I found it really difficult to like him, to take to him, and so 
there were associations with other men that I’ve had that kind of uncomfortable feeling 
around as well. But apart from those vague kind of associations, I didn’t know why I felt 
so, so ashamed, so small. I’m afraid it’s a bit unprocessed still.
So I guess when you’re, you’re in that kind of a situation, how can you tell when 
shame on your part, your experience of it, may be coming up for you in the context 
of a session? Is it something that you are aware of happening as it’s happening? 
When do you kind of recognise it, how do you recognise it?
How I usually recognise it now-I mean normally it’s the actual physical sensations that I 
have, so lean feel that kind of blush for instance [laughing]. Sometimes it’s very
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physical and I can feel myself tightening. I can, I feel very much the physiological 
response. That’s my first signal usually that’s what alerts me, and then feelings that 
accompany that. Is that what you mean?
Yeah.
That’s what would make me aware. And sometimes I’m aware of the physiological 
sensations where I’m not actually aware of any feelings of shame. I can feel that my 
body is sometimes more alert to it than my emotional whatever -  radar, if you like. And I 
feel the kind of sensations and I think what am I, what’s going on here that I’m not 
picking up? And I think it can go from-I’m very much more aware recently of how it 
can be translated, transmitted from unconscious to unconscious -also that either party 
really I think feeling it, but getting the sensations, so that it’s very primitive. And it feels 
like a very primitive response, shame, actually to me—almost before the time of language 
even, some of it. So that’s where I would be most conscious of it in a session. But it’s 
quite a good . . .  alert system, and it makes me kind of aware that there’s something 
going on that’s a bit out of consciousness, a bit below the level of consciousness, that. . .  
that’s happening between us in the session.
So when that, when you’re aware of that, when that happens, how do you, what do 
you do with it?
Well that depends on the context a bit. If I’m working with somebody who’s on the 
couch, it’s a lot easier actually to give yourself space. Because there is a space, they’re 
not looking at you directly. So you can think ‘what is it that’s going on here I’m 
experiencing this—what is it telling me about what they might be experiencing? How 
much of it is mine? How much of it is their’s?’ And you kind o f . . .  I kind of know what 
my own flashbacks are, if you like, what’ likely to arouse those feelings in me because of 
my own experience, but even then-even though I know it’s hooking into something in 
me-that doesn’t mean it’s not hooking in, it’s not come from them as well, it’s not a 
communication about how they might be feeling too. Or about what they might be 
wanting me to do for them, what role they might want me to play at time for them, and 
maybe to carry a humiliated bit of them that they don’t want to know about, so it can be 
that. Or it can be that they’re feeling very shamed, and it’s a shared . . .  it’s a 
communication of that. I think usually there’s something about, I don’t, I think normally 
I would, I would be looking to see what is. .. Is it a communication from them, or is it 
something they’re asking me to hold for them, but they don’t want to know about—is that 
a projection of something unwanted, or is it a communication about how it feels that can 
be shared? I would normally not think-even though it’s my own stuff-of not maybe
looking for that as well Because I do think even if it hooks into, it hooks us where
we’ve got vulnerable point, but in the service o f . . .  something that’s happening in them, 
in the client or patient as well. But I think I find it a bit more difficult when we’re sitting 
opposite somebody in the chair, and-if I do actually blush, and I am aware how I might 
feel this rush of heat and actually nothing shows, but sometimes it does, so I’m also 
aware that I’m feeling this and they’re noticing that I’m feeling something, they’re
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clocking it, and do I refer to it, or do I say nothing and just see what they do with it, and 
how we then think about it later, or do I just listen to what might be happening in them 
and see how it fits in—where the shame is in their story or what they’re saying. And it 
depends a bit on the context and the relationship I have with that person whether I refer to 
it very overtly or not.
Do you sometimes do that, or?
Sometimes I will. . .  I won’t necessarily draw attention to the fact that I’m experiencing 
something unless there is a very clear link and I can think that they want me to know 
what it’s like to feel that shame that they feel. Then I think it’s appropriate. I think it’s 
much more difficult, I find it much more difficult. Otherwise I know some people 
some people will say, ‘you’re aware that I’m blushing,’ or ‘you might be aware that I’m 
blushing, and that has. I’m having a response to what you’re saying.’ I don’t do that, not 
unless there’s something in the material, which makes it feel relevant. I suppose my 
stronger sense is that if somebody’s noticing that their words are having a certain impact 
on me . . .  that what they need to hear also is that I’m okay with that, that I’m not 
uncomfortable about it, and as I’ve got more experienced, I am less uncomfortable and 
more able to just feel, ‘oh this is what I’m feeling . . .  this is what is happening to me, and 
I wonder what that’s about.’ But that’s again, that’s something that more recent.
So there’s a sense in which you kind of listen, you listen to whatyou’re using it, to 
sort of gauge what’s going on, yeah?
Yeah.
And sometimes you can feel it but you can’t actually attach it to some particular. . .
Yeah, sometimes it comes embodied . . .  but without the images or pictures or things that 
would help you give it a context—not so often I suppose, but it does happen. I’ve had 
experience where there’s nothing, there’s no affect that you would expect to go with it. 
There’s just a, very much in the way that people who experience panic attacks, for 
instance, or anxiety, acute anxiety in their bodies. They’ve got all the physical 
manifestations and terror, but they have no sense that, of what the feeling, the affect 
might have been that started it off—that was behind it, or that might be involved in it.
It’s just, it’s purely body, yeah and it comes out of nowhere.
The body can register something. And can you say a little bit more about your 
experience—times that you have said something when you felt it that would be 
useful to say something about their wanting you to know what the experience of 
shame felt like, I mean, how is that? What’s been your experience of that?
That’s, that’s something I do more when I’m working more psychoanalytically. And it 
would . . .  let me just see if I can think of something that would pick up on that point..  . 
Well, maybe it’s not quite shame, but it’s the kind of thing I would do with i t . . .
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somebody who . . .  who’s suffering from a lot of anxiety which is getting in the way of 
his doing a major project, and he was describing how he had felt all his life—although 
he’d been very successful-he’s always felt terrified that he’s going to fail, so he’s not be 
able to enjoy his success or relax into it. It’s always just the next project, and the next 
hurdle and the next lot of anxiety, and the terrible pressure that he feels under. And he 
said to me that he couldn’t afford . . .  he couldn’t afford to pay the full fee, and although a 
part of me felt I don’t really understand why you can’t afford the full fee—he’d got a 
good job and his wife was working full time as well, but I did take it, and so I agreed to 
work at a reduced fee, but I did say to him I felt that it would be better for him to be 
coming two or, I mean I said three times a week rather than once a week, and he said he 
couldn’t possibly afford that, so I just went a wee bit further and I’m getting this part of 
me saying ‘what am I doing here?’ but anyway that was another point. He did, he was 
very good at getting what he needed from me, but he did say to me that he would, he said 
to me when he came back that he would like to work twice weekly—if that was alright, 
and he didn’t know about a third session, but he’d like to wait see how it goes. And I 
immediately felt like I was on trial. . .  it was, it was, but it, and it felt to me like a 
communication from him, and I was able to put it to him eventually in the session that 
maybe he did want me, he wanted me too, to know what it was like to feel on trial, to feel 
under pressure to, to feel I might fail, that I might not be the therapist he wanted, I might 
not make him better, I might not go as quickly as he wanted, so that I too might have to 
feel the shame o f . . .  that I wouldn’t succeed . . .  I would fail, and that he’d done this in 
the way that he had said to me he’d come twice but he couldn’t commit himself to three 
times with me until he could see what I could do, and how it would be with me. And my 
response to that at the time, that feeling of ‘my God, I’m going to fail. I’m not going to be 
able to do this. I’m not going to be able to satisfy him. I’m not going to be able to make 
him better’ . . .  was, that was a communication; I felt he wanted me to know what it was 
like for him, and to have a firsthand experience of it. And he had difficulty . . .  he had 
difficulty with it at first, and he said I’m not sure what you mean, but when someone else 
spelled it out ‘this is what you were saying, I think what you meant was that you can 
want me, but you don’t want to commit yourself to three times a week until you see 
whether I am good enough, that I come up to scratch, whether I might fail, I might not get 
you better, etc. I had to spell it out and then he just smiled and said ‘okay.’ So he didn’t . 
say yes- he had felt those things-but, but I knew that there was some . . .  I was very sure 
of it, that there was that communication from him that I was to be in that position. It was 
a projective identification. And I think it helps to put it to them. I think it helped him to 
know — not only that it was understood, but that it could be spoken about—that it didn’t 
have to be something that was just simmered under the surface—that he was putting me 
on trial. And as I indicated too, that he would also feel on trial with me—would he be a 
good enough patient for me, would I think he was bright enough, going fast enough, 
making enough progress? So that we were both to be in it together. So does that answer 
your question?
Being able to sort of see how you use that essentially. Are there any particular kinds 
of, after a session, if you had those kinds of feelings come up, if you’ve experienced
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shame feelings come up in a session, what do you do with them inbetween times, or 
afterward? How do you work with them?
Well one of the things I would do would be to talk about it in my own therapy. And out 
of that would come all sorts of things, obviously to unexpected places, but it gives you 
some sense of what it’s been about—not just for me, but also she’s very good at helping 
me to think about what, what the communication from the patient has been, and what 
might have been going on between us in that, that kind of context. And certainly the 
therapist I have is very good in helping. My sense, my tendency is always to think it’s 
my fault—I’ve not done it right. I’ve not done it well enough, o r . . .  and she’s very good 
at helping me to see the power of the transference, and how I can get drawn into it.
Alright it’s my stuff. . .  it’s my own early experiences of shame which are being 
activated, but I’m getting drawn into the client’s world, an internal world, and that’s 
what’s significant for the work. And I have to unhook a bit from— acknowledge it—that 
this is my stuff-but actually unhook enough from it to see what, why it’s being mobilised 
at that point in the relationship. And that’s difficult to do, and I think it certainly helps to 
talk over with someone else, and supervision is another. . .  that’s the other context in 
which I would kind of explore it. I might, I would do some of it myself in writing up 
notes, what going on here, what’s this about. One of the things that I have to say makes 
all this more difficult I think has been, is when you’re in the training situation, and you’re 
a trainee as I have been in psychoanalytic stuff for a number of years now. There’s 
always . . .  it’s very difficult not to, to feel that a lot of what’s happening there-especially 
if it’s around shame-is just because you are not experienced enough, not good enough at 
it, not quick enough to pick things up. And it’s quite difficult to kind o f . . .  just 
acknowledge that there might be some of that, but also that there is something else going 
on too. It’s very easy to say, ‘oh, God, if I just had a bit more experience -didn’t I make 
a mess of that. Why did I say that? How did I say that?’ And it’s not just about my 
inexperience or my own stuff, it’s that AND something else as well. And it’s like, it’s the 
um . . .  the thing the Sandlers talk about very well I think in their book on role 
responsiveness—that the, when they, they kind of acknowledge that the therapist gets 
drawn into taking on a certain role and enacting something with the patient, and that if 
you’re not allowed-if you don’t allow that enactment, then you lose a lot of useful 
material, because the patient draws you in order for both of you to be able to think about 
what’s being re-enacted and why, and to understand the person’s internal world, and how, 
what they do with their objects, how they use them, and allowing yourself to be drawn in 
and not to be too ashamed of the things that you might do in an enactment is really 
important. I think that’s the thing I feel most strongly now is . . .  and that’s been a big 
learning for me-is not to get stuck in ‘oh my God how awful, how on earth did I do that’ 
but to look beyond that to what is it telling us about this person’s internal world, and what 
they’re looking for from me.
So it sounds like there’s quite, in some ways over time, you’ve come to have quite an 
openness to see how you can use that emotional experience in yourself. And I guess 
I’m wondering are there ways, because what you described at the beginning is quite
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an aversive experience—are there ways in which you feel you ever protect yourself 
from it or try to protect yourself from it, or there’s any defensiveness around that?
I’m sure that’s true. And one of the things I have found recently is that—and maybe this 
is a way of protecting myself—I will, I find myself instinctively feeling one thing, and 
I’ll say something quite different, right, and I’ve begun to recognise a pattern here-that I 
think something instinctively, and then part of me says ‘oh I can’t say that, I can’t 
possibly say that’ and because it sounds too off the wall, or way out, or something that I 
feel the client is going to reject this-they’re going to say, ‘are you mad?’ ‘are you 
crazy?’—there is something about it, and I protect myself from that response by saying 
something that feels less . . .  that feels harmless. And I make them harmless, simpler, the 
more, it’s not more benign, more an interpretation that’s actually not going to touch them 
really. I take, I take the heat out of it, and so I think that’s a defensiveness in me, that’s 
just a way of protecting myself from that response of ‘no, that’s not what I thought, 
that’s not what I felt,’ of being dismissed as stupid, o r . . .  and the feelings that that 
engenders I suppose. So I’ll take the safe way, and I’ve just begun to recognise, or now I 
actually catch myself, sometimes see myself, ‘well I thought that and I said this’ and it’s 
usually around that— doing something that feels safer.
Because of how it might feel, the client’s reaction, the feelings that might be 
engendered in you by the client’s reaction.
Yeah. Is that the kind of thing?
Yeah.
I suppose I’m aware too that I protect myself sometimes by just not addressing 
something, (break to turn over tape)
I can’t remember where I was.. .1 was talking about my training patient—she was very 
difficult, and sometimes I just, um . . .  she was so attacking, so . . .  and could make me 
feel such a bad therapist, and I suppose that’s shame as well—there’s that whole 
experience of feelings that I, that I’m just not a good therapist, that I can’t get it right for 
her, that I can’t tune into her properly, like it, it’s like a child who . . .  that you can’t get 
to feed . . .  who’s crying out desperately hungry to kind of get something, something 
really nourishing and good, and you kind of keep giving her this crap that she throws it 
back at you and says ‘that’s not right, that’s not what I want, you’re not listening, you 
don’t know, you don’t understand, you don’t understand’ . . .  and sometimes I . . .  I did 
two things- one, that I would retreat back into counsellor mode rather than a 
psychoanalytic one, more thoughtful about what’s going on here, and I would start to 
kind of look with her at the immediate, and what she needed to do, and what she was 
thinking of doing, and just keep it on the surface. And other times I just felt helpless and 
did, and disengaged in a way, didn’t get, anything that was going to get into a struggle 
with her I just, I wouldn’t go there sometimes just because I couldn’t . . .  the battle just 
felt too difficult at times. And the attacks felt too difficult. Sometimes I just thought I
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can’t take this tonight, so I just withdrew a bit . . .  protected myself that way I sometimes. 
And then afterwards you can think about that was about, and what she was needing and 
why, why I couldn’t (phone rings).
Just in terms of I mean you were talking, giving different examples of ways in which 
your protected yourself.
I think what it does though . . .  what that communicates to the patient is that it’s not safe 
to allow them to, to do that. Or sometimes I think, I mean when I was able to address the 
attacking directly, that was okay. But other times when I just, I just retreated from it, I 
think she felt very bad. I think she felt it very damaging—that’s what she had felt as a 
child, you know that she had the power to damage her objects, and she did punch holes in 
them, and she punched a lot of holes in me too along with way, and it took a lot of 
supervision and holding for me to kind of really stay with it—that that was what was 
happening, and not that I was just useless in helping this woman.
And I guess that kind of brings us to one of the last things I wanted to ask you about 
and that is, what have you found really helpful—anything that you would find 
particularly useful in terms of understanding those kind of feelings and managing 
them, using them?
Three things, basically. One is my own therapy, and that’s an interesting one for me, 
because I changed therapists halfway through my training, and I did not find the first one 
helpful in that at all. I found that really really very difficult because whenever I took 
something that had came up at work to that therapist, I ended up feeling more shame, 
interesting. I found it very, it didn’t matter how m ^y times I tried it, or how I did it, I 
ended up feeling a lot of shame—that I had not understood, that I was useless, and that it 
was just really very, very difficult. And it was one of the reasons why I thought in the 
end that I had to change therapists. I could not go on like that, and it was not helping my 
work, and I think that was the right instinct, because with this second therapist, I have 
found it enormously helpful, and much safer. I can talk freely about what was, what’s 
happened, what I felt. And she’s very good at helping me to unhook again as I said from 
that tendency in myself to feel it’s all to do with what I’m doing or not doing correctly, 
and to really think about the communication and what’s being played out that’s part of 
the client’s pathology. And I found my supervisors enormously helpful with that as well, 
in just being able to think, to think there about what. . .  about the interaction and what’s 
been going on, what might be, how it might be understood. And some of the things I’ve 
read as well have helped. I mentioned the Sandlers, and I think that John Steiner. And 
Herbert Rosenfeld has a very, also very good material on understanding the 
countertransference and the pull to the client’s, the client’s pulling you into their material, 
and how to think about that, and how to work with it. So that’s, you know, those things 
are all very useful. And clinical seminars -part of training-when you’re able to hear 
other people talking about their work, and then you actually. . .  you see how everybody 
struggles with the same difficulties, and that feels very encouraging really. I think that 
helps, so you hear how other people work, and case studies in journals and things, that
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We’ve had lots of different seminars these days and get lots of different approaches to 
how to deal with them. And some appeal more than others, and I suppose you begin to 
find your own way of doing it and working that out.
You mentioned in particular a very interesting observation which is that you had 
two different kinds of therapy yourself on the client side, and the way in which that 
impacted your own experience of shame, and I’m wondering if you’re able to 
identify what it was, or um . . .  that made that such a different experience in terms 
of shame in particular?
I’ve thought a lot about this. I’m really interested in the contrast, the very different 
experiences being... And one of the things I think that happened continually in my first 
therapy was that it was very, it was very Kleinian, and it was very focused on the 
negative—on destructiveness, on aggression, on hostility, and the manifestations of those. 
I think the danger with that, and certainly what happened to me, is that you get-that the 
therapist may be communicating even though they don’t mean to—to me, it was like I was 
all the destructive, I was all hostile, I was all aggression, there was nothing good in me. .. 
that it becomes about the self and not about behaviours. And it certainly felt very much 
as if, when I talked about my work as well, it was, the focus was on my aggression and 
how that might be part of it, and there was no . . .  it was not . . .  she didn’t hold the other 
side. And I think also what she didn’t do . . .  was-in interpreting destructiveness and 
aggression, was to show what that was in service of—that she didn’t also show how it was 
a defense or aimed at protecting me, and how that developed as well. I think she thought 
she did that, but actually she didn’t. It was unrelentingly negative, and that ended up 
with me feeling that whatever I tried, I was not going to get anything right, and that 
therefore I must be this really hopeless. And interestingly when she, she wrote her report 
back to my training tutor, because I was in training at the time when I walked out on her, 
and decided that I wasn’t having any more of this . . .  but interestingly she, she’d said to 
them that I was a promising student, and I thought ‘well I’d never have known that.’ I 
got no sense that anything that I was doing might have any value or AT ALL . . .  whereas 
in my present experience, is somebody who is a lot more—she works very differently 
anyway—but her concept. . .  she always—when she’s pointing out something that, she 
always relates it to the whole structure. She’s always concerned to show what it, the 
meaning of it might be, or the function of it might be, so that you can actually think about 
what this destructive bit or aggressive bit or hostile bit might be in the service of. Now 
that helps me to do it with my patients as well, and one of the things that I was really 
concerned about was that I was interpreting before in much the way my therapist had 
interpreted to me. And one of my supervisors in particular—I was saying, ‘you know, this 
patient, she felt very persecuted by that, and she used to say to me ‘that’s because it is 
persecutory’—that what I was saying was . . .  I was doing to her what was being done to 
me, and that really concerned me as well. But I think it was that unrelenting interpreting 
of destructiveness and negative feelings without any context. . .  without any sense of 
why that might be or what the meaning of it was. It was, it’s based on a particular way of 
working, which is to help the person to see their destructive organisation and how it’s 
working, but unless you do that with some sense of [laughter] that there is something else
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as well, that it’s not the whole story, I think you can really feel very much ‘this is all I 
am,’ and then, because you know it’s not, that’s not all there is, then why is she focusing 
on this all the time, and it becomes very undermining, very shaming.
Yeah, shaming and I suppose that leaves me a little bit with the question, of does it 
in any way in your mind have anything possibly to do with the difference between 
the two therapists and the way in which they relate to their own shame? I don’t 
know, that’s a bit of a leading question, and I almost can’t resist asking you whether 
you think-since we are talking about therapists’ experiences of their own shame 
and how it may impact the relationship . . .
Right, that’s an interesting question, and I think there’s probably some truth in that, 
because there were times, certainly with my, with my first therapist when I was very 
aware of her vulnerability, because she would react to some things I said enormously 
defensively, and I thought ‘uh uh, I have to back off here.’ And I think what I was 
picking up, now that I’m thinking about it, was a very big fragility in her, actually, but 
which was not acknowledged, but there were certain things I couldn’t, I wasn’t free to be 
myself. That was for sure, and I think it was probably was to do with her own sense of 
self, whereas with this one I’ve got at the moment, I feel I’m with somebody who’s much 
clearer about who she is, much firmer, but also able to be flexible and more open, 
whereas the other was very structured, very rigid, very defined. And it’s a certain school 
of thought, but I think it does attract certain personalities as well, and perhaps h i s . . .  
there is something to do with how you’ve dealt with your own shame, and whether 
you’ve been able to process it or not, and maybe that could be part of it. Whereas this 
one’s not . . .  not afraid to, to address it, but can do it in a very much more benign way.
So she’s had something that I think the other one had not had, and maybe that’s in terms 
of their own therapy as well as their own early experience.
I’m aware of the time, is there anything else you want to say or add, or?
Um . . .  I can’t think of anything. Okay?
Thank you very much.
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Elephant in the Consulting Room: 
Implications of Therapist Affective Style in Responding to ‘Mistakes’ 
and Client Criticism
Abstract
This paper explores the implications of therapists’ affective style (defined as the 
likelihood of experiencing shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment) in response to 
‘mistakes’ and client criticisms in the therapeutic relationship. Two questionnaires 
assessing affective style were completed by a sample of 136 therapists: (1) Test of Self- 
Conscious Affect - 3 (TOSCA-3: Tangney, Bearing, Wagner & Gramzow, 2000)—an 
established measure of dispositional affective style in response to scenarios depicting 
‘mistakes’ and failures encountered in everyday life, and (2) Measure of Therapists’ Self- 
Conscious Affect (MOTSCA)—a scale modelled on the TOSCA, but substituting 
scenarios drawn from therapists’ accounts of mistakes and client criticisms in clinical 
practice. The relationship between therapists’ experiences of self-conscious affect, and 
their tendency to externalise or detach in the therapeutic relationship was assessed, as was 
the relationship between their clinical affective style scores and the following: (1)
dispositional affective style in everyday life; (2) trainee status; (3) a racial-ethnic 
difference between the therapist and client. Findings: Self-conscious affect was a
significant predictor of externalising cause or blame to the client, especially in the case of 
shame affect (external), which also significantly increased the likelihood of detachment. 
The strongest predictor of overall affective style in the clinical setting was affective style 
in everyday life. Being a trainee was associated with significantly increased proneness to 
shame (internal) in the clinical context. In this sample of predominantly ethnic-majority 
therapists, the presence of a racial-ethnic difference between therapist and client 
significantly increased the likelihood of guilt, but decreased externalisation. Practice and 
training implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Going back to Freud, it has been recognised that therapists as well as clients can 
experience the arousal of complex and difficult feelings in a therapeutic relationship, 
which can interfere with or serve the therapy depending on how they are understood and 
processed. However, theories about the role and impact of therapists’ emotions within the 
therapeutic process continue to evolve. As recent research has afforded a deeper glimpse 
into the moment-to-moment processing that goes on in human relationships (e.g., Beebe, 
1982; Stem, 1985; Wolf, Gales, Shane, & Shane, 2000), it seems increasingly evident 
that the affective experience of each participant in a dyad is both internally generated, 
and mutually constructed and regulated within the relationship (Beebe & Lachmann, 
2002). Each participant’s moment-to-moment subjective experience of ‘self and ‘other’ 
and the state of their relational bond is continually mediated and updated through co­
constructed affective experience (Schore, 1994; Stem, 2004). As clinicians have begun 
to apply this expanded understanding of human relational ‘process’ to therapeutic 
relationships (e.g., Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; Dreher, Mengele & Krause, 2001; Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Stem, 2004), a new appreciation of the implications of 
the therapist’s affective engagement in the therapeutic relationship continues to emerge.
Perhaps some the most difficult and least talked about of therapists’ affective experiences 
involve shame and guilt aroused when a therapist feels s/he may have made a ‘mistake’ 
or failed a client in some way. Such experiences are undoubtedly difficult because they 
involve worry and regret about the impact of something we have done or said on the 
client—an emotional response that affect theorists (e.g., Lewis, 1971, 1987; Natharison, 
1992; Tangney & Bearing, 2002) would consider consistent with the phenomenology of 
guilt. However, another reason we are likely to find such experiences difficult is the 
feeling state that can accompany ‘failures’ to live up to our intemalised image of the 
‘good enough’ therapist—a reaction more consistent with contemporary understandings 
of the phenomenology of shame.
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Over the past two decades, much theoretical and empirical work has been done in 
understanding the interpersonal implications of shame and guilt in response to mistakes 
and failures in everyday life. For example, shame and guilt are both negatively-valenced, 
self-reflective emotions and can occur together, but there is considerable evidence that 
they have distinct phénoménologies and implications for relational dynamics (Lewis, 
1971; Tangney, 1995a, Tangney & Bearing, 2002). Whereas, guilt is associated with 
regret or remorse about one’s actions and concern about their impact on the ‘other,’ 
shame involves the experience of seeing one’s ‘self as inferior or unacceptable in one’s 
own eyes (‘internal shame’), or in the eyes of another (‘external shame’) (Gilbert, 1998). 
Interpersonally, guilt tends to motivate efforts to make amends or repair, whereas shame 
is more associated with the desire to escape, withdraw, or ‘turn the tables’, and has been 
positively correlated with externalisation of cause or blame (Tangney & Bearing, 2002). 
Additionally there is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the arousal of 
strong feelings of shame can interfere with empathy (Tangney, 1991; 1995b). Although 
chronic unresolved shame and excessive shame sensitivity are recognised to be 
problematic, some shame theorists (e.g., Scheff & Retzinger, 1997; Scheff, 1997; Flarder 
& Greenwald, 2000) have asserted that shame also plays an adaptive relational function 
such that subtle shame cues provide us with vital feedback on our standing within social 
bonds enabling us to ‘read’ social contexts and adjust accordingly in terms of distance 
and intimacy, deference and respect (Scheff, 1997; Scheff & Retzinger, 1997). It has 
been argued that too little as well as too much shame sensitivity can be problematic 
(Harder & Greenwald, 2000).
Within the context of therapeutic relationships shame in particular has come to be 
recognised as a commonplace and powerful client-therapist dynamic. Lewis (1971) 
systematically traced the flow of clients’ shame and guilt through the running dialogue of 
several hundred transcripts of psychoanalytic sessions and found that, when shame was 
‘bypassed’ by the therapist, client and therapist would often become entangled in a 
defensive exchange. Sometimes these dynamics ran for sessions, ultimately progressing
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to therapeutic impasse and treatment failure. Lewis (1971) concluded that ‘unanalysed 
shame’ in the client was a significant contributor to treatment failure.
Building upon Lewis’ work, Scheff (1987, 1998), Scheff and Retzinger (1997), and 
Retzinger (1998) explored more fully the role of the therapist’s own shame affect in the 
therapeutic relationship. In analysing transcripts of sessions, they noticed that when a 
client felt criticised or judged by an intervention, the client might display brief indications 
of shame, but then move to anger, (termed ‘humiliated fury’ by Lewis) which would 
often be expressed indirectly as impatience, sarcasm, implied criticism of the therapist, or 
silent withdrawal. This cycle—of moving from shame to angry externalisation (or 
withdrawal)—seemed to spark a similar cycle in the therapist, who might communicate 
impatience or implied criticism of the patient. Their microanalysis of session transcripts 
highlighted how a therapist’s own shame affect could become activated and lead to 
defensive externalisation or withdrawal in relation to the client. They stressed the need 
for therapists to become better at recognising shame affect and defenses in themselves 
and their clients, and argued that therapists could learn to use their own and their clients’ 
shame cues as a kind of barometer of the state of the therapeutic bond (Scheff & 
Retzinger, 1997).
In a qualitative analysis of therapists’ accounts of their own shame experiences with 
clients. Miller (2004) found that shame and guilt often seemed to be co-mingled in 
response to what therapists perceived as a mistake or failure in their work with a client, or 
sometimes to a client’s criticism. Therapists’ accounts contained examples of defensive 
withdrawal and externalisation as well as ways that they had been able to make 
therapeutic use of their feelings. Much has been learned from qualitative study of 
therapists’ experiences of self-conscious affect, especially shame, and its potential 
implications within the therapeutic relationship, and much has been learned from 
quantitative study of shame and guilt in everyday life-—comprehensively reviewed by 
Tangney and Bearing (2002). However, to date there has been little quantitative 
investigation of the implications of therapists’ shame and guilt in the clinical setting, so it
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is difficult to say to what extent these phenomena might generalise to the wider 
population of therapists.
Considerable effort on the part of June Tangney and colleagues has gone into the 
development of a psychometrically sound measure of individual ‘affective style’ in 
response to failures and mistakes in everyday life, which has led to the development of 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect - 3 (TOSCA-3: Tangney, et al., 2000). The empirically 
supported theory underlying this measure is that individuals vary in ‘affective style’ (that 
is, a trait tendency toward shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment in response to 
failures or mistakes). Thus, individuals’ proneness to shame or guilt may go up or down 
at different developmental periods (e.g., more shame-prone during adolescence), but their 
place in relation to a sample of peers will remain constant (Tangney & Bearing, 2002). 
The TOSCA-3 generates four sub-scales (shame, guilt, externalisation, 
detachment/unconcern) based on participants’ responses to scenarios depicting everyday 
life‘mistakes’ and‘failures.’
To date, this concept of affective style has been applied in just one investigation of 
therapists’ self-conscious affect. Livingston and Farber (1996) used the Test of Self 
Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) to assess the 
relationship between dispositional shame proneness and trainee therapists’ self-reported 
affective responses to two different expressions of shame affect by a client, one very 
ashamed, the other, ‘humiliated fury’ at feeling judged by the therapist. They found no 
statistically significant differences among therapists according to gender, age, ethnicity, 
or level of training. However, trainees with higher dispositional ‘shame proneness’ 
scores on the TOSCA reported identifying more strongly with clients’ accusatory shame 
affect. Livingston and Farber (1996) concluded that dispositional ‘shame proneness’ 
increases therapists’ sensitivity to clients’ angry shame affect, and recommended that 
therapists become aware of their own shame proneness and defensive style. Inasmuch as 
the Livingston and Farber finding was based on the experience of trainees, it would be 
useful to know if this finding would generalise to more experienced therapists. Elsewhere
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in the literature (Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Miller 2004), it has been suggested that trainee 
therapists may be particularly prone to experiences of shame in clinical work.
While shame and guilt proneness have tended to be conceptualised as residing in an 
individual as a stable state or trait (‘affective style’), this conceptualisation has been 
criticised by Leeming and Boyle (2004) on the basis that it does not take sufficient 
account of the influence of social and cultural context. This seems a valid critique in that 
there is some empirical evidence to suggest that therapeutic dyads as well as individuals 
can be ‘prone’ to shame or guilt. For example, in analysing a case described by Altman 
(2000) of a white therapist and black client, Gump (2000) points out that, in a therapeutic 
dyad consisting of opposite members of socially constructed power relations based on 
differences in race or class, one of the members will come with unearned inferior status, 
the other with the fact of unearned superiority. She asserts that these differences in social 
location will position them to experience one another as ‘other’ rather than ‘like me,’ and 
will become potential sources of shame and guilt in their interactions. Miller (2004) 
found an analogous dynamic between a therapist who reported intense shame 
surrounding her German-ness activated in work with third generation Jewish Holocaust 
survivor. It would seem that any model of therapists’ affective style in the clinical setting 
needs to take into consideration cultural/contextual dynamics such as a race difference 
between therapist and client alongside individual factors such as dispositional affective 
style and‘trainee status’.
As a next step, this project sought to develop a measure of therapists’ affective style 
modelled on the TOSCA that could be used to quantitatively investigate therapists’ 
experiences of self-conscious affect in order to find out to what extent factors previously 
identified generalise to a larger sample of therapists. Such knowledge could have 
implications for the training of therapists and for therapeutic practice.
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Project Aims
• To explore how therapists affectively respond to their own mistakes and client 
criticism in clinical work with the aim of using this understanding to inform 
therapeutic training, practice, and supervision.
• To develop a scenario-based self-assessment measure that can be used to assess 
therapists’ self-conscious affective style in the therapeutic context.
Research Questions
1. How is the affective style of therapists in clinical work related to their trait 
affective style in everyday life?
Hypothesis: There will be a statistically significant positive correlation between 
therapists’ affective style in response to everyday life scenarios as measured by 
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3: Tangney, et al., 2000), and 
scenarios depicting mistakes and client criticisms in clinical practice as measured
by the Measure of Therapists’ Self-Conscious Affect (MOTSCA) designed as part
of this study.
2. Are there any statistically significant differences in affective style in clinical work 
based on gender, ethnicity, or trainee status?
Hypothesis: There will be no significant differences between trainees and fully 
qualified therapists in affective responses to the everyday scenarios, but trainees 
as a group will be significantly more likely to experience shame and guilt in 
response to the clinical scenarios. Based on previous research it is likely that the
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shame and guilt scores of females will be somewhat higher, on average, than 
males.
3. What is the relationship between the tendency to experience shame and guilt in 
response to mistakes and client criticism, and the tendency toward externalisation 
and detachment responses?
Hypothesis: There will be a statistically significant positive correlation between 
shame and externalisation scores.
4. Is individual affective style significantly altered by the introduction of systemic 
factor such as a racial-ethnic difference between the therapist and client?
Hypothesis: There will be a statistically significant difference in shame and guilt 
scores between two groups responding to identical sets of scenarios apart from the 
addition of a racial ethnic difference between therapist and client in a sub-set of 
the scenarios given to one of the groups. The group with the added race factor will 
have significantly higher shame and guilt scores on those scenarios.
5. Can any specific factors (e.g., content or type of scenario) be identified that would 
add to theoretical understanding of the dynamics of therapists’ shame and guilt in 
therapeutic work?
6. How valid and reliable are the TOSCA and MOTSCA with this sample of 
therapists?
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from professional registers of the British Psychological 
Society (BPS) and the United Kingdom Council of Psychotherapy (UKCP). Criteria for 
inclusion were (1) fully qualified or postgraduate trainee counselling or clinical 
psychologist, or psychotherapist, (2) currently working with clients. Only those self- 
identified in the registers as offering private services were approached due to a concern 
on the part of the university ethics committee that separate Multi-centre Research Ethics 
Committees (MREC) approval for NHS staff could not be sought given the short time­
frame for the study. Those contacted included 250 chartered counselling and clinical 
psychologists listed in the BPS register (virtually the entire target population), 120 
psychotherapists listed in the UKCP directory (drawn from randomly selected pages), and 
50 trainees on two postgraduate counselling psychology courses.
Of those sent materials, 141 returned the questionnaires, a response rate of 33.5%. The 
sample consisted of 59 counselling psychologists, 16 clinical psychologists, and 84 
psychotherapists, including 26 postgraduate counselling psychologist trainees (some 
participants listed more than one professional qualification). Participants ranged in age 
from 25 to 86, with a median age of 50. Participants had an average of 14.8 years 
practice experience (SD 9.67). 76 % were female. Most described themselves as White 
(94%), with 2% as Asian, 1.5% as Mixed, 1% as Black, and 2% as Other. On theoretical 
orientation, 37% described themselves as integrative, 27% as psychodynamic, 19% as 
pluralistic (ticked 2 or more models), 8% as cognitive behavioural, 7% as humanistic, and 
3% as existential. One hundred and thirty-four participants provided data for all of the 
sub-scales of the TOSCA, and 136 participants provided data for all of the sub-scales of 
the MOTSCA (two participants did not complete the TOSCA questionnaires).
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Measures and Procedure
Approval for the project was sought and obtained from the university ethics committee 
(Appendix A). Packets containing a cover letter (Appendix B), information sheet 
(Appendix C), and the TOSCA-3 and MOTSCA measures (Appendices D & E), along 
with a postage-paid return envelope were posted to 420 therapists meeting the inclusion 
criteria. Permission had been obtained for use of the TOSCA in this project. The general 
nature and procedures of the study were explained in the packet, emphasising the 
confidential and anonymous nature of participation, and stating that returned 
questionnaires would be taken as informed consent to ensure that participants’ responses 
would be completely anonymous. Participants were invited to complete and return in a 
return addressed postage-paid envelope two paper and pencil questionnaires, the Test of 
Self Conscious Affect -3 (TOSCA-3: Tangney, et al., 2000), and the Measure of 
Therapists’ Self-Conscious Affect (MOTSCA).
The TOSCA-3 is a measure of ‘affective style’ generating four sub-scales (shame, guilt, 
externalisation, detachment), which are theorised to correspond to key components of 
affective style in responding to mistakes or failures. The measure consists of a series of 
brief scenarios depicting mistakes or failures that participants might encounter in 
everyday life. Following each scenario, participants are presented with four brief 
responses representing brief phenomenological descriptions for shame, guilt, 
externalisation, and detachment specific to the context, and asked to rate on a 5-point 
scale their likelihood of responding to each; ranging from not likely to very likely. They 
are asked to rate each possible response. For example, respondents are asked to consider 
the following situation: “You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. 
Then you find out you did poorly.” Participants then rate the likelihood of responding in 
each of the following ways: “Well it’s just a test.” (detachment/unconcern). “The 
instructor doesn’t like me” (externalisation). “I should have studied harder” (guilt). “You 
would feel stupid” (shame). The order of responses (e.g., shame, guilt, externalisation, 
detachment) after each scenario is varied. TOSCA scenarios were drawn from written 
accounts of personal guilt and shame from a sample of several hundred university
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students and non-student adults. The shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment 
responses were drawn from a much larger pool of affective, cognitive, and behavioural 
responses provided by a second sample of adults, favouring responses put forward by 
multiple participants, thus enhancing its ecological validity. The TOSCA-3 is widely 
used and has been established as a psychometrically sound measure with previous 
samples (Tangney & Bearing, 2002). TOSCA-3 reliability ratings (Cronbach’s Alpha) 
for internal consistency average .80 for the shame sub-scale, .77 for guilt, .74 for 
externalisation, and .70 for detachment across three independent samples ranging in size 
from 184-376 (Tangney & Bearing, 2002, p. 238).
The MOTSCA (both versions) was developed for this study and is modelled on the 
TOSCA, but substitutes clinical scenarios depicting therapist mistakes or client criticisms 
for the scenarios drawn from everyday life. As in the TOSCA, participants are presented 
with 11 brief scenarios followed by responses indicating shame, guilt, externalisation, 
and detachment. The 11 clinical scenarios were generated by the researcher, drawing 
upon clinicians’ descriptions of shame and guilt in the literature about therapists’ 
experiences of self-conscious affect in clinical work, favouring those situations that came 
up in more than one source. The brief phenomenological depictions of internal shame, 
external shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment/unconcern responses included in 
the MOTSCA were also generated by the researcher and are patterned after the TOSCA 
with one exception: in the MOTSCA, shame is divided into two phenomenologically 
distinct categories. ‘Internal shame’ responses on the MOTSCA are similar to ‘shame’ 
responses on the TOSCA and involve ‘bad’ feelings (inadequate, stupid, incompetent) 
about one’s self (e.g., “You would feel inadequate”) ‘External shame’ (Gilbert, 1998) 
responses, also included on the MOTSCA, involve anticipated or actual feelings of 
devaluation in the eyes of others such as colleagues, supervisors, the client (e.g., “You 
imagine your colleagues would think less of you if they knew”). The additional category 
of external shame has been included in the MOTSCA because it has been cited in the 
literature about therapists’ shame as posing a potential hazard in the therapeutic 
relationship (e.g.. Miller, 2004; Retzinger, 1998). As in the TOSCA, guilt responses on
185
the MOTSCA involve regret or worry about the impact of one’s actions on the other (e.g., 
“You would feel badly about letting the client down”). Like the TOSCA, MOTSCA 
externalisation responses involve the attribution of cause or blame for the mistake or 
client criticism to the ‘other’ (e.g., “Most likely it’s the client’s stuff’). Finally, 
MOTSCA detachment/unconcern responses involved resignation, minimization, or 
normalisation of the therapist’s mistake or client criticisms (e.g., “What’s done is done”; 
“It’s only one case”; “This could happen to anyone”).
Two versions of the MOTSCA were developed for this study. One version presents the 
11 basic scenarios. The second version presents the identical scenarios with an addition: 
participants are asked to imagine that they and the client are of a different racial ethnic 
group in 6 of the 11 scenarios.
A small sample of male and female trainee colleagues was presented with a pilot version 
of the MOTSCA. They were invited to informally comment on the degree to which they 
thought the scenarios and responses would be both credible and clear to most therapists, 
and some modifications to the final versions of the MOTSCA were made accordingly. 
After the fact, it was discovered that, in error, the wording of the internal shame response 
(item ‘c’) for scenario 9 varied between the two versions (“You would feel badly about 
yourself’ versus “You would feel mortified”). Feedback from trainee colleagues in the 
pilot indicated that the latter was too strong for the context, but it was inadvertently left in 
the final version of the questionnaire that went to the group without the race factor. It is 
possible that internal shame scores for this group (n = 65) might be slightly lower as a 
result. Inasmuch as this was an exploratory study, the data for this item were not 
excluded from the analysis.
Results
Prior to analysis all data were examined for accuracy and missing values. Five 
questionnaires were excluded from the study because of the degree of missing data.
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Statistical analyses were conducted on 136 questionnaires. The data collected was coded 
and analysed using SPSS 12.0.1 for Windows.
Quantitative variables used in parametric tests were checked for normal distribution with 
a test by Tabachnick & Fidell (1996, p. 73) that involves dividing the skew and kurtosis 
figures by their respective standard error figures to ensure that the data met the primary 
assumption for the use of parametric statistical analysis (< +/- 3.29 meets normality 
assumption). Where data did not meet the primary assumption, non-parametric tests were 
used (Green & Salkind, 2000). Given the exploratory nature of the study, the Alpha level 
for the probability of a Type 1 error was set at .05 throughout unless otherwise noted.
Relationship between TOSCA and MOTSCA measures of affective style
The TOSCA-3 generates four sub-scales based on participants’ responses to everyday life 
scenarios: shame, guilt, externalisation, detachment. The Measure of Therapists’ Self- 
conscious Affect (MOTSCA) generates five sub-scales: internal shame, external shame, 
guilt, externalisation, detachment. Table 1 shows the each of the mean scores, standard 
deviations, and ranges for each of the sub-scales of the TOSCA and MOTSCA measures 
of Affective Style.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for TOSCA and MOTSCA Quantitative Variables
Quantitative Variable Mean SD Range
TOSCA sub-scale means (n = 133)
Shame 2.7224 .65512 2.91
Guilt^ 4.0906 .46352 2.60
Externalisation 2.9779 .51745 3.29
Detachment 2.7341 .47898 2.91
MOTSCA sub-scale means (n = 136)
Internal shame 2.7105 .78083 3.91
External shame 2.7982 .70822 3.64
Guilt 3.5749 .62160 3.09
Externalisation 2.9779 .51745 2.82
Detachment 2.6319 .61977 3.09
♦TOSCA guilt variable does not meet Tabachnick & Fidell (1996, p. 73) test of the normality assumption.
It was hypothesised that therapists’ affective style in response to scenarios depicting 
‘mistakes’ or ‘failures’ in everyday life as measured by the TOSCA would be positively 
correlated with their affective style in response to scenarios depicting ‘therapist mistakes’ 
or ‘client criticism’ in the clinical setting as measured by the MOTSCA.
The scatterplots for each of these five pairs (Figure 1) indicate that the sub-scale scores 
are linearly related such that, as the TOSCA scores increase, the MOTSCA scores also 
increase.
Figure 1
Five scatterplots showing relationship between the TOSCA and MOTSCA sub-scales (1) Internal Shame; 
(2) External Shame; (3) Guilt; (4) Externalisation; (5) Detachment
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TOSCA Detachment and MOTSCA Detachment sub-scales
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With the exception of guilt (TOSCA guilt variable violated the normality assumption) a 
linear regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the prediction of therapists’ 
MOTSCA sub-scale scores on the basis of their TOSCA sub-scale scores. The regression 
equations for predicting the MOTSCA sub-scale scores are
Predicted MOTSCA internal shame score = . 76 TOSCA shame score +.632 
Predicted MOTSCA external shame score = . 62 TOSCA shame score +. 1.119 
Predicted MOTSCA externalisation score = .40 TOSCA externalisation score +2.116 
Predicted MOTSCA detachment score = .62 TOSCA detachment score +.927
The 95% confidence interval for the slopes does not contain the value of zero in any 
instance, and therefore each of the TOSCA sub-scale scores is significantly related to the 
MOTSCA sub-scale scores. As hypothesised, the two measures of affective style are 
well-correlated. The correlations for each pair and the approximate percentages of the 
variances in the MOTSCA sub-scale scores accounted for by their linear relationship with 
the TOSCA sub-scale scores are reported in Table 2.
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Table 2
Everyday Affective Style as a Predictor of Clinical Affective Style
Affective Style TOSCA/MOTS % 95%
sub-scale CA Variance Confidence
Pearson explained level of slope
coefficient 
correlations
p-value Accuracy of 
predictor*
Internal shame** .64 41% .608 to .926 .000 Strong
External shame** .57 33% .463 to .770 .000 Strong
Guilt .35*** — — —
Externalisation .43 19% .252 to .538 .000 Moderate
Detachment .48 23% .427 to .819 .000 Moderate to 
Strong
small, .30 is medium, and .50 is large (Green & Salkind, 2003, p. 259).
**MOTSCA internal shame and external shame scales are each paired with TOSCA shame scale because TOSCA does 
not differentiate between internal and external shame.
*** Spearman’s rho based on non-parametric test due to violation of normality assumption.
Reliability of TOSCA and MOTSCA measures with this sample
Internal consistency estimates of reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) were computed for each 
of the TOSCA and MOTSCA sub-scales. Table 3 displays the values of coefficient alpha 
for each sub-scale. According to Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott (2002), the suggested 
standard for ‘good’ reliability is .80, for ‘acceptable’ is .70, and for ‘marginal’, .60.
191
Table 3
Internal Consistency Estimates for MOTSCA (clinical scenarios) and TOSCA (everyday scenarios)
Test Sub-scale Coefficient 
Alpha 
n =  136
Reliability
MOTSCA Clinical shame (internal) .88 good
Clinical shame (external) .83 good
Clinical guilt .79 acceptable/good
. Clinical externalisation .66 acceptable
Clinical detachment .79 acceptable/good
TOSCA-3 Everyday shame .78 good
Everyday guilt .65 marginal
Everyday externalisation .69 acceptable
Everyday detachment .61 marginal
Group Differences in Affective Style
Trainees and fully qualified therapists. On the basis of previous theory and research 
(Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Miller, 2004), it was predicted that trainees as a group would 
have higher shame and guilt scores, on average, in response to the clinical scenarios, but 
that there would be no statistically significant differences between trainees and therapists 
in response to everyday scenarios.
Given that the two groups were unequal in size (trainee n = 26; fully qualified = 110), a 
non-parametric test of group differences was chosen.
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that trainees as a group 
would score similarly, on average, to fully qualified therapists on the likelihood of 
experiencing shame or guilt in response to everyday life scenarios, but would score
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higher on shame and guilt than fully qualified therapists, on average, in response to 
clinical scenarios.
The results were as predicted on the everyday life scenarios, with no significant 
difference found between trainees and fully qualified therapists on any of the TOSCA 
sub-scales. On the clinical scenarios, however, trainee status was associated with 
somewhat higher, on average, affect scores as predicted, and lower externalisation and 
detachment scores. However, only internal shame showed a statistically significant 
difference (z = -2.850, p = .0025). Trainees had an average rank of 88.08 for internal 
shame, while fully qualified therapists had an average rank of 63.87, a difference of 24.21 
in average rank. Figure 3 illustrates group differences in the profile of affective style 
when responding to everyday versus clinical scenarios.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for non-parametric test of difference between trainees and fully qualified therapists 
on TOSCA and MOTSCA
Test Group n Group
mean
Mean rank SD Range
TOSCA
Shame
Trainee 26 2.70 66.54 .686 2.45
Qualified 107 2.73 67.11 .651 2.91
Guilt
Trainee 26 4.15 73.85 .474 2.00
Qualified 107 4.08 65.34 .462 2.60
Externalisation
Trainee 26 2.25 70.38 .664 3.19
Qualified 107 2.17 66.18 .540 2.45
Detachment
Trainee 26 2.86 78.69 .370 1.82
Qualified 107 2.70 64.16 .498 2.91
MOTSCA 
Internal shame
Trainee 26 3.10 88.08 .715 3.36
Qualified 110 2.62 63.87 .770 3.73
External shame
Trainee 26 2.92 74.13 .699 2.82
Qualified 110 2.77 67.17 .710 3.55
Guilt
Trainee 26 3.75 77.12 .574 2.09
Qualified 110 3.53 66.46 .627 3.00
Externalisation
Trainee 26 2.92 64.51 .505 2.00
Qualified 110 2.99 69.21 .522 2.82
Detachment
Trainee 26 2.52 61.21 .529 1.82
Qualified 110 2.66 70.22 .639 . 3.09
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Figure 3
Line Graphs Showing Group Differences in Affective Style Profile on the TOSCA and MOTSCA -  Trainees 
and Fully Qualified ( ‘ 'not trainee ' = fully qualified therapists; 7 ' = trainee therapists)
Responses to Everyday Scenarios (TOSCA) 
Comparison of Sub-scale Means - Trainees and Fully Qualified
- G u i l t
E x te rna lisa tion
no t tr a in e e
trainee
Responses to Clinical Scenarios (MOTSCA) 
Comparison of Sub-scale Means - Trainees and Fully Qualified
In ternal s fiam e
 G uilt
—  E x te rna lisa tion  
- D e ta d im e n t
no t tr a in e e
trainee
Female and Male Therapists. Based on previous findings summarised by Tangney & 
Bearing (2002), it was anticipated that females would score slightly higher, on average.
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than males on both kinds of shame and guilt on the MOTSCA as well as the TOSCA, 
Regarding externalisation and detachment, no directional predictions were made.
Given that the two groups were unequal in size (female n = 104; male n = 32), a non- 
parametric test of group differences was chosen. A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted 
to evaluate the hypothesis that females as a group would score higher, on average, than 
males on the likelihood of experiencing shame or guilt in response to everyday life 
scenarios, and also higher, on average, than males on internal and external shame and 
guilt in response to the clinical scenarios.
The results were in the direction predicted on both everyday and clinical scenarios for 
internal shame and guilt, with the exception of external shame, which was slightly higher 
in males. Externalisation scores were slightly higher, on average, for females on both the 
everyday and clinical scenarios, whereas detachment scores were higher, on average for 
males, on both sets of scenarios. However, only one difference (females higher on guilt) 
was statistically significant (z = -2.153, p = .016). Table 5 contains descriptive statistics 
for the Mann Whitney tests. Figure 4 illustrates gender differences in the profile of 
affective style when responding to everyday versus clinical scenarios.
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Figure 4
Une Graphs Showing Group Differences in Affective Style Profiles o f Males and Females on MOTSCA 
(clinical scenarios) and TOSCA (everyday scenarios)
MOTSCA TOSCA
Responses to Clinical Scenarios 
Comparison of Sub-scale Means - Females
Responses to Everyday Scenarios 
Comparison of Sub-scaie Means - Females
3 ,6 0 -
3 .4 0 -
--------- In terna l s t i a m e  4  5 0 .
--------- E x te rn a l s h a m e
G uilt
--------- E x te rn a lisa tio n
D e ta c h m e n t
- __________ _______:
m e a n ^ - ^ ° " m e a n ^ ‘®°"
3 .0 0 - 3 .0 0 -
2 0 0 - 2 .5 0 -
2 .6 0 - --------------- 2 .0 0 -
-  guilt 
e x te rn a l isa t io n
-  d e ta c tim e n t
participant gender participant gender
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for non-parametric test of difference between male and female therapists on TOSCA 
and MOTSCA
Test Group n Group
mean
Mean rank SD Range
TOSCA
Shame
female 101 2.74 67.66 .607 2.64
male . 32 2.68 64.92 .798 2.91
Guilt
female 101 4.15 71.04 .400 2.27
male 32 3.91 54.25 .597 2.42
Externalisation
female 101 2.21 69.18 .579 3.29
male 32 2.08 60.13 .514 2.09
Detachment
female 101 2.70 64.99 .483 2.73
male 32 2.84 73.36 .457 1.91
MOTSCA 
Internal shame
female 104 2.74 70.03 .744 3.82
male 32 2.61 63.52 .896 3.36
External shame
female 104 2.79 70.14 .697 3.64
male 32 2.82 68.00 .756 2.82
Guilt
female 104 3.59 69.13 .588 3.09
male 32 3.53 66.44 .727 2.82
Externalisation
female 104 2.99 68.55 .482 2.09
male 32 2.94 68.33 .626 2.82
Detachment
female 104 2.61 66.92 .604 2.91
male 32 ' 2.72 73.63 .671 3.09
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Impact on Affective Style of Systemic Factor -  Racial-Ethnic Difference Between 
Therapist and Client
Based on theory and empirical findings (Gump, 2000; Altman, 2000; Miller, 2004), it 
was predicted that there would be a statistically significant difference in affective style 
between therapists responding to two different versions of the MOTSCA: (1) clinical 
scenarios, (2) identical clinical scenarios, with six of these (# 2,4,5,7,9,11) modified to 
include the factor of a racial ethnic difference between client and therapist. The 
prediction was that the group responding to the scenarios with the systemic race factor 
would have significantly higher shame and guilt scores on those items than the group 
responding to identical scenarios but for that factor. No a priori predictions were made 
about externalisation and detachment but analysis of those variables was run on an 
exploratory basis.
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine 
the effect of the systemic race factor on the five dependent variables: (1) internal shame, 
(2) external shame, (3) guilt, (4) externalisation, and (5) detachment. A multivariate test 
for homogeneity of dispersion matrices, the Box’s Test, was used to evaluate whether 
variances and covariance among the dependent variables are the same for all levels of a 
factor. The test was non-significant (F (15,71) = 1.372, p = .15) so the homogeneity 
hypothesis was not rejected. Significant differences were found between the two groups 
on the dependent measures (Wilk’s Lambda = .88 F(5,130) = 3.465 p = .006). The 
multivariate partial Eta squared based on Wilk’s Lambda was . 12.
Analyses Of variance (ANOVA) on each dependent variable were conducted as follow-up 
tests to the MANOVA. Each ANOVA was tested at the more stringent .01 level (.05 
divided by 5) using the Bonferroni method to correct for an increased chance of error due 
to the number of tests. Table 6 contains the means and the standard deviations on the 
dependent variables for both groups, along with the results of follow-up analyses of 
variances (ANOVA). The mean guilt-proneness scores of the group with the race 
difference scenarios were significantly higher, F(l,134) = 6.036, p < .01 (one-tailed), and
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their externalisation scores significantly lower, F(l,134) = 7.660, p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Figure 5 contains one graph showing the affective style profile of the two groups to 
scenarios with the race factor (item 2,4,5,7,9,11), and a second graph showing affective 
style profile of the two groups to the scenarios without the race factor (items 1,3,6,8,10).
Figure 5
Comparison of Group Differences in Affective Style Profile between Race and Non-race scenarios - Group 
With and Without Race Factor
Responses to Non-Race Scenarios (MOTSCA)
Comparison of Group Sub-scale Means - With and Without 
Race Factor
In terna l s h a m e
E x te rn a l s h a m e
3 .5 0 -
E x te rn a lisa tio n
D e ta c h m e n tMean
Score
3 .0 0 -
2 .5 0 -
g ro u p  w ith o u t r a c e  fac to r
with/without race
Responses to Race Scenarios (MOTSCA)
Comparison of Group Sub-scaie Means - With and Without 
Race Factor
—'—  Internal sham e
 External shame
Guilt
 Externalisation
Detachment
3 .60 -
3.40 -
3.20-
2.80 -
2 .60 -
2 .40-
2.20-
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Table 6
Analyses of Variance in Components of Affective Style Between Groups With and Without Race Difference 
Scenarios
Scale Group n Mean
Score
SD F (df 1,134) p value Partial 
Eta Sq.
Internal shame
No Race 
Race
65
71
2.400
2.615
.7108
.9593
2.173 p = .072 .016
External shame
No race 
Race
65
71
2.504
2.565
.7243
.8382
.206 p = .326 .002
Guilt
No race 
Race
65
71
3.271
3.565
.5914
.7814
6.036 P = .008 .043
Externalisation
No race 
Race
65
71
3.153
2.870
.6131
.5789
7.660 P = .006 .054
Detachment
No race 
Race
65
71
2.872 ■ 
2.692
.6623
.7109
2.328 P = .129 .017
Intercorrelations Between Components of Affective Style on the MOTSCA
Based on previous empirical investigation of affective style in everyday life (Tangney & 
Bearing, 2002), a statistically significant positive association was predicted between 
shame and externalisation scores in response to clinical scenarios. Also based on 
previous research, an inverse relationship was predicted between guilt and externalisation 
scores. Because of theoretical controversy over the function of detachment, no
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directional predictions were made. Table 7 shows the intercorrelations between the 
affective style sub-scales.
Table 7
Correlation coefficients of MOTSCA affect sub-scales with 
externalisation and detachment. (N = 136)
Internal
shame
External
shame
Guilt
Internal shame 
External shame .818**
Guilt .670** .626**
Externalisation .188* .359** .187*
Detachment .027 .241** -.017
*correlation significant p < .05 (2-tailed)
** correlation significant p < .01 (2-tailed)
A linear regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the prediction of therapists’ 
externalisation and detachment sub-scale scores on the basis of their shame and guilt sub­
scale scores for the MOTSCA.
Externalisation. Scatterplots illustrating the relationship between each of the affects and 
externalisation are shown in Figure 6. The sub-scale scores for both kinds of shame and 
guilt appear to be linearly related to externalisation in the predicted direction such that, as 
the shame and guilt scores increase, the externalisation scores also increase.
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Figure 6
Scatterplots showing relationship between affect and externalisation responses
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The regression equations for predicting the MOTSCA externalisation sub-scaie scores are
Predicted externalisation score = .125 MOTSCA internal shame score +2.640 
Predicted externalisation score = .262 MOTSCA external shame score + 2.245 
Predicted externalisation score = .156 MOTSCA guilt score + .2.420
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With regard to predicting externalisation, the 95% confidence interval for the slopes does 
not include the value of zero for either kind of shame (as predicted), or for guilt (contrary 
to prediction). Therefore, all three affects are statistically significant predictors for 
externalisation. The correlations for each pair and the approximate percentages of the 
variances in the externalisation scores accounted for by their linear relationship with each 
of the affect sub-scale scores are reported in Table 8. Approximately 13% of the variance 
of the externalisation scale was accounted for by its linear relationship to the external 
shame score, and approximately 3.5% each, was accounted for by its linear relationship 
with internal shame, and with guilt, respectively.
Table 8
Shame and Guilt as Predictors of Externalisation in Response to Scenarios Depicting Mistakes or Client 
Criticism
Affect Predictors Correlations % Variance 
explained
95% Confidence 
level of slope
Accuracy of 
predictor
Internal shame as 
predictor of 
externalisation
.19 3.5% .014 to .236 significant 
p = .014 
one-tailed
External shame as 
predictor of 
externalisation
.34 13% .146 to .379 significant
p < .000
one-tailed
Guilt as predictor 
of externalisation
.19 3.5% .016 to .296 significant 
p = .015 
one-tailed
Detachment. Scatterplots showing the relationship between each of the affects and 
detachment for this sample are shown in Figure 3. These indicate that there is a weak 
positive relationship between both kinds of shame and detachment. Thus, as shame 
increases, there is a corresponding increase in detachment. Guilt scores, however, appear
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to have a weak negative relationship to detachment, such that as guilt increases, 
detachment slightly decreases.
Figure 7
Three scatterplots showing relationship between affect and detachment responses
external shame and detachment
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The regression equations for predicting the MOTSCA detachment sub-scale scores are
Predicted detachment score = .02 MOTSCA internal shame score + 2.573 
Predicted detachment score = .21 MOTSCA external shame score + 2.042 
Predicted detachment score = -.02 MOTSCA guilt score + 2.694
With regard to predicting detachment, the 95% confidence interval for the slopes of the 
affect scales contains the value of zero for all but the external shame scale. Therefore, no 
statistically significant relationship was found between detachment and internal shame or 
guilt with this sample. However, the detachment scale does appear to be significantly 
related to the external shame scale such that therapists in this sample who have higher 
scores on external shame also tend to have higher scores on detachment. The correlations 
and the approximate percentages of the variances in the detachment scores accounted for 
by their linear relationship with each of the affect sub-scale scores are reported in Table 
9. The correlation between the external shame scale and detachment scale was .24. 
Approximately 6% of the variance of the detachment scale was accounted for by its linear 
relationship with the external shame score.
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Table 9
Shame and Guilt as Predictors of Detachment in Response to Scenarios Depicting Mistakes or Client 
Criticism (MOTSCA)
Affect Predictors Correlations % Variance 
explained
95% Confidence 
level of slope
Accuracy of 
predictor
Internal shame as .03 0% -.114 to .157 Not significant
predictor of p = .753
detachment 2-tailed
External shame as .24 6% .056 to .356 Significant
predictor of p = .005
detachment
-
2-tailed
Guilt as predictor -.01 0% -.188 to .153 Not significant
of detachment p = .841
2-tailed
Influence of Scenario Content
A final factor hypothesised to influence therapists’ affective style in the therapeutic 
setting was the content of the scenarios. Which scenarios would be associated with the 
highest participant ratings of likelihood to experience internal shame, external shame, or 
guilt? Table 8 shows the means, medians, and standard deviations of affect scores 
(internal shame, external shame, guilt) for each of the scenarios. Table 9 shows the 
scenario rankings for each of the five components of affective style based on the sample 
mean scores on internal shame, external shame, guilt, externalisation, and detachment. 1 
= the highest rank (largest mean score) and 11 = the lowest rank (smallest mean score) 
for a given component of affective style. Content is given for the scenarios, and for 
externalisation and detachment responses. The reader is referred to Appendices D & E for 
content details of each of the affect responses.
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Over 50% of the therapists in this sample indicated they would be more likely than not to 
experience guilt in response to 10 of the 11 scenarios. There was only one scenario for 
which the mean score was less than ‘3.0’.
Over 50% of the therapists in this sample indicated they would be more likely than not to 
experience internal or external shame in response to just four of the scenarios: (1) 
forgetting a session, (2) underestimating suicidality, (3) being criticised for acting 
condescending, (4) lack of progress with a client referred by a senior colleague. The first 
three of these also generated the highest guilt scores.
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Table 10
Scenario
Content
Internal
shame
External
shame
Guilt Externalisation Detachment
#1
Forgotten
session
3.7852 4.2164 4.7407 3.2148 2.0896
#2 ‘R’ . 
Boundary 
Violation
2.6791 2.3778 3.5481 2.6593 2.7481
#3
Underestimate
Suicidality
3.7721 2.9779 3.8235 2.5515 3.2353
#4 ‘R’ 
‘Tuning ouf 
to client
2.1504 2.6015 3.1278 2.6466 3.4361
#5 ‘ R’ 
Judgmental 
toward client
2.6103 2.0588 3,6029 4.3235 2.3111
#6
No progress 
with senior 
referral
2.8603 2.9191 3.5441 2.8971 2.2647
#7 ‘R’
Client says 
therapy is 
making worse
2.5662 2.5441 3.0588 2.2132 3.5441
#8
Client angry at 
feelingjudged
1.9706 2.6176 3.7647 3.0956 1.8824
#9 ‘R’
Client accuses 
therapist of 
condescension
2.4706 3.4632 4.1544 3.2296 2.3704
#10
Client stuck 
and questions 
competence
2.3382 2.8456 2.9044 2.9706 2.8162
#11 ‘R’
Client doesn’t 
feel
understood.
2.6000 2.1704 3.0519 2.9403 2.2593
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Table 11
Ranking of each clinical scenario based on group mean score for: Internal shame, External Shame, Guilt,
Scenario
Content
Internal
Shame
External
Shame
Guilt Externalisation
Response
Detachment
Response
Therapist forgets 
session
1 I I 3
(Something 
distracted me)
10
(The client will 
understand)
Suicide attempt 
therapist aware 
of under­
estimating risk
2 3 3 10
(I would have 
known if the 
client wanted me 
to know)
3
(This could 
happen to 
anyone)
Referral by 
senior colleague 
no progress & 
missed last 2 
sessions
3 4 7 7
(Client would 
come if 
motivated)
8
(It’s just one 
case) '
Therapist aware 
of boundary 
violation (R)
4 9 6 8
(Harder to keep 
boundaries with 
attractive clients)
5
(What’s done is 
done)
Therapist aware 
of feeling very 
judgmental 
toward client(R)
5 II 5 I
(Must be 
something about 
that client)
7
(Nobody’s 
perfect)
Client says 
therapist doesn ’/ 
understand (R)
6 10 10 6
(Maybe this 
client isn’t going 
to feel 
understood)
9
(Is it always 
necessary to 
feel
understood?)
Client says what 
therapist is doing 
is making client 
worse (R)
7 8 9 II
(Some clients not 
able to use 
therapy)
I
(Clients often 
feel worse 
before better)
Client says 
therapist acts 
condescending(R)
8 2 2 2
(Perhaps this 
client fragile 
sense of selj)
6
(You can 7 
always get it 
right)
Client feels stuck 
and questions 
therapist 
competence
9 5 II 5
(This is a very 
difficult client)
4
(I can 7 expect 
to succeed with 
everyone.)
Therapist aware 
o f ‘tuning out’(R)
10 7 8 9
(This client is so 
long-winded)
2
(Everyone does 
this sometimes)
Client says felt 
judged by 
therapist
II 6 4 4
(Most likely this 
is client's stuff)
II
(What’s done is 
done)
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Discussion
Validity and Reliability of the MOTSCA and TOSCA Measures
The results provide support for the reliability and validity of the MOTSCA with this 
sample of therapists. In order for a scale to be judged reliable, participants’ scores should 
be internally consistent—such that a response to one item is consistent with responses to 
comparable items across the scale. The internal consistency estimates for the MOTSCA 
internal shame, external shame, guilt, and detachment sub-scales with this sample are all 
between .79 and .88 (.80 is ‘good’), with the exception of externalisation (.66). Internal 
consistency estimates for the TOSCA with this sample are somewhat lower than with 
previous samples, though the sub-scales are still within marginal limits of reliability. 
Tangney & Bearing (2002) have pointed out that internal consistency estimates for 
scenario-based measures tend to be lower because of the introduction of variance 
attributable to situational factors. Taking that into account, both scales could be 
considered reliable measures with this sample of therapists.
With regard to validity, the respective sub-scales of the MOTSCA and TOSCA would 
appear to be closely correlated, evidence that the two sets of scales are measuring the 
same underlying constructs or components of affective style. As shown in Table 2 (page 
183), the correlations between participants’ responses on the MOTSCA and TOSCA 
range from a low of .35 on guilt (medium) to a high of .64 on internal shame (large) on 
all five of the sub-scales. To the extent that one is in agreement with the theoretical 
framework underpinning the TOSCA and considers it a valid measure of affective style 
in response to everyday life mistakes and failures, it would seem on the basis of findings 
with this sample, that the MOTSCA is a comparable measure of therapists’ affective style 
in response to failures and mistakes in the clinical setting—providing that these results 
can be replicated with other similar samples. Caution should be exercised in generalising 
these findings beyond similar samples because they represent a single sample lacking in 
ethnic diversity.
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The Relationship Between Affect, and Externalisation and Detachment Responses
Because of the practice implications, a key question in this investigation was how the 
arousal of therapists’ self-conscious affect (either type of shame, or guilt) in the clinical 
setting might correlate with defensive responses such as the externalisation of cause or 
blame or defensive detachment from uncomfortable self-conscious feelings.
Externalisation and detachment have been recognised as ways therapists might defend 
against feelings of shame (Gilbert, 1998; Hahn, 2000), and evidence of this has been 
found in therapists’ shame accounts (Miller, 2004).
Externalisation. With regard to externalisation in everyday life, Tangney and Bearing 
(2002) have reported a consistent positive correlation between shame and externalisation 
on the TOSCA such that, as shame scores rise, externalisation scores also increase, 
suggesting that externalisation of cause or blame for a mistake or failure outside oneself 
may be one way of trying to invalidate uncomfortable feelings of shame about the self. 
In contrast, externalisation has been inversely correlated with guilt on the TOSCA.
Therefore, it was hypothesised that there would also be a statistically significant positive 
association between both kinds of shame and externalisation on the MOTSCA as well as 
an inverse relationship between guilt and externalisation. It was theorized that, when 
therapists’ concerns about the impact of their ‘mistake’ or ‘failure’ were more focused on 
the client (guilt), externalisation responses would be inhibited, but that as the focus 
shifted toward concern about negative reflection on the self (internal or external shame), 
there would be a greater tendency to defensively externalise cause or blame to the client.
Contrary to expectation, not only were both kinds of shame significant predictors of 
externalisation, but guilt was also a significant predictor. By far the strongest association 
was between external shame and externalisation. In reviewing externalisation scores on 
the individual scenarios (Table 11, page 210), it is apparent that those highest ranking in 
externalisation represent widely accepted ways in the profession of interpreting
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difficulties in a therapeutic relationship (e.g., “Most likely it’s the client’s stuff’, 
“Perhaps the client has a fragile sense of self’). Perhaps the underlying affect (shame or 
guilt) was secondary to whether or not participants thought a given externalisation 
response was something that they would find a professionally acceptable way of 
explaining a problem in the therapeutic relationship. Regarding the difference between 
internal and external shame in predicting externalisation on the MOTSCA, it may be that 
actually experiencing oneself as inadequate or incompetent (internal shame) is not the 
same as experiencing oneself as inadequate or incompetent in others’ eyes—external 
shame. (Gilbert, 1998). Perhaps when there is concern about one’s professional image 
with others (external shame), there is a greater tendency to externalise the cause of the 
difficulty to the client. In considering why the association between affect and 
externalisation might be different on the MOTSCA and TOSCA scales, the MOTSCA 
externalisation responses (see Table 11, page 210) are intentionally weighted toward 
attributing blame or cause to the client because of the obvious practice implications, 
whereas TOSCA externalisation responses (see Appendix D) appear to vary more. 
Possibly this difference could have influenced findings on the relationship between affect 
and externalisation in clinical work. Also it is important to bear in mind that other factors 
such trainee’s higher average shame scores, and higher average guilt scores on the race 
questions could also have factored into the relationship between affect and externalisation 
on the MOTSCA.
Detachment. With regard to detachment, Tangney & Bearing (2002) have reported an 
inverse relationship to self-conscious affect. In other words, as shame and guilt scores 
increase, detachment decreases, suggesting that detachment responses on the TOSCA 
may be representative of unconcern or emotional indifference rather than defensive ways 
to defuse uncomfortable self-conscious emotion. No directional predictions were made 
with regard to detachment on the MOTSCA, because of uncertainty about whether 
detachment in the clinical setting would function more as a way of coping with self- 
conscious feelings, or as an expression of unconcern/indifference. The intercorrelations
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between affect and detachment responses on the MOTSCA and their predictive 
relationships are presented in Table 7 (page 202), and Table 9 (page 207), respectively.
Interestingly, again only external shame was found to be a statistically significant 
predictor of detachment responses—a finding suggesting that detachment responses on 
the MOTSCA scale are probably more indicative of defensive strategies aimed at 
‘normalising’ or ‘minimising’ external shame than they are of genuine emotional 
indifference or unconcern. In reflecting on the content of the MOTSCA and TOSCA 
detachment responses, it would appear that the TOSCA responses (Appendix D, page 
233) are weighted toward ‘resignation’ (e.g., “What’s done is done”), whereas the 
MOTSCA responses (Table 11, page 210) are weighted toward ‘normalisation’ (e.g., 
“This could happen to anyone”).
Guilt, despite being strongly correlated with both internal and external shame, was 
weakly correlated with externalisation and showed no statistically significant correlation 
with detachment. This provides some evidence for discriminant validity of the MOTSCA 
guilt scale and is evidence that external shame and guilt can be differentiated on the basis 
of their differing phénoménologies and interpersonal implications—with external shame 
far more likely affect to generate defensiveness in the form of externalisation or 
detachment.
A final observation is that relationships between affect and externalisation or detachment 
responses in response to the clinical scenarios are very complex and difficult to interpret 
with certainty.
Factors influencing affective style in the clinical setting
The central purpose of this study was to explore various factors hypothesised to influence 
therapists’ affective style in responding to mistakes and client criticism in the clinical 
setting that might have significant practice or training implications.
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Individual shame and guilt proneness. One of the factors hypothesised to account for 
significant variance in therapists’ responses to mistakes and client criticism is an 
individual’s dispositional or characteristic tendency to respond in a particular way to 
mistakes and failures more generally—that is, dispositional ‘affective style’ in everyday 
life. The results of this study support the hypothesis that dispositional affective style in 
everyday life is indeed a significant predictor of affective style in the clinical setting— 
with the greatest accuracy in predicting internal and external shame. Individual 
differences in affective style accounted for more of the variance in participants’ responses 
than any other single factor explored in this study (ranging from a low of approximately 
12% in the case of guilt to a high of approximately 41% in the case of internal shame).
Trainee Status. A second factor hypothesised to account for variance in therapists’ 
affective style in the clinical setting was professional status. In the literature about 
therapists’ experiences of shame, trainee status has been cited as a factor likely to 
increase shame vulnerability in therapeutic work. (Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Miller, 
2004). It was assumed that individual shame and guilt proneness in response to mistakes 
in everyday life would be similar, on average, between trainee and fully qualified 
therapists, but that trainees would have higher guilt and shame scores in response to 
mistakes and criticism depicted in clinical scenarios. The logic behind this was that the 
process of learning something new increases the likelihood of mistakes and might, 
accordingly, be expected to increase a trainee’s vulnerability to feelings of guilt and 
shame. As predicted, no significant difference was found between trainees and fully 
qualified therapists in response to the everyday life scenarios. However, trainees as a 
group were significantly more shame-prone (but not guilt-prone) in their responses to 
clinical scenarios. Why might trainees be especially vulnerable to shame but not guilt? 
One possible explanation is that the effect size of an increase in guilt was too small to 
pick up given the small sample size (n = 26). Another possibility is that because 
participants’ scores are generally higher on guilt than shame, ceiling effects could have 
prevented an increase in guilt scores firom showing up. A more theory-based explanation 
for the finding is that the process of training involves continuous scrutiny and assessment.
215
which involve a need to establish in one’s own mind and the mind of one’s assessors that 
one is a safe, competent, and ethical practitioner—that is, to develop the solid sense of a 
‘professional self.’ Drawing upon ‘self psychology’ theory regarding shame 
vulnerability (e.g., Kohut, 1982; Mollon, 1993), trainees could be considered to have a 
comparatively fragile sense of professional self, which might be expected to leave them 
especially prone to shame in the professional setting, but not correspondingly to guilt 
(phenomenologically more focused on implications for the ‘other’ and less focused on 
implications for the ‘self). In other words, the balance between self-focus and other- 
focus is tipped more toward self-focus during training.
Racial-ethnic difference between therapist and client. Another factor hypothesized to 
influence therapists’ affective style in the clinical setting is the combination of the 
respective social-cultural positions brought together in a particular therapist-client dyad. 
Contemporary understandings of the therapeutic relationship (e.g.. Miller, 2002; Walker, 
2002) recognise that, not only do client and therapist bring into the consulting room their 
individual backgrounds (interpersonal relationship), but they also bring their respective 
social locations occupied within a wider culture—locations that inevitably influence 
experiences and images of the ‘other’ (Miller, 2002). Examples of this phenomenon have 
surfaced in therapists’ accounts of their own shame and guilt experiences in clinical 
practice—as, for example, in the case of ah ethnic majority therapist and minority client 
(Altman, 2000) and another case of a German therapist and a Jewish holocaust survivor 
client (Miller, 2004). One aim of this study was to demonstrate whether this 
phenomenon would generalise to a wider population of therapists.
On the basis of such examples it was hypothesized that two groups of therapists 
responding to the same scenarios apart from the addition of a racial ethnic difference, 
would significantly differ in affective style such that the group with the race factor added 
would have higher shame and guilt scores, on average, than the other group. No 
directional predictions were made about externalisation or detachment. The group with 
the race factor showed a significant increase in proneness to guilt (as predicted) but not
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shame (contrary to prediction). However, the biggest difference between the two groups 
was a decline in proneness to externalise. In other words, when imagining themselves 
making a mistake or being criticised in a therapeutic relationship with a client of another 
racial ethnic group, therapists were more likely to experience guilt (but not shame) and 
less likely to externalise cause or blame for the difficulties. The effect sizes of both 
differences were comparatively modest, approximately 7% of the variance in 
externalisation scores, and approximately 4% of the variance in guilt scores).
Given the context, one possible explanation for an increase in guilt and corresponding 
decrease in externalisation of cause or blame to the client is that ethnic majority therapists 
may have a sense (not always within awareness) that their communication is taking place 
at two levels, the individual-to-individual level but also the majority-to-minority social 
level. This could possibly increase the therapists’ proneness to experience guilt in 
response to mistakes or client criticism—the therapist sensing that his/her interventions 
are being ‘read’ by the client not only as interpersonal interactions, but also as a majority- 
to-minority interactions—^amplifying the potential impact of any therapeutic mistakes or 
disconnections.
This would not, however, explain the absence of the predicted increase in internal and 
external shame. One possible explanation is that such an effect is too subtle to have been 
picked up in this size sample. Another possibility is that therapists may tend to 
‘normalise’ difficulties in cross-cultural therapeutic relationships and might find it more 
acceptable to attribute the cause to ‘cultural differences’ than to any shortcoming in 
themselves or the client. A third possibility is that therapists wanted to present 
themselves to the researcher (and themselves) as non-racist. In order to do this, they 
might have felt they needed, on the one hand, to demonstrate that race would ‘make no 
difference’ in their responses to the client, becoming less likely to ‘admit’ to internal 
shame (e.g., “feeling inadequate or incompetent”) or external shame (e.g., “you imagine 
your colleagues would think less of you if they knew”). However, on the other hand, 
they might have felt the need to show they could be sensitive to the impact that race
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difference might have on the client’s experience, so were more likely to experience guilt 
and less inclined to externalise cause or blame to the client (e.g., “You would feel badly 
about letting down the client”). Without further investigation, it is difficult to infer with 
any certainty what dynamics might underlie the demonstrated effects of the race factor. 
However, it does seem to significantly influence affective style. It must be remembered 
though, that because this sample was lacking in ethnic diversity, this finding only pertains 
to this sample of ethnic majority therapists imagining their responses to making mistakes 
and being criticised in therapeutic relationships with ethnic minority clients.
Scenario content. A final factor expected to influence affective style was the content of 
the scenarios. It was hypothesised that the scenarios would vary considerably in their 
‘potency’ for generating internal shame, external shame, externalisation, and detachment 
responses. Although an in-depth analysis of the variance due to this factor would 
constitute a study in its own right, given the exploratory nature of this study we wondered 
what might surface from a cursory analysis of the descriptive data that could enhance 
understanding of the relationship between scenario content and affective style.
Immediately striking was an overlap between the highest ranking scenarios across the 
internal shame, external shame, and guilt scales, which could be considered further 
evidence that the content of situations is not intrinsically shame or guilt-inducing, but that 
shame and guilt, though phenomenologically distinct, often co-mingle (Tangney & 
Bearing, 2002). A second observation is that, consistent with previous research on 
affective style (Tangney & Bearing, 2002), guilt scores in general are much higher than 
shame scores.
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Summary and Conclusions
The key findings can be summarised as follows:
Regarding the validity and reliability of the MOTSCA and TOSCA measures of affective 
style (internal shame, external shame, guilt, externalisation, detachment):
• Estimates of internal consistency for the MOTSCA and TOSCA sub-scales with 
this sample range from marginal to good.
• Therapists’ affective style in the clinical setting as measured by the newly 
designed MOTSCA correlates well with dispositional affective style as assessed 
by the TOSCA, a widely used and validated measure of affective style in 
everyday life.
Regarding the association between self-conscious affect, and externalisation and 
detachment in response to clinical mistakes and client criticism:
• There was a statistically significant positive correlation between all three self- 
conscious affects (internal and external shame, guilt) and the tendency to 
externalise blame or cause to the client, with external shame being the strongest 
predictor, accounting for 13% of the variance in externalisation scores.
• External shame was the only self-conscious affect predictive of detachment 
responses. There was a statistically significant positive association between 
external shame and the tendency to detach, with external shame accounting for 
6% of the variance in detachment scores. No significant associations were found 
between internal shame or guilt, and the tendency to detach.
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Factors related to individual affective style in the clinical setting:
• Dispositional affective style in everyday life (based on TOSCA sub-scale scores) 
was the best predictor of affective style in the clinical setting, accounting for 41% 
(internal shame), 33%, (external shame) 23% (detachment), 19% 
(externalisation), and 12% (detachment) of the variance in MOTSCA scores.
• Trainee status was associated with a statistically significant increase in the 
tendency to experience internal shame, but only in response to the clinical 
scenarios. -
• Gender was not a statistically significant factor.
• The introduction of a racial-ethnic difference between therapist and client had a 
statistically significant impact of affective style. Therapists who imagined 
themselves to be working with a client of another racial ethnic background had, 
on average, significantly higher guilt scores and lower externalisation scores than 
their counterparts without the race factor, but the dynamics underlying this 
relationship remain unclear. Because the sample was 94% ethnic majority, this 
finding pertains to the dynamics between ethnic majority therapists relating to 
ethnic minority clients only.
Scenario rankings in order of affect-generating potential:
• The three highest ranking scenarios for generating internal shame were (1) 
forgotten session, (2) underestimation of suicidality, (3) lack of progress with 
client referred by senior colleague.
• The three highest ranking scenarios for generating external shame were (1) 
forgotten session (2) criticised for acting condescending (3) underestimation of 
suicidality.
• The three highest ranking scenarios for generating guilt were (1) forgotten 
session, (2) criticised for acting condescending, (3) underestimation of suicidality.
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• Shame and guilt often co-occur in response to the same scenario, and guilt scores 
tend to be higher, on average, than shame scores.
Practice and Training Implications
First, as practitioners, when we find ourselves thinking, “There must be something about 
this client that makes me feel this way” or “Most likely it’s the client’s stuff,” or 
“Perhaps this client has a fragile sense of self,” we should consider the possibility that we 
may be externalising some of our own feelings in addition to whatever the client has 
contributed to the dynamic. These findings reiterate the importance of the capacity for 
non-defensive self-reflection on the part of therapists.
Second, given the finding that individual dispositional affective style in everyday life is a 
strong predictor of our affective style in the consulting room, we should make an effort, 
as Livingston and Farber (1996) have suggested, to increase awareness of our own 
proneness to self-conscious affect and characteristic defensive style. Perhaps a measure 
such as the MOTSCA could prove useful in that regard (if validated with further 
samples).
Third, in light of the finding that trainees may be especially prone to the painful affect of 
internal shame during training, it might be useful for training institutions to normalise 
these experiences, and to provide opportunities for support and development of ‘affective 
style’ self-awareness on the part of trainees.
Finally, when an ethnic majority therapist is working with a minority ethnic client, it is 
important to be aware that the engagement is happening on two levels, the interpersonal 
and the cultural. Based on the findings of this study, the additional dyadic dynamic is 
likely to influence how the therapist responds to his/her own mistakes and client criticism 
in complex ways.
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While these findings can contribute to our understanding of the ‘elephant in the 
consulting room,’ they have many limitations. First of all, they are based on a single 
comparatively small sample and thus need to be replicated with other samples. 
Additionally, item-analysis is needed in order to further refine and validate the MOTSCA 
as a measure of affective style in the therapeutic setting. Finally, although participants’ 
responses were fully anonymous in an effort to maximise their comfort in responding 
candidly, research is nonetheless inevitably a social encounter between the participant 
and researcher. In spite of anonymity, participants may have felt they needed to present 
themselves to the researcher in a professionally and politically correct manner, which 
could have influenced their responses and is important to bear in mind. Also, given the 
lack of diversity in this sample, further research is needed to explore the full implications 
of systemic factors such as race difference in the clinical setting. Despite its limitations, 
hopefully the findings of this study have gone some distance in toward furthering 
awareness and understanding of the ‘elephant in the consulting room.’
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Reflections on My ‘Use of Self
My initial interest in the topic of therapists’ self-conscious affect was sparked because at 
the beginning of training I often found myself feeling self-conscious in the therapeutic 
relationship. I took seriously the idea that I should not be working beyond the bounds of 
my competence, and yet I didn’t always feel very competent and was concerned about the 
potential impact of my lack of experience and novice status on my clients—especially 
during the early stages of working with a new theoretical model. Looking back I believe 
it was the ‘fragility’ of my fledgling professional self that left me peculiarly vulnerable to 
‘flare-ups’ of shame surrounding my adequacy and competency to be working with ‘real’ 
clients. By the same token, I felt little ‘permission’ to talk about these insecurities in the 
training context—as though by ‘owning’ these feelings, it might somehow plant doubts 
about my competence in the minds of my trainee colleagues or my tutors. Gratefully I 
had supervisors with whom I could work through and resolve these feelings, and 
gradually over time, I felt able to ‘own’ them in other contexts. I think this personal 
process has definitely informed and influenced both my motivation and interpretations 
over the entire course of my research—including the literature review, qualitative, and 
finally, this quantitative project.
Another aspect of my personal experience that has contributed to my approach to this 
topic is the experience I have had as a client—particularly a brief experience with a 
traditional psychodynamic practitioner in the ‘blank screen’ tradition. I found my 
experience with her extremely shame-generating and made up my mind that I did not 
want to be ‘that kind’ of practitioner. The experience kindled my interest in trying to 
understand the dynamics underlying the way I had experienced this approach, and in 
learning more about the debates surrounding ‘use of self in therapeutic practice. I 
suspected that therapists sometimes ‘hid’ behind the blank screen to avoid shame 
vulnerability in themselves—the logic being that if they were just a ‘blank screen,’ they 
could attribute everything that happened in the room to client transference—in this way 
effectively ‘transferring’ all vulnerability to the client.
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In reviewing the shame literature, I felt especially validated in terms of my own reaction 
as a client when I read about infants’ distressed responses to the ‘still face’ along with 
other evidence suggesting that, from birth, humans are evolutionarily primed to engage 
with emotionally responsive others such that when this responsiveness is missing, they 
recoil in what is believed to be the rudiments of a shame response (feelings of deflation in 
the powerlessness to elicit an empathie response from the other). I was delighted to 
discover that some clinicians were challenging the traditional psychodynamic perspective 
(DeYoung, 2003; Miller, Jordan, Stiver, Walker, Surrey, & Eldridge, 1999; Morrison, 
1994; Ricci & Broucek, 1998) and was especially drawn to the writing of practitioners 
who take a more bi-directional view of therapeutic affective engagement and consider 
their own emotions to be part of a co-created dynamic. This led me toward contemporary 
object relations, self psychology, and most especially the relational/intersubjective 
strands of psychodynamic theory (e.g., DeYoung, 2003; Mitchell & Aron, 1999; 
Stolorow & Atwood, 1995).
Finally, my professional and religious background in peace and social justice work, and 
my experience as an ex-pat have, 1 think, sensitised me to some of the more systemic and 
cultural dynamics of shame that might influence the therapeutic relationship. 1 believe 
we are often most ‘blind’ to these dynamics within our own culture, and they can exert a 
powerful influence on our work. When 1 came across (in the literature and my own 
research) cases of shame and guilt-proneness that seemed peculiar to therapeutic 
relationships with the Other—especially an Other located in an historic oppressor- 
oppressed system such as racism or the holocaust, 1 wanted to find out if this dynamic 
might generalise more widely, and if so, to bring it into the open.
The work has had many ups and downs—at times 1 wished 1 had chosen something more 
‘upbeat,’ but ultimately 1 have found it richly rewarding and personally therapeutic. At its 
worst shame can leave us feeling a “loss of empathie possibility” (Jordan, 1997, p. 147). 
Thus one of the best ways of resolving shame can be ‘owning’ it in a relationship and
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feeling accepted and understood. I am deeply indebted to the participant practitioners 
who generously shared with me from their own experience, and helped me to learn from 
their experiences more about my own and those of my clients.
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Thank you very much for taking time to consider participating in this study, which is being conducted as 
part of my ‘practitioner doctorate’ training in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology. I realise that 
your time is valuable and hope the enclosed material will both answer your questions and spark your 
interest in the project, which is looking at the emotional experience of therapists in client work and its 
influence in the therapeutic relationship.
Title of the study:
Therapists’ Experiences of Self-conscious Emotion in the Therapeutic Relationship
Enclosed please find
• Participants Information Sheet
• Questionnaire
• Self-addressed postage-paid envelope to return the questionnaire
It should take about 15 minutes to complete. Please return your questionnaire as soon as you have 
completed it—before or by 25 April. I hope you will find time to contribute to this project and want to 
thank you in advance for your participation.
With best wishes,
Donna Miller, Trainee Counselling Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH 
Miller.donna@,zen.co.uk
Supervised by Dr. Elena Touroni, PsychD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist
Department of Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
e.touroni@surrev.ac.uk
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A ppendix C
Information Sheet for Participants
Title of the Research Project
Therapists’ Experiences of Self-Conscious Emotions in the Therapeutic Relationship 
Purpose and Objectives o f the Research
Therapists as well as clients can experience the arousal of complex feelings in a therapeutic 
relationship. Recent qualitative research suggests that various factors (individual, client, and 
social/contextual) are involved in the activation of self-conscious feelings and their impact within 
the therapeutic relationship. This study seeks to build on research that has been done in the area 
of self-conscious emotions generally and apply it to understanding therapists’ emotions in the 
therapeutic process.
Name of Researcher and Research Supervisors:
• Donna Miller, Trainee Counselling Psychologist, PsychD Programme, University of 
Surrey
• Dr. Elena Touroni, PsychD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist
• Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz, PhD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Who is being recruited to take part in this study?
We are seeking postgraduate trainees and fully qualified counselling or clinical psychologists, 
psychotherapists, and psychoanalysts who are currently working with clients. Your participation 
is being sought because you are listed on a professional register or enrolled in a relevant training 
course.
What is involved in taking part?
You are asked to read this information sheet and then to respond to two short questionnaires. 
Your return of the completed questionnaires in the enclosed stamped envelope will be taken as 
indication of your informed consent. Altogether, your participation should take approximately 15 
minutes. Each questionnaire contains scenarios followed by several responses and you will be 
asked to rate each response according to the likelihood that it would match your own response to 
the scenario. The first set of scenarios has been drawn from everyday life and the second set from 
possible situations in clinical practice.
Will my participation in this study be confidential?
There will be no way to identify you as an individual from your responses. Therefore, you will 
be completely anonymous and your participation in this study will be fully confidential.
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What are the possible risks o f taking part in the study?
There are no known risks in taking part in this study. It is possible though that completing the 
questionnaires may cause you some uneasy feelings. If this is the case, then you may wish to 
consult with a trusted colleague or supervisor, or a confidential debriefing session can be 
arranged by emailing the researcher Donna Miller, Trainee Counselling Psychologist via email at 
miller.donna@zen.co.uk.
What are the possible benefits o f taking part?
Participation in this study is an opportunity to contribute to increased understanding of therapists’ 
emotional experiences in the therapeutic practice, which could have implications for practice, 
supervision, and training—potentially benefiting yourself and others.
Has this study been ethically reviewed and approved?
This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the University of Surrey Ethics 
Committee. It is not an NHS study being conducted on those employed or fiinded by the NHS.
What will happen to the results o f the study?
These will be written up and submitted as a part of a practitioner doctorate in Psychotherapeutic 
and Counselling Psychology. It is anticipated that the results will be submitted to peer-reviewed 
journals. You will not be identified in any report or publication. If you should wish, you may 
request a brief summary of the findings at the end of the study (August 2005).
Contacts for further information
For further information about the study, please contact Donna Miller, Counselling Psychologist in 
Training via email at miller.donna@zen.co.uk.
Research Supervisor:
Dr. Elena Touroni, PsychD, Chartered Counselling Psychologist
Department of Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surry
GU2 7XH
e.touroni@surrev.ac.uk
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A ppendix D
TOSCA-3
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to 
those situations.
As you read each scenario, tiy to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be 
to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one 
way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times.
For example:
A. You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining. 1 —
not likely veiy likely
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
In the above example. I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a " 1 " for answer (a) 
because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning -  so it's not at all likely that I would do 
that. I circled a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I 
circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain 
and sometimes I wouldn't -  it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because I would 
probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
Please do not skip any items — rate all responses.
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1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood him up.
a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate.” 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand." 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon 1—2—3—4—5
as possible. not likely very likely
d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just 1—2—3—4—5
before lunch." not likely very likely
2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a) You would think: "This is making me anxious. I 1—2—3—4—5
need to either fix it or get someone else to." not likely very likely
b) You would think about quitting. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made 1—2—3—4—5
very well these days." not likely very likely
d) You would think: "It was only an accident." 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
3. At work, vou wait until the last minute to plan a proiect. and it turns out 
badlv.
a) You would feel incompetent. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
b) You would think: "There are never enough hours 1—2—3—4—5
in the day." not likely very likely
c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for 1—2—3—4—5
mismanaging the project." not likely very likely
d) You would think: "What's done is done." 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
4. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.
a) You would think the company did not like the 1—2—3—4—5
co-worker. not likely very likely
b) You would think: "Life is not fair." 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the 1—2—3—4—5
situation. not likely very likely
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a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even 
throw a ball.
1 —2—3 —4—5 
not likely very likely
b) You would think maybe your friend needs more 
practice at catching.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c) You would think: "It was just an accident." 1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d) You would apologize and make sure your friend 
feels better.
1 -«2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
6. You are driving down the road, and vou hit a small animal.
a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been 
on the road.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b) You would think: "I'm terrible." 1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident." 1—2—"3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert 
driving down the road.
1 —2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
7. You walk out of an exam thinking vou did extremelv well. Then vou find out
vou did poorlv.
à) You would think: "Well, it's just a test." 1 —2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me." I—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c) You would think: "I should have studied harder." 1 «-2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d) You would feel stupid. 1 —2"""3—4"""5
not likely very likely
8. While out with a grout) of friends, vou make fun of a friend who's not there.
a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1 —2—3 —4"*5 
not likely very likely
b) You would feel small...like a rat. 1 —2"*3—4“““5 
not likely very likely
c) You would think that perhaps that friend should 
have been there to defend himselfrherself
1 —2«-3*"“4"**5
not likely very likely
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d) You would apologize and talk about that person's 1—2—3—4—5
good points. not likely very likely
9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on vou. and vour boss criticizes 
vou.
a) You would think your boss should have been more 1—2—3—4—5
clear about what was expected of you. not likely very likely
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) You would think: "I should have recognized the 1—2—3—4—5
problem and done a better job." not likely very likely
d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect." 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
10. You are taking care of vour friend's dog while thev are on vacation and the 
dog runs awav.
a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and 1—2—3—4—5
incompetent.” not likely very likely
b) You would think your friend must not take very 1—2—3—4—5
good care of their dog or it wouldn't have run not likely very likely
away.
c) You would vow to be more careftil next time. 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
d) You would think your friend could just get a 1—2—3—4—5
new dog. not likely very likely
11. You attend your co-worker's housewarming oartv and vou spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet but you 
think no one notices.
a) You think your co-worker should have expected 1—2—3—4—5
some accidents at such a big party. not likely very likely
b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain 1—2—3—4—5
after the party. not likely very likely
c) You would wish you were anywhere but at 1—2—3—4—5
the party. ' not likely very likely
d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to 1—2—3—4—5
serve red wine with the new light carpet. not likely very likely
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TOSCA-3*
We are now recommending the use of the TOSCA-3 (Test of Self-Conscious 
Affect-Version 3) in place of the TOSCA and TOSCA-2. The TOCSA-3 is composed of 
11 negative and 5 positive scenarios yielding indices of Shame-proneness, Guilt- 
proneness, Extemalization, Detachment/Unconcern, Alpha Pride, and Beta Pride.
The majority of TOSCA-3 items are identical to the original TOSCA (Tangney, 
Wagner & Gramzow, 1989). TOSCA scenarios were drawn from written accounts of 
personal shame, guilt, and pride experiences provided by a sample of several hundred 
college students and non-college adults. The responses were drawn from a much larger 
pool of affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses provided by a second sample of 
adults.
In a subsequent revision, the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Ferguson, Wagner, Crowley & 
Gramzow, 1996), an experimental “maladaptive guilt” scale was introduced. In addition, 
we added two new scenarios and deleted the “dieting” scenario, owing to concerns about 
gender bias. This most recent version of our measure, the TOSCA-3 (Tangney, Bearing, 
Wagner & Gramzow, 2000), eliminates the Maladaptive Guilt items because analyses 
have raised serious questions of about the discriminant validity of this scale. (The Shame 
and Maladaptive Guilt scales correlate about .79.)
As a new feature, the TOSCA-3 provides the option of a short version, which 
drops positive scenarios (and therefore eliminates the Pride scales). In a recent study, 
short versions of the TOSCA-3 shame and guilt scales correlated .94 and .93 with their 
corresponding full length versions, thus supporting the utility of the abbreviated form.
Scoring for the Tosca-3*:
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1. (Negative Scenario) 7. (Negative Scenario)
a) Shame a) Shame
b) Detached b) Extemalization
c) Guilt c) Detached
d) Extemalization d) Guilt
2. (Negative Scenario) 8. (Positive Scenario)
a) Guilt a) Shame
b) Shame b) Extemalization
c) Extemalization c) Guilt
d) Detached d) Alpha Pride
è) Beta Pride
3. (Positive Scenario)
a) Guilt 9. (Negative Scenario)
b) Alpha Pride a) Extemalization
c) Beta Pride b) Shame
d) Extemalization c) Detached
e) Shame d) Guilt
4. (Negative Scenario)
a) Shame
b) Extemalization
c) Guilt
d) Detached
5. (Negative Scenario)
a) Extemalization
b) Detached
c) Shame
d) Guilt
6. (Positive Scenario)
a) Alpha Pride
b) Guilt
c) Shame
d) Beta Pride
e) Extemalization
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10. (Negative Scenario) A short version of the TOSCA-3 may be created by
a) Detached dropping the positive scenarios.
b) Extemalization
c) Guilt * Tangney, J.P., Dearing, R., Wagner, P.E., &
d) Shame Gramzow, R. (2000). The Test of Self-
Conscious Affect- 3  (TOSCA-3). George
11. (Positive Scenario) Mason University, Fairfax VA.
a) Extemalization
b) Shame
c) Beta Pride
d) Alpha Pride
e) Guilt
12. (Negative Scenario)
a) Detached
b) Shame
c) Extemalization
d) Guilt
13. (Negative Scenario) '
a) Extemalization
b) Shame
c) Guilt
e) Detached
14. (Positive Scenario)
a) Shame
b) Extemalization
c) Guilt
d) Beta Pride
e) Alpha Pride
15. (Negative Scenario)
a) Shame
b) Extemalization
c) Guilt
d) Detached
16. (Negative Scenario)
a) Detached
b) Guilt
c) Shame
d) Extemalization
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A ppendix E
CLINICAL SCENARIOS QUESTIONNAIRE (Race Version)
Below are some situations that therapists might encounter in clinical practice followed by 
reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself actually in that situation. Then indicate how 
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all the responses 
because therapists may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react 
different ways at different times.
Sample question: Your next client does not turn up for his/her session.
a) you would ring a friend 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
b) you would feel disappointed 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
c) you would fix yourself a cup of tea 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
d) you would send a letter 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
In the above example. I’ve rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a ‘2’ for 
answer (a) because, although I might ring a friend upon learning of a cancellation, it would 
probably not happen often. I circled a ‘4’ for answer (b), because more often than not I would 
feel some disappointment. I circled a ‘3’ for (c) because it’s about half and half. Sometimes I 
would take the opportunity for tea, other times not. And I circled a ‘5’ for answer (d) because I 
would nearly always send a letter acknowledging the missed session.
Please do not skip any items -  rate all responses.
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1. You suddenly realise vou forgot to turn u p  for a session you had booked with one of vour 
clients.
a. You would feel irresponsible and untrustworthy.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would worry about appearing unprofessional.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “Something must have distracted me.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You’d think you should apologise to the client and work to rebuild trust.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would think, “The client will understand.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
2. You realise vou have iust made a subtle disclosure that vou are single to a client vou find 
sexually attractive who havoens to be of a different racial ethnic background to yourself.
a. You would think, “Boundaries are harder to keep with attractive clients.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even hold to basic boundaries.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “What’s done is done.”
1—2—3 ^ —5 
not likely very likely
d. You would worry that your supervisor would think you are unsafe.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would feel unhappy and worried about the impact on your client.
1— 2— 3— 4—5 
not likely very likely
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3. You learn that one of vour clients made a serious suicide attempt over the weekend and 
vou realise vou had under-estimated the risk.
a. You would feel inadequate and incompetent.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would imagine your colleagues thinking badly of you if they knew.
1—2—3-^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel badly about letting the client down and want to work on the 
relationship.
1—2—3 4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would think, “This could happen to anyone.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would think, “I would have picked up on it if the client wanted me to 
know.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
4. In a session with a client, who happens to be of a different racial ethnic background to 
vourself. vou become aware that vou have been ‘tuning out’ for the better part ofvour 
client’s response to the question vou asked him/her.
a. You would think this was disrespectful and worry about the impact on the client.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Fm a lousy therapist.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “This client is so longwinded.”
1—2—3 - ^ 5  
not likely very likely
d. You think, “Everyone does this sometimes.”
1— 2— 3—4— 5 
not likely very likely
e. You would worry that the client might think you weren’t a good therapist.
1—2— 3 -4 —5 
not likely very likely
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5. You repeatedly find vourself feeling very judgmental toward one o f vour clients who 
happens to be o f a different racial ethnic backsround to vourself.
a. You would think you should not be so judgemental, and would worry about the 
effect on your alliance with the client.
1 - ^ —3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Nobody’s perfect.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “There’s something about this client that makes me feel this 
way.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would feel unprofessional.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You imagine your colleagues would think less of you if they knew.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
6. You are iindins it very difficult to ensase a client referred to vou bv a senior cùlleasue 
who thought the case would give vou £ood experience. The client does not seem to be 
making any proeress and has missed the last couple sessions.
a. You would think, “Well, it’s just one case.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “The client would attend if s/he was really motivated.”
1—2—3-^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel inadequate.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would worry about how it might reflect on your competence if your 
colleague knew how badly it was going.
1—2—3 - ^ 5  
not likely very likely
e. You would feel bad about the effect of your lack of experience and seek out 
additional supervision.
1—2—3 ^1 —5
not likely very likely
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7. Your client who happens to he o f a different racial ethnic background to vourself. tells 
vou s/he thinks what vou are doin£ is making him/her worse.
a. You would think, “Some clients are not able to make use of therapy.”
1— 2— 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Clients often feel worse before they start to feel better.”
1— 2— 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel incompetent.
1— 2— 3 - ^ 1— 5 
not likely very likely
d. You would feel bad for any harm you have caused to the client.
1— 2 — 3— 4 — 5 
not likely very likely
e. You would feel anxious about how this would reflect on you if the client said it 
to others.
1— 2 — 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
8. Your client an^rilv tells vou s/he felt judged bv somethin^ vou said to him/her (that vou 
can Y recall) in the last session.
a. You would look for ways to show you are not a judgemental person.
1— 2— 3— 4 — 5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Most likely this is the client’s stuff.”
1— 2— 3^ 1— 5 
not likely very likely
c. You would probably emotionally withdraw and stick to ‘safe’ interventions.
1— 2 — 3— 4 — 5 
not likely . very likely
d. You would feel badly about your part in the rupture and want to repair the 
alliance.
1— 2— 3— 4 — 5 
not likely very likely
e. You would think, “What’s done is done.”
1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
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9. Your client, who happens to he o f a different racial ethnic back^ound to vourself, says
s/he thinks vou are treating him/her in a condescending manner.
a. You would think, “Perhaps the client has a fragile sense of self.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would feel mortified.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c. You’d feel some responsibility for the client’s reaction and want to work on the 
relationship.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely veiy likely
d. You would think, “Well, you can’t always get it right.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would want to show you are not someone who looks down on clients.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
10. Your client savs s/he feels stuck and wonders i f  vou know what vou ’re doins.
a. You would feel you should have been more helpful to the client.
1_2—3-^1—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “I can’t expect to succeed with everyone.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “This is a very difficult client.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would look for ways to show you know what you are talking about.
1— 2— 3—4— 5 
not likely ‘ very likely
e. You would feel devalued and useless.
1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likel
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IL Your client who happens to be from a different racial ethnic backeround to vourself. savs
s/he does not feel vou understand him/her.
a. You would feel badly about letting down the client
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Is it always necessary to feel understood?”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel inadequate.
1—2—3 - ^ 5  
■ not likely very likely
d. You think, “Maybe this client isn’t going to feel understood.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely ' very likely
e. You would be uncomfortable with others knowing the client feels this way.
1—2—3 - 4 —5 
not likely very likely
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The following information is being requested for statistical purposes only. You will remain completely 
anonymous.
Gender [] female [] male
Age [ ] years
Which (if any) of the following terms best describes your ethnic background?
[] Asian or Asian British 
[j Black or Black British 
[j Mixed
[] White or White British
[] Other Ethnic Group {please specify)____________________
What professional qualifications have you obtained? (p/ease û f / / qpp/y)
[] Chartered Counselling Psychologist [{Currently Training -Counselling Psychologist
[] Chartered Clinical Psychologist ^Currently training -  Clinical Psychologist
Q Psychotherapist Q Currently training - Psychotherapist
□ Psychoanalyst [] Currently training - Psychoanalyst
n OthQT {please specify)_________ _____________ _
KQgisXevQàWVih. (please tick all that apply):
[]BACP []BCP [] BPS [jUKCP
[\0\her (please specify)______ ______________________
Theoretical Orientation:
□Cognitive Behavioural []Psychodynamic [JHumanistic [] Integrative 
□Other (please specify):_____________________________
250
Scoring for MOTSCA Race Version
1 forgotten session
a) internal shame
b) external shame
c) externalisation
d) guilt
e) detachment
2. boundaries
a) externalisation
b) internal shame
c) detachment
d) external shame
e) guilt
3. suicidality
a) internal shame
b) external shame
c) guilt
d) detachment
e) externalisation
4 ‘tuning out’
a) guilt
b) internal shame
c) externalisation
d) detachment
e) external shame
5 feeling judgmental
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) externalisation
d) internal shame
e) external shame
6 senior referral
a) detachment
b) externalisation
c) internal shame
d) external shame
e) guilt
7 client feeling worse
a) externalisation
b) detachment
c) internal shame
d) guilt
e) external shame
8 client feeling judged
a) external shame
b) externalisation
c) internal shame
d) guilt
e) detachment
9 client feels therapist is condescending
a) external shame
b) externalisation
c) internal shame
d) detachment
e) guilt
10 client feeling stuck
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) externalisation
d) external shame
e) internal shame
11 client not feeling understood
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) internal shame
d) externalisation
e) external shame
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CLINICAL SCENARIOS QUESTIONNAIRE (Non-race version)
Below are some situations that therapists might encounter in clinical practice followed by 
reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself actually in that situation. Then indicate how 
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate gU the responses 
because therapists may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react 
different ways at different times.
Sample question: Your next client does not turn up for his/her session.
c) you would ring a friend 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
d) you would feel disappointed 1—2—3—4— 5
not likely very likely
c) you would fix yourself a cup of tea 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
d) you would send a letter 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
In the above example. I’ve rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a ‘2’ for 
answer (a) because, although I might ring a friend upon learning of a cancellation, it would 
probably not happen often. I circled a ‘4’ for answer (b), because more often than not I would 
feel some disappointment. I circled a ‘3’ for (c) because it’s about half and half. Sometimes I 
would take the opportunity for tea, other times not. And I circled a ‘5’ for answer (d) because I 
would nearly always send a letter acknowledging the missed session.
Please do not skip any items -  rate all responses.
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1. You suddenly realise vou forgot to turn uv for a session vou had hooked with one o f your 
clients.
a. You would feel irresponsible and untrustworthy.
1—2—3 4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would worry about appearing unprofessional.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “Something must have distracted me.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
d. You’d think you should apologise to the client and work to rebuild trust.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely veiy likely
e. You would think, “The client will understand.”
1—2—3 - ^ 5  
not likely very likely
2. You realise vou have iust made a subtle disclosure that vou are sinsle to a client vou find 
sexually attractive.
a. You would think, “Boundaries are harder to keep with attractive clients.”
1— 2— 3—4 — 5 
not likely very likely
b. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even hold to basic boundaries.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “What’s done is done.”
1— 2— 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
d. You would worry that your supervisor would think you are unsafe.
1_2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would feel unhappy and worried about the impact on your client.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
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5. You leam that one o f vour clients made a serious suicide attempt over the weekend and 
vou realise vou had under-estimated the risk
a. You would feel inadequate and incompetent.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would imagine your colleagues thinking badly of you if they knew.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely ,
c. You would feel badly about letting the client down and want to work on the 
relationship.
1— 2— 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
d. You would think, “This could happen to anyone.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would think, “I would have realised if the client wanted me to know.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
4. In a session with a client vou become aware that vou have been ‘tunins out ’ for the better 
part o f vour client’s response to the question vou asked him/her.
a. You would think this was disrespectful and worry about the impact on the client.
1— 2— 3— 4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “I’m a lousy therapist.”
1— 2— 3— 4— 5 
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “This client is so longwinded.”
1— 2— 3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You think, “Everyone does this sometimes.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would worry that the client might think you weren’t a good therapist.
1— 2— 3—4—5 
not likely very likely
254
5. You repeatedly find vourself feelim very iudsmental toward one o f vour clients.
a. You would think you should not be so judgemental, and would worry about the 
effect on your alliance with the client.
1—2—3-^1—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Nobody’s perfect.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
• c. You would think, “There’s something about this client that makes me feel this 
way.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would feel unprofessional.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You imagine your colleagues would think less of you if they knew.
1—2—3-^kr-5 
not likely very likely
6. You are finding it very diificult to enmse a client referred to vou bv a senior colleasue 
who thought the case would give vou ^ood experience. The client does not seem to be 
makins any progress and has missed the last couple sessions.
a. You would think, “Well, it’s just one case.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “The client would attend if s/he was really motivated.”
: 1—2—3 - ^ 5
not likely very likely
c. You would feel inadequate.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would worry about how it might reflect on your competence if your 
colleague knew how badly it was going.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would feel bad about the effect of your lack of experience and seek out 
additional supervision.
1—2—3 - 4 —5
not likely very likely
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7. Your client tells vou s/he thinks what vou are doin^ is making; him/her worse.
a. You would think, “Some clients are not able to make use of therapy.”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Clients often feel worse before they start to feel better.”
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel incompetent.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would feel bad for any harm you have caused to the client.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would feel anxious about how this would reflect on you if the client said it 
to others.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
8. Your client ansrilv tells vou s/he felt judged bv somethins vou said to him/her (that vou 
can’t recall) in the last session.
a. You would look for ways to show you are not a judgemental person.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Most likely this is the client’s stuff”
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would probably emotionally withdraw and stick to ‘safe’ interventions.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would feel badly about your part in the rupture and want to repair the 
alliance.
1_2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
e. You would think, “What’s done is done.”
1—2—3 - ^ 5  
not likely very likely
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9. Your client savs s/he thinks vou are treating him/her in a condescendins manner.
a. You would think, “Perhaps the client has a fragile sense of self.”
' 1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
b. You would feel mortified.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
c. You’d feel some responsibility for the client’s reaction and want to work on the 
relationship.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would think, “Well, you can’t always get it right.”
1—2—3 - 4 —5 
not likely very likely
e. You would want to show you are not someone who looks down on clients.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
10. Your client savs s/he feels stuck and wonders i f  vou know what vou ’re doinz
a. You would feel you should have been more helpful to the client.
1— 2— 3- — 4— 5 
not likely veiy likely
b. You would think, “I can’t expect to succeed with everyone.”
1— 2— 3 - ^ 5  
not likely very likely
c. You would think, “This is a very difficult client.”
1— 2— 3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You would look for ways to show you know what you are talking about.
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely veiy likely
e. You would feel devalued and useless.
1—2—3—4—5
not likely very likely
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11. Your client savs s/he does not feel vou understand him/her.
a. You would feel badly about letting down the client.
1—2—3-^1—5 
not likely very likely
b. You would think, “Is it always necessary to feel understood?” .
1—2—3^1—5 
not likely very likely
c. You would feel inadequate.
1—2—3—4—5 
not likely very likely
d. You think, “Maybe this client isn’t going to feel understood.”
1_2—3^1—5 
not likely veiy likely
e. You would be uncomfortable with others knowing the client feels this way.
1—2—3^—4—5 
not likely very likely
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Scoring for MOTSCA Non-Race Version
1 forgotten session
a) internal shame
b) external shame
c) externalisation
d) guilt
e) detachment
2. boundaries
a) externalisation
b) internal shame
c) detachment
d) external shame
e) guilt
3. sucidality
a) internal shame
b) external shame
c) guilt
d) detachment
e) externalisation
4 ’tuning out’
a) guilt
b) internal shame
c) externalisation
d) detachment
e) external shame
5 feeling judgmental
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) externalisation
d) internal shame
e) external shame
6 senior referral
a) detachment
b) externalisation
c) internal shame
d) external shame
e) guilt
7 client feeling worse
a) externalisation
b) detachment
c) internal shame
d) guilt
e) external shame
8. client feeling judged
a) external shame
b) externalisation
c) internal shame
d) guilt
e) detachment
9 condescending
a) externalisation
b) internal shame
c) guilt
d) detachment
e) external shame
10 client stuck
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) externalisation
d) external shame
e) internal shame
11 client not feeling understood
a) guilt
b) detachment
c) internal shame
d) externalisation
e) external shame
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